Here the statute contained the words of forfeiture declaring the effect of the bidder's breach under otherwise similar circumstances. The statutory language, as it applies to the facts in the present case as hereinafter shown, has been so construed since 1924 in MillValley v. Massachusetts Bonding etc. Co., 68 Cal.App. 372 [ 229 P. 891]. We adopt the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Barnard of the District Court of Appeal which reads as follows:

Palo and Dodini v. City of Oakland, 79 Cal.App.2d 739 [ 180 P.2d 764], involved a provision of the Oakland City Charter requiring the deposit of a certified check with a bid and the forfeiture of the check in the event the successful bidder failed to execute the contract. It was held that, restricting the charter language to its most technical limits, as required by the established rule, the explicit and mandatory terms called for a forfeiture and prohibited any relief therefrom. In Mill Valley v. Massachusetts Bonding Insurance Co., 68 Cal.App. 372 [ 229 P. 891], the bond forfeiture declaration of section 10 of the Improvement Act of 1911 (Stats. 1911, p. 730) was brought into question.

) (Gov. Code, § 1504, formerly Pol. Code, §§ 959, 960.) By virtue of the provision of the charter above discussed (§ 72) the foregoing applies to the treasurer's bond. [6] The terms of a statute dealing with official bonds fixing the obligation of the surety within the penal sum specified are read into the bond and become a part of it. (See City of Oakland v. Snow, 145 Cal. 419 [ 78 P. 1060]; Mill Valley v. Massachusetts Bonding etc. Co., 68 Cal.App. 372 [ 229 P. 891]; Bridges v. Price, 95 Cal.App. 394 [ 273 P. 72]; Anthony v. Van, 96 Cal.App. 523 [ 274 P. 563]; San LuisObispo County v. Farnum, 108 Cal. 562, 566 [41 P. 445]; Fresno Enterprise Co. v. Allen, 67 Cal. 505, 508 [8 P. 59]; 23 Cal.Jur. 1017-18; 109 A.L.R. 501.) The authorities generally hold that the obligation of a surety on an official bond continues as long as the holdover officer remains in office and until his successor has qualified.

They are intended to get beneficial results, and while the property owners' rights must be protected by due legal procedure and such definiteness and certainty in plans and specifications as will guard against jerry-building and dishonesty, the tendency to strain at gnats is to be deprecated. The discretion authorized in this instance is reasonable, and is justified by the views expressed in Mill Valley v. Massachusetts Bonding Co., 68 Cal. App. 372, 380 [ 229 P. 891]; Chase v. Trout, 146 Cal. 350, 364 [ 80 P. 81]; Haughawout v. Hubbard, 131 Cal. 675, 679 [63 P. 1078]; Thoits v. Byxbee, 34 Cal.App. 226, 234 [ 167 P. 166]; Burnham v. Abrahamson, 21 Cal.App. 248, 258, 259 [ 131 P. 338]; Burns v. Casey, 13 Cal.App. 154, 168 [101 P. 94]. [5] "Defectiveness in the specifications is charged also because of a clause, in relation to the cement for use in concrete pavements, declaring that the contractor, if requested by the engineer, shall furnish tests of cement made by some reliable chemist, such tests to conform to specifications required by the American Association of Civil Engineers. This, however, is not the only provision concerning such cement.

The cases relied on by the appellant are distinguishable. C.O. Sparks, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Paving Co., 159 Cal.App.2d 513 [ 324 P.2d 293]; W.P. Fuller Co. v. Alturas School Dist., 28 Cal.App. 609 [ 153 P. 743]; Ryan v. Shannahan, 209 Cal. 98 [ 285 P. 1045]; French v. Farmer, 178 Cal. 218 [ 172 P. 1102]; Christie v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 6 Cal.App.2d 710 [ 45 P.2d 263]; and Mill Valley v. Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co., 68 Cal.App. 372 [ 229 P. 891], have no application as they deal with common law bonds, and, furthermore, the court found that the parties intended to have the surety bond extend to third parties or that such intention was expressed in the provisions of the bond. City of Oakland v. De Guarda, 95 Cal.App. 270 [ 272 P. 779, 273 P. 819], concerned a bond issue pursuant to the Street Improvement Act of 1911, and the act specifically provided authority to include third parties.

the property owner is to judge whether he will protest against or acquiesce in the proposed improvement"; McIvor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., supra, p. 253 [5]: ". . . where the excavation is actually deeper or is conducted in a different and more dangerous manner than stated in the notice, the notice is insufficient" (emphasis added); Fay v. Reed, 128 Cal. 357, 360 [ 60 P. 927]: "The resolution . . . is for the purpose of enabling the owners of property, which would be liable for the cost of the improvement, to determine whether they will file written objections and so postpone the work"; Shepherd v. Chapin, 45 Cal.App. 645, 648 [ 188 P. 571]: "Under all the circumstances it is incredible that there could exist any misunderstanding as to which plans and specifications furnished the description of the work to be done. . . . This allegation [variable cost of iron or steel] is a mere opinion. It does not show what the difference in cost is, or how it may injuriously affect the property owner"; Mill Valley v. Massachusetts Bonding etc. Co., 68 Cal.App. 372, 381 [ 229 P. 891]: "There is no evidence that the difference in these requirements would vary materially the cost. The objection is without merit"; Bou v. Willits, 61 Cal.App. 32, 37 [ 214 P. 519]: ". . . but minor defects such as are here involved in such notice ought not to be allowed to constitute a failure of publication where such notice is manifestly sufficient to call the attention of the property owner to what is proposed to be done and does not have the effect of misleading him.

[3] The right of municipalities to require guarantee deposits to accompany bids, and to forfeit them in the event of the failure or refusal of the successful bidder to enter into the contract, has long been upheld. (44 C.J. 337, § 2505, and cases there cited, including Mill Valley v. Massachusetts Bonding etc. Co., 68 Cal.App. 372 [ 229 P. 891].) Plaintiffs argue that defendants here presented no evidence showing that they were damaged in any way and allege that the retention of the deposit was unlawful and unjust enrichment.

[1] It is established that when the legislature has, by statute, prescribed the mode and manner in which a right may be exercised, the courts are without authority to make a change. ( Town of Mill Valley v. Massachusetts Bonding etc. Co., 68 Cal.App. 372, 378 [ 229 P. 891]; J.B. Orcutt Co. v. Green, 204 U.S. 96 [ 27 Sup. Ct. 195, 51 L.Ed. 390]; In re Harris Bros., 5 F. Supp. 191; People v. Osgood, 104 Cal.App. 133, 137 [ 285 P. 753]; United States Gypsum Co. v. Hart,(Cal.App.) 54 P.2d 517; Mello v. County of Tulare, 99 Cal.App. 268 [ 278 P. 465]; Thompson v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App. 73 [ 35 P.2d 185].) REPORTER'S NOTE. — In the case of United States Gypsum Co. v. Hart, a hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on April 2, 1936.

( State v. McGuire, 46 W. Va. 328 [76 Am. St. Rep. 822, 33 S.E. 313].) To the same effect are Town of Mill Valley v. Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co., 68 Cal.App. 372, 378 [ 229 P. 891], and Malachowski v. Varro, 76 Cal.App. 207, 213 [ 244 P. 936]. No case is cited which goes so far as to hold that in a bond of this character, not only the statute in force when the bond is written, but amendments not then contemplated, enter into the surety's contract.

The reference to the statute as amended in 1923 is so obviously a mistaken reference to the statute as amended in 1925 that it must be so read, under the authorities above cited, and as a matter of plain common sense. Further support for this construction of the bond is found in Town of Mill Valley v. Massachusetts etc. Co., 68 Cal.App. 372 [ 229 P. 891]. [4] Appellant insists that since surety contracts are to be construed strictissimi juris it cannot be held beyond the express letter of the bond.