Opinion
Civ. No. AMD 03-3020.
March 31, 2005
ORDER
Plaintiff, Jerry Miles ("Miles"), is a member and steward of defendant Teamsters Local 355 ("Local 355"), a Maryland-based constituent of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL-CIO ("IBT"). Defendant Keith Biddle ("Biddle") is also a member of Local 355 and, at the times relevant to this case, was its Recording Secretary and Business Agent. Plaintiff has purported to sue Biddle in his "official capacity" as an officer of Local 355. Miles brought a "free speech" claim for damages and injunctive relief against defendants pursuant to sections 101(a)(2) and 102 the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(2), 412. Miles also asserts a state law claim for battery. Jurisdiction is present under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367.
Section 101(a)(2) provides:
(2) Freedom of speech and assembly
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2).
Section 102 provides:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is located.29 U.S.C. § 412.
The gravamen of the claims here is straightforward. In sum, during the spring of 2002, Miles opposed a plan favored by Local 355's union leadership to pay the entry fees of the local's delegates in the James R. Hoffa Memorial Golf Tournament during their attendance at an IBT convention to be held in Las Vegas. Specifically, during a union meeting, Miles put forth a proposal ("the golf resolution") that would have prohibited Local 355 from incurring the full costs of the delegates' participation in the tournament. Although Miles's proposal garnered significant support among the union membership, the proposal ultimately failed when all votes had been counted.
Miles, a self-described "dissident" who had also opposed a dues increase supported by the Local 355 leadership, alleges that the Local 355 leadership, including Biddle and President Denis Taylor, strongly resented his vigorous opposition to the local's financing of the golf tournament entry fees. Several months after Miles's proposal had been defeated by vote of the union membership, i.e., during the fall of 2002, Miles and Biddle attended a union-sponsored seminar held at a hotel in Pennsylvania. During an evening of cocktails in the union-sponsored "Hospitality Room" at the hotel, Biddle remarked on the failed golf resolution. More than an hour later, under hotly disputed circumstances as described by those present, Biddle struck Miles in the face with his fist, either one or two times. Miles fell to floor and suffered minor injuries from the punch or punches thrown by Biddle.
Thereafter, Miles filed misconduct charges against Biddle through the Local 355 and IBT grievance processes. The president of the local, Taylor, at the first stage of the disciplinary proceedings, found no probable cause to discipline Biddle. Thereafter, Miles pursued charges of misconduct against both Biddle and Taylor before an entity of the IBT. Before the completion of that process, Miles filed this action against Local 355 and Biddle.
Miles's principal theory of the case is that Biddle, acting in his "official capacity" as an officer of Local 355, struck him in retaliation for exercising his free speech rights as a union member, i.e., for advancing the golf resolution. Local 355 denies that allegation and contends that Biddle was acting in his personal capacity when he struck Miles. Interestingly, no doubt in an effort to force Local 355 to provide indemnification should Miles prevail on his claim against Biddle, Biddle contends that he was indeed acting in his "official capacity" when he struck Miles, but he contends he struck Miles in self defense.
In any event, upon the completion of discovery, all parties moved for summary judgment in whole or in part. In an informal letter order denying summary judgment, I stated the following, in part:
As much as in any case over which I have ever presided, what is manifest here is the truism that "summary judgment is rarely appropriate in actions in which the litigant's state of mind, motive, or subjective intent is an element of [the] plaintiff's claim." Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 573 S.E.2d 118, 124-25 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is equally true as to similar elements of a defendant's defense. Even more fundamentally, genuine disputes of material fact as to several ultimate issues pervade this record, not least because no party has presented implausible or fantastic evidentiary support for his or its assertions. Finally, credibility determinations (including those resting on demeanor evidence) will drive a factfinder's resolution of several ultimate questions. All these considerations compel the conclusion that summary judgment must be denied, including on the issues of agency and ratification. It is plain from my review of the summary judgment record that a reasonable juror could reasonably reach a verdict for any one of the parties here.
Thereafter, the case was calendared for trial and I conducted a pre-trial conference and a hearing on motions in limine with counsel. It became apparent during the hearing in colloquy with plaintiff's counsel that my abbreviated ruling denying summary judgment had failed to make clear to counsel (although I tried to make it clear during the hearing), that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support Miles's theory that when Biddle struck Miles, it was an act of retaliation taken in Biddle's "official capacity" as an officer of Local 355. I here make clear that summary judgment is entered in favor of Local 355 on that theory. There simply is not a scintilla of evidence in the record to support Miles's theory in that regard.
What remains for trial, as I stated on the record, in addition to the state law claim against Biddle in his individual capacity for battery, is a claim against Local 355 based on the theory of ratification, Miles's alternative theory of liability against Local 355. As I explained on the record, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence of the acts and omissions of Taylor, as the President of Local 355, in representing Biddle in the disciplinary proceedings instituted by Miles after the incident in Pennsylvania, could reasonably support a reasonable juror's finding that Local 355 ratified and approved of Biddle's act in striking Miles (even if Local 355 would not have requested it in advance), and that such ratification constituted an official expression of retaliation against Miles for the exercise of his free speech rights in making the golf resolution. I candidly acknowledged to counsel that I viewed this theory as thin indeed, but, again, drawing the reasonable inferences to which plaintiff is entitled under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, jury questions, not issues of law, are presented.
It is SO ORDERED.