Opinion
24A-CR-256
08-09-2024
Raphael Israel Miles, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Yvette M. LaPlante, Gonterman & Meyer, LLC. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita, Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak.
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Vanderburgh Superior Court The Honorable Robert J. Pigman, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 82D03-2210-F6-6255.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Yvette M. LaPlante, Gonterman & Meyer, LLC.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita, Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Raphael Miles appeals his conviction for domestic battery committed in the presence of a child, a Level 6 felony. Miles argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence regarding the victim. We, however, disagree and, accordingly, affirm.
Issue
[¶2] Miles raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence regarding the victim.
Facts
[¶3] Miles and A.C. dated for several years and had one daughter, A.M. ("Daughter"), who was born in October 2021. In February 2022, Miles and A.C. ended their relationship, and A.C. "move[d] out." Tr. Vol. II p. 34. At the time, A.C. had been taking prescribed Suboxone.
"Suboxone is the combination of two different drugs, a partial opioid agonist and a pure opioid antagonist, that is used to treat opioid addiction. It suppresses withdrawal symptoms and cravings for opioids, which can help prevent relapse." In re Adoption of S.P., 172 N.E.3d 344, 349 n.5 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (citation omitted).
[¶4] The parties disputed at trial which parent had "custody" of Daughter;however, according to Miles, he was the primary caregiver for Daughter, and Mother visited Daughter twice per week. On July 18, 2022, Miles petitioned to establish paternity of Daughter. The paternity court held a hearing on the petition in August 2022.
No court documents discussing custody arrangements at this time were presented to the jury in this case.
[¶5] On October 11, 2022, A.C. picked up Daughter from Miles to take her to a birthday party. A.C., however, did not return Daughter to Miles after the party. The next day, October 12, 2022, the paternity court issued an order adjudicating Miles' paternity of Daughter and setting a custody hearing for December 2022. On October 14, 2022, Miles filed a motion in the paternity court to establish custody or parenting time before the December hearing; however, the paternity court did not rule on this motion before the charged offense in this case took place.
According to Miles, he called the police when A.C. did not return Daughter, although the record is silent regarding what transpired from this call.
[¶6] On October 17, 2022, A.C. was inside a gas station convenience store with Daughter in a stroller when Miles and his girlfriend, T.M., arrived in the parking lot. A.C. left the store but quickly returned inside, followed by Miles. Miles entered the store and attempted to greet Daughter in the stroller; however, A.C. wheeled the stroller around so that Miles could not face Daughter. As Miles bent over to pick up Daughter, A.C. shouldered Miles away from the stroller, and Miles pushed A.C., causing her to take a few steps back. A.C. then moved the stroller to the corner of the store and covered the stroller with her body. T.M. was in the store at this point, and she and Miles pried Daughter from the stroller. Miles left the store with Daughter; however, T.M. remained and fought with A.C. One witness described Miles' demeanor in the store as "[a]ngry." Tr. Vol. II p. 45.
T.M. later pleaded guilty to several offenses based on her conduct.
[¶7] The State ultimately charged Miles with domestic battery committed in the presence of a child, a Level 6 felony, for pushing A.C. Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine to preclude Miles from offering evidence regarding his and A.C.'s "family court matters regarding" Daughter. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 37. The State argued that these matters were irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court granted the motion.
The transcript for the hearing on this motion is not included in the record; the record contains only the Chronological Case Summary entry reflecting the trial court's ruling.
[¶8] A jury trial commenced in November 2023. A.C. testified that she continues to take prescribed Suboxone. She further testified that when she picked up Daughter from Miles' home for the birthday party, she told Miles that she did not "know when" she would return Daughter to him. Tr. Vol. II p. 37. Regarding the gas station incident, A.C. testified that Miles "pushed" A.C. because "[Miles] wanted [A.C.] to get away from [Daughter] so [Miles] could take his baby." Id. at 28-29. A soundless video recording of the gas station incident was admitted as State's Exhibit 1.
[¶9] Following the State's case-in-chief, Miles requested a hearing outside the presence of the jury to make an offer of proof. The offer of proof included a 2021 Department of Child Services ("DCS") report that substantiated a finding of neglect against A.C. based on the circumstances of Daughter's birth. The report found that A.C. used marijuana while pregnant with Daughter and that Daughter was born exposed to this substance. The report also indicated that A.C. took prescribed Suboxone and that Miles was Daughter's primary caregiver. Additionally, during the offer of proof, Miles testified that A.C. had previously been convicted of possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and unlawful possession of a syringe. Miles claimed that A.C. told him she would return Daughter later that night after the party but that A.C. failed to do so. Miles claimed that he acted in defense of Daughter at the gas station; he took Daughter because of A.C.'s history of neglect, including failing to change Daughter's diaper, failing to supervise Daughter, and using illegal drugs.
[¶10] Miles argued that the trial court should find the DCS report and the evidence regarding A.C.'s history of drug use admissible notwithstanding the motion in limine because it would "explain [Miles'] action and what he was thinking and feeling at the time" of the gas station incident. Id. at 62. The State argued that A.C.'s history of drug use was not relevant and would confuse the jury. The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible.
Both parties treat this evidence as excluded by the trial court's motion in limine ruling precluding evidence regarding "family court matters." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 37. Again, the transcript of the hearing on this motion is not included in the record.
[¶11] Miles then testified in his own defense. Miles testified that, after A.C. moved out, A.C. "bounced around" and was "homeless," and Daughter often had diaper rashes and was sick when A.C. would return her to Miles. Id. at 71, 72. Regarding the gas station incident, Miles claimed that he just wanted to "visit" with Daughter and "make sure she was okay." Id. at 79. He also testified that he only pushed A.C. because she "pushed [him] initially ...." Id. at 81. On cross-examination, Miles conceded that Daughter "was not being harmed" by A.C. at the gas station. Id. The trial court instructed the jury on Miles' claim of defense of others.
[¶12] The jury found Miles guilty as charged, and the trial court entered judgment of conviction. The trial court sentenced Miles to two years in the Department of Correction with all but two days suspended to probation. Miles now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[¶13] Miles argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the DCS report and evidence regarding A.C.'s history of drug use. Miles argues that this evidence was relevant because he "was acting to protect [Daughter] from what he reasonably believed was unlawful treatment, given [A.C.'s] unstable history, prior drug use, and her neglect." Appellant's Br. p. 11. We find that any error in the exclusion of this evidence was harmless.
[¶14] We review challenges to the admission of evidence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Combs v. State, 168 N.E.3d 985, 990 (Ind. 2021). We will reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259-60 (Ind. 2013). "The effect of an error on a party's substantial rights turns on the probable impact of the impermissible evidence upon the jury in light of all the other evidence at trial." Gonzales v. State, 929 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. 2010). "The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction." Pelissier v. State, 122 N.E.3d 983, 988 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied.
[¶15] Here, Miles claimed that he acted in defense of Daughter. "Self-defense is a legal justification for an otherwise criminal act." Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367, 376 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (citing Gammons v. State, 148 N.E.3d 301, 304 (Ind. 2020)), trans. denied. The self-defense statute provides that a person "has the right to use 'reasonable force against any other person to protect . . . a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.'" Id. (quoting Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c)). Like all evidence, however, evidence marshalled in favor of a defense must comply with the rules of evidence. See Schermerhorn v. State, 61 N.E.3d 375, 379 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (noting that "both a defendant and the prosecutor 'must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence'") (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1049 (1973)), trans. denied.
[¶16] The State argued that the evidence here was inadmissible because it was irrelevant and prejudicial. Pursuant to Evidence Rule 402, relevant evidence is generally admissible, whereas "[i]rrelevant evidence is not admissible." Evidence is relevant if: "(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." Evid. R. 401. Even relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." Evid. R. 403. Here, the trial court ruled that the DCS report and other evidence regarding A.C.'s history of drug use was inadmissible under these rules. Miles challenges this ruling.
[¶17] We conclude that, whether or not the evidence was relevant and admissible, the exclusion of this evidence was harmless. Miles was only authorized to use force against A.C. in defense of Daughter if Miles reasonably believed Daughter was at risk of "imminent use of unlawful force" by A.C. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c). Nothing about the DCS report or A.C.'s history of drug use indicated that Daughter was at risk of any imminent unlawful force by A.C. We, thus, disagree with Miles' argument that "the [omitted] evidence would lead one to infer that [A.C.] was abusive" toward Daughter in a physical manner. Appellant's Br. p. 15. Moreover, Miles admitted at trial that Daughter "was not being harmed" by A.C. at the gas station, and he offered no evidence that A.C. had ever physically harmed Daughter beforehand. Tr. Vol. II p. 81. Thus, any error in the exclusion of the challenged evidence would be harmless.
Conclusion
[¶18] Any error in the exclusion of the challenged evidence would be harmless. Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶19] Affirmed.
Crone, J., and Bradford, J., concur.