Opinion
NUMBER 13-16-00481-CR
06-29-2017
JOVAN MILES, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 94th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Contreras, and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant Jovan Miles challenges his conviction for continuous trafficking of persons. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20A.03(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 49, 2017 R.S.). A jury convicted Miles and sentenced him to forty years' confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID). By one issue, Miles challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Miles was convicted of continuously trafficking a fifteen-year-old girl, E.B., a first-degree felony. See id. In relevant part, the indictment charged Miles with knowingly trafficking E.B. by compelling her to engage in prostitution more than once from January 2015 to March 2015. See id.; see also id. § 20A.02(7)(H) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 49, 2017 R.S.); id. § 43.05(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 49, 2017 R.S.).
The State presented multiple witnesses from the Corpus Christi Police Department. Stephen Day, a Corpus Christi Police Department detective, testified that on March 4, 2015, he received a tip from a Houston Police Department detective that a minor girl was prostituting herself through online ads. Detective Day explained that, after receiving the tip, he worked undercover and contacted E.B. via the ad's listed phone number. Detective Day and E.B. agreed on a time and place to meet, as well as a fee to be paid for her services. According to Detective Day, E.B. instructed him to meet her in room 130 at a Days Inn located in Corpus Christi; upon his arrival, Detective Day took E.B. into custody. He testified that he subsequently determined E.B. was fifteen years old.
Michael Ilse, a Corpus Christi Police Department detective, explained to the jury that he verified with the Days Inn management staff that room 130 was registered to Miles from March 2 through March 4, 2015. It is undisputed the Days Inn room registration information contained Miles's name, address, telephone number, and driver's license number.
FBI Agent Ryan Schultz, who worked with Detective Ilse on this case, testified that he discovered additional Days Inn reservations made using Miles's personal information. According to Agent Schultz, those reservations reflected various dates in mid-January and February. Agent Schultz further testified that after he obtained records from a Red Roof Inn location in Houston, E.B. explained to him that she and Miles had also been together at that particular Red Roof Inn. Agent Schultz testified that, based on this information, he and Detective Ilse determined some of E.B.'s trafficking also occurred in Houston. Agent Schultz explained the Red Roof Inn records were very similar to the Days Inn records because, like the Days Inn records, they included Miles's name and home address. The Red Roof Inn records admitted as State Exhibit 38 reflected reservations made for: January 15-16, 2015; January 18-19, 2015; February 4-6, 2015; and February 17-18, 2015.
Detective Day testified that E.B.'s ads were posted on the website Backpage.com. Detective Ilse stated that he issued a subpoena to Backpage.com requesting subscriber information for E.B.'s postings. Detective Ilse explained that E.B.'s ads were posted in both Houston and Corpus Christi through Miles's personal e-mail address.
According to Detective Day, Backpage.com is an internet advertising program utilized for services including those "directed toward adult services such as escorts, body rubs, [and] massages . . . ."
According to Detective Ilse's and Agent Schultz's testimony, E.B. initially identified her trafficker to authorities as someone other than Miles. Both officials further stated that E.B. later identified Miles as her trafficker when she signed her name on his picture during questioning. According to Agent Schultz, E.B. acknowledged her earlier deliberate misrepresentation of Miles's identity. He also explained that this behavior is common among individuals who are subject to child trafficking because of their desire to protect their traffickers from harm.
Carol McLaughlin, who was employed as a forensic nurse in 2015, testified about the medical examination she performed on E.B. on March 4, 2015. McLaughlin explained that as part of E.B.'s medical history, E.B. communicated she had been transported by her "pimp" between Corpus Christi and Houston for purposes of prostituting herself.
E.B. testified that she had been with Miles for about six to eight weeks—from January 2015 until March 4, 2015. She testified that Miles posted all her Backpage.com ads, decided each city in which she would "work" and each hotel in which she would stay, and transported her between locations. E.B. stated that Miles first had her work in Houston at the Red Roof Inn, and when he decided to leave Houston to "work somewhere different," he had her work at the Days Inn in Corpus Christi. During her testimony, E.B. agreed that she relinquished all the money she earned from her "dates" to Miles. E.B. also testified she deliberately misrepresented her trafficker's true identity to authorities when she was first questioned in March 2015.
The defense called Miles as a witness. Miles testified that he knew E.B. for less than thirty days, beginning around mid-February 2015. While Miles did not dispute that his e-mail address was being used to post E.B.'s Backpage.com ads, he testified that he did not personally post those ads; instead, according to Miles, E.B.'s father arranged all of her hotel reservations. Miles admitted to trafficking E.B. in Corpus Christi from March 2, 2015 to March 4, 2015; however, he disputed that he trafficked E.B. at any other time outside of that March time frame.
The jury convicted Miles of continuous trafficking of persons and sentenced him to forty years of confinement in the TDCJ-ID. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The Jackson standard "tasks the factfinder with resolving conflicts in testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences from basic facts." Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see also Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). It is presumed that the factfinder resolved conflicts, supported by the record, in favor of the verdict, and the appellate court will defer to that determination. Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448. Consequently, contradictory testimony from a witness does not render the evidence insufficient. Davila v. State, 147 S.W.3d 572, 575 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, pet. ref'd); Mercado v. State, 695 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1985), aff'd en banc, 718 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The appellate court will "determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and cumulative force of all the evidence . . . ." Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448. In evaluating the cumulative force of all the evidence, "[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
As the trier of fact, the jury is "the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the strength of the evidence." Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). As such, a jury is free to believe or disbelieve any portion of the testimony of any witness. Matamoros v. State, 500 S.W.3d 58, 65 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.); see also Moreno v. State, 1 S.W.3d 846, 855 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. ref'd).
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc). A hypothetically correct jury charge "would be one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.; see Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A person commits the offense of continuous trafficking of persons "if, during a period that is thirty or more days in duration, the person engages two or more times in conduct that constitutes an offense under section 20A.02 [trafficking of persons] against one or more victims." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20A.03(a). A person commits trafficking of persons "if the person knowingly . . . traffics a child and by any means causes the trafficked child to engage in, or become the victim of, conduct prohibited by . . . Section 43.05 (Compelling Prostitution)." Id. § 20A.02(a)(7)(H); see id. § 43.05(a)(2).
According to the penal code, a "child" is defined as "a person younger than 18 years of age." Id. § 20A.01(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 49, 2017 R.S.). Additionally, "'[t]raffic' means to transport, entice, recruit, harbor, provide, or otherwise obtain another person by any means." Id. § 20A.01(4).
IV. DISCUSSION
Miles concedes he trafficked E.B. from March 2 to March 4, 2015. However, by his sole issue on appeal, Miles contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of continuously trafficking E.B. He asserts E.B.'s testimony, which conflicts with his own, is inconsistent and not credible enough to convict him of trafficking her for thirty days or more. The State responds that E.B.'s testimony itself is sufficient to support Miles's conviction. Considering E.B.'s testimony in connection with the testimony provided by the State's additional witnesses, we agree with the State.
At trial, E.B. testified concerning the duration of her relationship with Miles and explained that she worked for Miles for about six to eight weeks. In her testimony, she also indicated that Miles posted all the Backpage.com ads soliciting her services and that he drove her between Houston and Corpus Christi on multiple occasions to meet with men. It is undisputed that E.B. was fifteen years old throughout her relationship with Miles.
In cases involving minors connected with sexual offenses, courts give wide latitude to testimony provided by minors involved in the conduct. See Gonzales Soto v. State, 267 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, no pet.). The court cannot expect a minor to give testimony with the same level of clarity and assurance as testimony that would be given by a mature and capable adult. See Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 134 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc); see also TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a)-(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 49, 2017 R.S.) ("A conviction under Chapter 21, Section 20A.02(7) . . . is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of the sexual offense . . . . [T]he requirement that the victim inform another person of an alleged offense does not apply if at the time of the alleged offense the victim was a person 17 years of age or younger[.]").
Moreover, the State's additional witnesses corroborated much of E.B.'s testimony. The testimony of Detectives Day and Ilse, FBI Agent Schultz, and McLaughlin support E.B.'s claim that Miles trafficked E.B. in Houston at the Red Roof Inn and in Corpus Christi at the Days Inn, beginning on or around mid-January and lasting through March 4, 2015. The hotel reservations made using Miles's personal information and E.B.'s Backpage.com ads posted through Miles's personal e-mail address, also support E.B.'s claim. Despite Miles's contention that E.B. lied about her trafficker's identity, Agent Schultz testified that E.B. specifically identified Miles as her trafficker during questioning.
The State argues, and we agree, that E.B.'s contradictory and conflicting testimony does not render the evidence insufficient to convict Miles of the continuous trafficking of persons offense. See Davila, 147 S.W.3d at 575. Despite Miles's denial that he continuously trafficked E.B., the jury is presumed to have believed E.B.'s testimony that Miles compelled her into prostitution two or more times during a period of thirty days or longer. See Matamoros, 500 S.W.3d at 65; see also Moreno, 1 S.W.3d at 855. Because the jury is presumed to have resolved any inconsistencies between E.B.'s and Miles's testimony in favor of the State, we defer to the jury's decision to believe the testimony of E.B. and other witnesses that Miles continuously trafficked E.B. See Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448. Provided that the jury is the trier of fact and sole judge of a witness's credibility, it is not this Court's responsibility to question a witness's credibility when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. See Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 271. Thus, to the extent Miles challenges E.B.'s credibility as a witness in this case, we defer to the jury's assessment. See Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 271.
Miles concludes his brief by contending the evidence is insufficient because the State failed to prove he had sex with E.B. for thirty days or more. However, in this case, it was not necessary to prove this assertion in order to convict Miles of continuous trafficking of persons. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20A.03(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 49, 2017 R.S.); TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Viewing all the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdict, and evaluating the cumulative force of all evidence presented, direct and circumstantial, a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Miles knowingly and continuously trafficked E.B. by causing her to engage in prostitution more than once over a period of thirty days or more. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Thus, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to show that Miles committed the offense of continuous trafficking of persons, as defined by the statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN. § 20A.03(a).
We overrule Miles's sole issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 29th day of June, 2017.