Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension & Retirement Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan

367 Citing cases

  1. Osborne v. N.Y. State Teamsters Fund

    783 F. Supp. 739 (N.D.N.Y. 1992)   Cited 5 times
    In Osborne v. New York State Teamsters Fund, 783 F. Supp. 739, 745-47 (N.D.N.Y.), reconsideration granted, vacated on other grounds, 792 F. Supp. 177 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), the court criticized Miles because "[t]he fact of the matter is that ERISA does prescribe a limitations period for certain, limited actions brought under § 1132 [ i.e., breach of fiduciary duty by a plan administrator]."

    The parties' disagreement as to the applicable limitations period is understandable, in light of the apparently conflicting law on point. Confusion stems in part from the Second Circuit's decision in Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conf. Pension and Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829, 104 S.Ct. 105, 78 L.Ed.2d 108 (1983). In Miles, the court held that New York State's six-year statute of limitations should apply to actions brought under § 1132.

  2. Larsen v. NMU Pension Trust

    902 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1990)   Cited 45 times
    In Larsen, the Second Circuit applied the six-year limitations period adopted in Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983) for claims arising under ERISA's civil enforcement provision.

    B. Statute of Limitations. In Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829, 104 S.Ct. 105, 78 L.Ed.2d 108 (1983), we adopted a six-year limitations period for actions under ERISA's civil enforcement provision, and held that "[a] plaintiff's ERISA cause of action accrues, and the six-year limitations period begins to run, `when there has been "a repudiation by the fiduciary which is clear and made known to the beneficiaries."'" Id. (quoting Valle v. Joint Plumbing Indus. Bd., 623 F.2d 196, 202 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting In Re Barabash, 31 N.Y.2d 76, 80, 286 N.E.2d 268, 270, 334 N.Y.S.2d 890, 893 (1972))).

  3. Solivan v. Com. Ed. Mut. Benefit Ass'n

    497 N.E.2d 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 1 times

    ) In analyzing the administration of ERISA plans, a relatively deferential standard of review was adopted: the findings of the plan's administrators are to be upheld by the court unless they re found to be either (1) arbitrary and capricious; (2) not supported by substantial evidence; or (3) erroneous on a question of law. ( Wardle v. Central Southeast Southwest Areas Pension Fund (7th Cir. 1980), 627 F.2d 820, 824.) This standard of review is applied in order to avoid excessive judicial intervention in, and interference with, the administration of ERISA plans. ( Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension Retirement Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan (2d Cir. 1983), 698 F.2d 593, 599.) Rather, ERISA seeks to place the primary responsibility for plan administration on the board created by the plan itself; here, the executive board.

  4. Bouchard v. Crystal Coin Shop, Inc.

    843 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988)   Cited 7 times
    Finding that a plan administrator's proposed understanding of the terms of a pension plan that does not "render any Plan provisions superfluous" is not arbitrary and capricious

    In resolving this dispute, we are not free to impose our own view of which interpretation is better or fairer; rather, our inquiry is limited by the rule that "'[w]here both the trustees of a pension plan and a rejected applicant offer rational, though conflicting, interpretations of plan provisions, the trustees' interpretation must be allowed to control.'" Jestings v. New England Tel. Tel. Co., 757 F.2d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund Employee Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829, 104 S.Ct. 105, 78 L.Ed.2d 108 (1983)); see Bachelder v. Communications Satellite Corp., at 521. We are to determine "'whether the [trustees'] actions were arbitrary and capricious in light of the trustees' responsibility to all potential beneficiaries.'"

  5. Mattson v. Farrell Distributing Corp.

    No. 2:00-CV-243 (D. Vt. Jul. 17, 2001)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that a violation of COBRA notice requirement is a statutory claim not analagous to a common law tort for personal injury or damage to personal property so is governed by statute of limitations requirements for economic damages

    Neither COBRA nor ERISA specifies what limitations period should apply to actions based on violations of their provisions. See Myers v. King's Daughters Clinic, 912 F. Supp. 233, 237 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd, 96 F.3d 1445 (5th Cir. 1996); Miles v. N.Y. State Teamsters Conf. Pension Ret. Fund Emp. Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir. 1983). Thus, the Court "must apply the limitations period of the state-law cause of action most analogous to the federal claim,"Sandberg v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 111 F.3d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1927, 1930 (1995); Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267-68 (1985)), so long as application of that statute is not inconsistent with federal law or policy, see Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-7.

  6. Marotta v. Road Carrier Local 707 Welfare Fund

    100 F. Supp. 2d 149 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)   Cited 6 times

    Because ERISA does not prescribe a limitations period for commencement of actions arising under § 1132 for recovery of employee benefits, federal courts will apply the most analogous state statute of limitations. See Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension Retirement Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir. 1983); see generally North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33-35, 115 S.Ct. 1927, 1930-31, 132 L.Ed.2d 27 (1995) ("state statutes have repeatedly supplied the periods of limitations for federal causes of action when the federal legislation made no provision, and in seeking the right state rule to apply, courts look to the state statute most closely analogous to the federal Act in need") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In this case, the Second Circuit has held, and the parties agree, that in New York, the six-year statute of limitations period prescribed by New York C.P.L.R. § 213 for contract actions governs an ERISA benefits claim.

  7. Smith v. Rochester Telephone Business Mktg.

    786 F. Supp. 293 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)   Cited 18 times

    Although "ERISA does not prescribe a limitations period for actions under § 1132, the controlling limitations period is that specified in the most nearly analogous state limitations statute," which in this case is the six-year period of C.P.L.R. § 213. See Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference, Etc., 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829, 104 S.Ct. 105, 78 L.Ed.2d 108 (1983). The next question is when this cause of action accrued.

  8. Evans v. W.E.A. Ins. Trust

    361 N.W.2d 630 (Wis. 1985)   Cited 7 times
    In Evans, we held that the appropriate remedy for the arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits under a health benefits plan was the restoration of payment to the health care providers involved.

    (Emphasis supplied.) Griffis v. Delta Family-Care Disability and Survivorship Plan, 723 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1984); Wolfe v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 710 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1983); Miles v. New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund, 698 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1984); Wardle v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981); Bayles v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1979); Reiherzer v. Shannon, 581 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1978); Brown v. Retirement Committee of Briggs Stratton Retirement Plan, 575 F. Supp. 1073 (E.D. Wis. 1983). See Wolfe, 710 F.2d at 393 n. 8, for cases in the 1st, 2d 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th circuits following this standard of review.

  9. Burke v. PriceWaterHouseCoopers LLP Long Term Disability Plan

    572 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009)   Cited 109 times   5 Legal Analyses
    Holding that limitations periods may start to run after the plaintiff's proof of loss is required, but before her legal claims have accrued

    The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001- 1461, does not prescribe a limitations period for 29 U.S.C. § 1132 actions, the section under which Burke brought her claim. See Miles v. N.Y. State Teamsters Conference Pension Ret. Fund Employee Pension Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir. 1983). Therefore, the applicable limitations period is "that specified in the most nearly analogous state limitations statute." Id.

  10. Guilbert v. Gardner

    480 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007)   Cited 634 times
    Holding that at-will employment agreement including promise to contribute $10,000 annually during employment to pension fund was not covered by Statute of Frauds under Cron because obligation was fixed and performable within one year

    Plaintiff maintains that "[i]n a pension case, 'the limitation period begins to run when there has been repudiation by the fiduciary which is clear and made known to the beneficiaries.'" Plaintiff asserts that Miles v. New York State Teamsters, 698 F.2d 593, 598 (2d Cir.1983) supports this proposition. Not so.