Opinion
CASE NO. 02-CV-72789-DT
February 11, 2003
OPINION AND ORDER
At a session of said Court, held in the U.S. District Courthouse, City of Detroit, County of Wayne, State of Michigan, on FEB 11 2003
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
On July 10, 2002, Petitioner Leon Miles ("Petitioner") filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his state court convictions for possession of cocaine and conspiracy to possess cocaine. Petitioner's sole ground for relief is entrapment in violation of his due process rights. Currently before the Court is Respondent's Motion to Dismiss the habeas petition based on Petitioner's failure to exhaust his state court remedies. For reasons given below, Respondent's motion will be granted and the habeas petition will be dismissed without prejudice.
On October 27, 1999, Jackson County Circuit Judge Alexander C. Perlos held an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's entrapment claim and concluded that Petitioner's conduct "was his own free act and deed." The motion for entrapment was denied. (Entrapment Hearing Tr. at 60).
On January 5, 2000, Petitioner conditionally pleaded guilty in Jackson County Circuit Court to possession of 225 to 649 grams of cocaine, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7403(2)(a)(ii), and conspiracy to possess 225 to 649 grams of cocaine, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.157a; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.7403(2)(a)(ii). On March 2, 2000, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive terms of five to thirty years in prison for the crimes.
Petitioner appealed his convictions to the Michigan Court of Appeals, which denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented. People v. Miles, No. 232942 (Mich.Ct.App. Apr. 19, 2001). Petitioner alleges that he raised the same issues in the Michigan Supreme Court, which denied leave to appeal because it was not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed. People v. Miles, No. 119445 (Mich. Nov. 30, 2001).
Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition through counsel on July 10, 2002. His sole legal argument reads as follows:
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WAS VIOLATED WHERE THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT NO ENTRAPMENT OCCURRED WHERE PETITIONER HAD NO PREDISPOSITION TO COMMIT THE OFFENSE, THE INFORMANT WAS UNSUPERVISED, WAS ALLOWED TO CHOOSE HIS OWN TARGET, RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE SENTENCING CONSIDERATION FOR HIS COOPERATION AND PREYED ON THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE DEFENDANT TO COMMIT THE INSTANT OFFENSE.
Petitioner's brief also contains a section entitled "State Law," wherein Petitioner argues that the Michigan Court of Appeals decision is clearly wrong and will cause an important injustice to Defendant, and the decision conflicts with other decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. (Pet.'s Br. at 8). This Court may only grant an application for writ of habeas corpus if a state court adjudication of a claim resulted in a decision contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of Federal law, or resulted in an "unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Petitioner's assertion that the Court of Appeals decision is "clearly wrong" falls into neither of these categories. As such, the Court will not consider this argument.
Respondent urges the Court to dismiss the habeas petition without prejudice on the ground that Petitioner did not exhaust his claim as a federal constitutional issue in state court. In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner states that he has "exhausted all State remedies available to him at the time of this petition." (Pet. at 2). Specifically, Petitioner states that he "cited federal case law employing a constitutional analysis of the issue, namely United States v. Russell, 411 U.S 423; 93 S.Ct. 163; 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973)." (Pet. at 2).
Federal habeas relief may only be granted to state prisoners after they have exhausted their claims in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) and (c); O'Sullivan v. Boerekel, 526 U.S. 838, 839, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 1730 (1999). "[W]hen a prisoner alleges that his continued confinement for a state court conviction violates federal law, the state courts should have the first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary relief." Id. at 844 (citations omitted). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied if a prisoner invokes one complete round of the state's established appellate review process. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845, 119 S.Ct. at 1732. Merely raising a claim in state court as a state law issue does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Stanford v. Parker, 266 F.3d 442, 451 (6th Cir. 2001).
In this case, Respondent believes he is entitled to a dismissal because although Petitioner did raise the issue of entrapment in the state courts, Respondent contends that "[n]ot once in the State appellate courts did petitioner ever raise this as a constitutional issue." (Resp.'s Br. at 1-2). A review of the record before the Court indicates that in his Leave to Appeal filed with the Michigan Court of Appeals, Petitioner began the Argument section of his brief with "[t]he principle of entrapment has deep historical roots in this state." (Pet.'s App. for Leave to App. at 5). He then proceeded with a discussion of Michigan case law. Petitioner made clear that his entrapment argument was based exclusively on state law as evidenced by the use of phrases such as "constituted entrapment under Michigan case law" (Pet.'s App. for Leave to App. at 1).
One way a petitioner may fairly present the substance of a federal constitutional claim to a state court is by citing "federal decisions using constitutional analysis." Hannah v. Conley, 49 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995). However, in this case, Petitioner has made clear that he was seeking relief only under the theory of entrapment rooted in Michigan case law and cited a federal case only to demonstrate that Michigan courts have relied on federal law in formulating the defense of entrapment (Pet.'s App. for Leave to Appeal at 5). The Court is satisfied that Petitioner has made no full and fair presentation of his constitutional claim to the state court and therefore, has not exhausted his claim in state court.
As pointed out by Respondent, Michigan Court Rules provide a process through which Petitioner may raise his unexhausted claim. Petitioner can file a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.C.R. § 6.500 et seq. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his state court remedies.
Accordingly, the Petition is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). However, although Petitioner's present Petition was timely filed, if this Court dismisses the Petition to allow exhaustion, any subsequent petition filed in federal court after exhaustion in state court will be beyond the one-year statute of limitation period. A federal habeas petition does not toll the statute of limitation. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (2001). Therefore, to avoid the inequity that would result from requiring Petitioner to exhaust his claim only to be precluded from federal habeas review because of the running of the statute of limitation, the Court will equitably toll the statute of limitations for the time this Petition has been pending. See Hargrove v. Brigano, 300 F.3d 717 (6th Cir. 2002).
Petitioner's delayed application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was denied on November 30, 2001. Petitioner then had 90 days to seek a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Petitioner did not do so. Therefore, his convictions became final, for purposes of the one-year limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), on the date that the 90 day time period for seeking certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. See SUP. CT. R. 13(1); Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the one-year statute of limitation began running on March 1, 2002, 90 days after the Michigan Supreme Court denied Petitioner's leave to appeal. Petitioner timely filed this Petition on July 10, 2002.
Consistent with the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Hargrove, the Court imposes certain reasonable conditions on Petitioner. First, Petitioner must pursue state remedies within thirty (30) days of this Court's Order. Second, Petitioner must return to federal court within thirty (30) days of exhausting his state remedies.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and Petitioner's § 2254 Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.