When, as in this case, the basis for the jury's verdict is open to multiple interpretations, the Seventh Amendment permits the district court to reach any interpretation that is supported by the evidence. See Miles v. Indiana , 387 F.3d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “when several issues have been litigated, and the jury may have supported its verdict by finding in the plaintiff's favor on any one of the issues but which one is not clear, the court is free to determine the basis of the jury's verdict unless extrinsic evidence clearly resolves the issue”). The district court must then, of course, avoid contradicting the findings implicit in its interpretation of the verdict when it acts in equity, but it need not avoid conflicting with other interpretations of the verdict.
"When the basis of a jury's verdict is unclear," because several issues were litigated and "the jury may have supported its verdict by finding in the plaintiff's favor on any one of the issues," the district court may properly deny a front pay award when that award would only be supportable by one of the issues. Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591, 600-01 (7th Cir. 2004). In Miles, because the verdict was ambiguous based on the jury's affirmative response to the question, "whether [plaintiff] had 'proven that his complaints of discrimination were more likely than not, a motivating factor in the decision of the defendant . . . to transfer him . . . or fail to promote him?," the trial court held a post-trial evidentiary hearing on why the plaintiff had not been promoted.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). In such cases, the district court has broad discretion to tailor equitable remedies to provide full relief. Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591, 602 (7th Cir. 2004); Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 863-865 (7th Cir. 2001). Successful Title VII plaintiff's are entitled to injunctive relief where the employer's discriminatory conduct "could possibly persist in the future."
But that the "basis of the jury's verdict [wa]s unclear" did not absolve the District Court of its duty to ensure that its disposition of the equitable claim was consistent with any common factual findings underlying the jury's verdict on the legal claims. Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 2004).
But “when the basis of the jury's verdict is unclear, each of the potential theoriessupporting the verdict is open to contention.” Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added) (citing Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1876)); cf. Putnam Res. v. Pateman, 958 F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir. 1992) (requiring “clarity and lack of ambiguity” when interpreting jury findings). III. DISCUSSION
is presumptively entitled to complete relief. Miles v. State of Indiana, 387 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 2004); Hutchinson v. Amateur Elec. Supp., Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1994). The court is authorized "to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but it not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . . or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."
I can't ignore that fact. I am required instead to render an equitable relief ruling that is consistent with what the jury decided. Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591, 599 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 281, 844 (7th Cir 1978)). The jury awarded Phillips $35,000 for her pain and suffering - a sum that is, in my view, simply too large to support the City's contention that the jury found she was retaliated against only on the basis of a five-day suspension and a paid relief of duty.
Under the Seventh Amendment, it is enough that the court adopted a reasonable interpretation of the verdict, supported by the evidence. See Teutscher v. Woodson , 835 F.3d 936, 952 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that where "the basis for the jury's verdict is open to multiple interpretations," a trial court acting in equity may "reach any interpretation that is supported by the evidence"); Miles v. Indiana , 387 F.3d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that where the jury may have found in favor of a party for any of several reasons, "the court is free to determine the basis of the jury's verdict unless extrinsic evidence clearly resolves the issue"); Williams v. First Gov't Mortg. & Invs. Corp. , 225 F.3d 738, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (jury's verdict has "no binding effect on the district court's subsequent factfinding" where "nobody can say what the jury found the facts to be" in light of verdict's generality); Burton v. Armontrout , 975 F.2d 543, 545 (8th Cir. 1992) (where a verdict is ambiguous about the jury's underlying factual findings, a court acting in equity may make its own factual findings). The court did that here when interpreting the jury's verdict to mean there was no enforceable Three Musketeers Agreement.
See, e.g., Teutscher v. Woodson, 835 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2016) ("[I]n a case where legal claims are tried by a jury and equitable claims are tried by a judge, and those claims are based on the same facts, the trial judge must follow the jury's implicit or explicit factual determinations in deciding the equitable claims." (internal quotations marks, citation, and alteration omitted)); Miles v. Indiana, 387 F.3d 591, 599-600 (7th Cir. 2004) (similar); Bartee v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 374 F.3d 906, 912-13 (10th Cir. 2004) (similar). Covidien relies on this logic and advances that the district court erred because the jury technically could have found that Esch both violated the confidentiality provision by publishing the Patent Applications and satisfied his duty to disclose any "Inventions" that were described therein by doing the same.
We set aside a ruling on a motion for restitution only if the judge abused his discretion. See Miles v. Indiana , 387 F.3d 591, 598 (7th Cir. 2004). The same is true of a decision to deny attorney’s fees.