Opinion
CASE NO.: 00-CV-72782-DT
August 21, 2000
OPINION
On June 20, 2000, Plaintiff Gregory Miles filed a pro se complaint against Defendants alleging assault and battery (Count I), unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution (Count II), racial discrimination (Count III), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV), conspiracy (Count V), and libel (Count VI). This matter is currently before the Court on two motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, improper service of process, and failure to state a claim; one filed by Defendants WTMX Radio Network ("WTMX") and Dave Fogel, and a second filed by Defendant Boogie Night Club. In response, Plaintiff filed two "motions for summary judgment." For the reasons stated below, both motions to dismiss shall be granted, and Plaintiffs motions for summary judgment shall be denied as moot.
Background
Plaintiffs cause of action stems from an incident that occurred on or about July 9, 1999, at the Boogie Night Club in Chicago, Illinois, and the events that ensued therefrom. According to Plaintiff, on the night in question, Defendant Fogel, a disc jockey employed by Defendant WTMX, was broadcasting live from the Boogie Night Club. Plaintiff alleges that during his broadcast, Defendant Fogel sought to embarrass him by making various libelous, inflammatory remarks about Plaintiff on the air. Thereafter, a verbal exchange took place between Plaintiff and Defendant Fogel, which escalated into a physical altercation. Because of this altercation, and subsequent assault charges filed by Defendant Fogel, Plaintiff was arrested by the Chicago Police Department and held for several days at the Cook County Jail.
Soon after Plaintiff Miles was released from the Cook County Jail, Defendant Fogel filed two complaints with Cook County, alleging that Plaintiff had been observing him through binoculars at his Chicago home and that Plaintiff had contacted and threatened him. As a result, the Court issued an order restricting Plaintiff from coming within 1,000 yards of Defendant Fogel or his place of work, and from entering the Boogie Night Club. Eventually, Plaintiff was placed in the custody of the Cermack Medical Center for psychological treatment.
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Fogel's allegations against him were untrue and that he is the victim of continual harassment and malicious prosecution by all the named Defendants. Plaintiff further asserts that while he was under the care of the Cermack Medical Center, he was tortiously medicated by the staff and subjected to beatings at the hand of other inmates.
On July 17, 2000, Defendants WTMX and Fogel filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient service of process, improper venue, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the alternative, Defendants WTMX and Fogel request this Court to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In response to Defendants WTMX and Fogel's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a "Combination Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants WTMX Radio, Dave Fogel and Co-Defendant Boogie Night Club and/or Combined Motion to Strike Both Defendants Defenses" on July 25, 2000.
Similarly, on August 4, 2000, Defendant Boogie Night Club filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, improper service, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In response to Defendant Boogie Night Club's motion, Plaintiff filed a "Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment against Co-Defendant Boogie Night Club and/or Amended Motion to Strike the Defendant's Defenses."
Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Theunissen v. Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1458 (6th Cir. 1991). "[I]n the face of a properly supported motion for dismissal, the plaintiff may not stand on his pleadings but must, by affidavit or otherwise, set forth specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction." Id. When, as here, the Court relies upon the parties' pleadings and affidavits, "the plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing that personal jurisdiction exists in order to defeat dismissal." Id. In determining whether Plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the pleadings and affidavits "are received in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id.
Viewing the allegations contained in Plaintiffs pleadings in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court is satisfied that personal jurisdiction over these Defendants is lacking. A federal court sitting in diversity must apply the law of the forum state to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists, subject to constitutional concerns of due process. Id. at 1462. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that Defendants Fogel, WTMX, or Boogie Night Club are subject to personal jurisdiction under Michigan law.
1. Defendant Fogel
Under Michigan law, a court has general personal jurisdiction over an individual defendant if the defendant (1) is present within the state at the time process is served, (2) is domiciled in the State, or (3) has consented to personal jurisdiction in Michigan. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.701. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Fogel was served while present in the State of Michigan, that Defendant Fogel is domiciled in the State of Michigan, or that Defendant Fogel has consented to jurisdiction in Michigan. Defendant Fogel, however, asserts in his affidavit that he "currently lives, and at all times material to the above-captioned action lived, in the State of Illinois," and that he received service of process via certified mail sent to his employer, Defendant WTMX, in Illinois. (Fogel Aff. ¶¶ 3, 8). The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that this Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendant Fogel.
Limited personal jurisdiction over Defendant Fogel is also lacking. Under Michigan law, a court has limited personal jurisdiction over a non-resident individual defendant when the cause of action arises out of certain of the defendants contacts with the state. See MICH COMP. LAWS § 600.705. The only contact that Plaintiff has arguably alleged with respect to Defendant Fogel and the State of Michigans Defendant Fogel's prior employment by a Michigan radio station. Plaintiff himself, however, acknowledges in his complaint that the incident upon which his claims are based occurred in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois, and that at the time of the incident "all Defendants were located in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois." (Compl. ¶ 10). It is clear from Plaintiffs complaint that his claims against Defendant Fogel do not "arise from" Defendant Fogel's prior employment in Michigan, but rather Defendant Fogel's employment by Defendant WTMX in Illinois, as well as Defendant Fogel's live broadcasts from Defendant Boogie Night Club in Illinois and Defendant Fogel's allegedly false claims to the Chicago Police Department in Illinois.
The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that Defendant Fogel is subject to either general or limited personal jurisdiction under Michigan law. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Fogel shall be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
2. Defendant WTMX
Defendant WTMX is a division of Bonneville International Corporation, a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Redd Aff. ¶ 3). Under Michigan law, a court has general personal jurisdiction over a defendant corporation if the corporation (1) is incorporated under the laws of Michigan, (2) consents to personal jurisdiction in Michigan, or (3) carries on a continuous and systematic part of its general business in Michigan. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.711.
As acknowledged by Plaintiff. Defendant WTMX's principal place of business is in Chicago. Illinois. (Compl. ¶ 2, McCarty Aff. ¶ 5). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant WTMX has ever conducted business in Michigan, of whatever nature. Furthermore, Plaintiff has not alleged, nor does the Court believe Plaintiff is able to allege, that Defendant WTMX has consented to personal jurisdiction in Michigan. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has not met his burden of establishing that this Court has general personal jurisdiction over Defendant WTMX.
Under Michigan law, a court has limited personal jurisdiction over a non-resident corporate defendant when the cause of action arises out of certain relationships between a defendant corporation or its agents and the state. See MICH. COMP. LAW'S § 600.715. As previously mentioned, however, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant WTMX has established any contact with the State of Michigan. Furthermore, in his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that all of the incidents giving rise to his claims occurred in Illinois. (Compl. ¶ 10). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing that his claims "arise out of' Defendant WTMX's contact with the State of Michigan. Because Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie showing that this Court has either general or limited jurisdiction over Defendant WTMX, Defendant WTMX's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction shall be granted.
3. Defendant Boogie Night Club
Similar to corporations, under Michigan law, a court has general personal jurisdiction over an unincorporated entity such as a partnership or association if the entity (1) was formed under the laws of Michigan, (2) consented to personal jurisdiction in Michigan, or (3) carries on a continuous and systematic part of its general business in Michigan. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.731. There is no indication that Defendant Boogie Night Club was formed under the laws of Michigan, or consented to personal jurisdiction in Michigan. Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that at all relevant times pertinent hereto" Defendant Boogie Night Club was conducting business in Chicago, Illinois. (Compl. ¶ 4). Therefore, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing general personal jurisdiction over Defendant Boogie Night Club.
Plaintiff has also failed to establish that this Court has limited personal jurisdiction over Defendant Boogie Night Club. Under Michigan law, a court has limited personal jurisdiction over a non-resident unincorporated defendant when the cause of action arises out of certain relationships between the defendant or its agents and the state. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.735. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant Boogie Night Club has established any contact with the State of Michigan. Furthermore, in his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that all of the incidents giving rise to his claims occurred in Illinois. (Compl. ¶ 10). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing that his claims "arise out of" Defendant Boogie Night Club's contact with the State of Michigan.
Because Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing a prima facie showing that this Court has either general or limited jurisdiction over Defendant Boogie Night Club, Defendant Boogie Night Club's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction shall also be granted.
Venue
The Court further finds that venue in this district is improper. Plaintiff has raised both state and federal claims against Defendants. In a civil action in which the federal court's jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship, venue is proper in:
(1) a judicial district where any' defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b).
For purposes of venue, a corporate defendant is "deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction." Id § 1391(c). As discussed supra, the Court is satisfied that neither Defendant WTMX, nor Defendant Boogie Night Club, is subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan and, therefore, neither of these Defendants "reside" in Michigan for purposes of venue. Furthermore, as indicated supra, Defendant Fogel is a resident of Illinois. With respect to the other remaining Defendants, i.e. Cermack Medical Center, the Chicago Police Department, and the Cook County Jail, Plaintiff has failed to allege that any' of these entities "reside" in this state, nor does the Court believe that Plaintiff is able to do so.
It is also clear, based upon the allegations in Plaintiffs complaint, that the incident giving rise to his claims occurred in Chicago, Illinois. Therefore, the Court is satisfied that "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim" did not occur in this district. See Id. § 1391(b). Lastly, the Court is satisfied that none of the Defendants can be "found" in this district. Accordingly, venue in this Court is improper.
A district court in which venue has been improperly laid may "dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought." Id § 1406(a). Plaintiff has raised no arguments in support of transferring this action to another district or that would lead this Court to believe that Plaintiff would be prejudiced by a dismissal instead of transfer. Therefore, Defendants' motions to dismiss for improper venue shall be granted.
In light of the Court's determinations regarding personal jurisdiction and venue, the Court finds it unnecessary to address Defendants' remaining arguments that service of process was improper and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Conclusion
The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over Defendants Fogel, WTMX. and Boogie Night Club, and that venue has been improperly laid in this district. Therefore, Defendants' motions to dismiss shall be granted, and Plaintiffs "motions for summary judgment" shall be denied as moot.
An Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue forthwith.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
On June 20, 2000, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against Defendants alleging assault and battery (Count I), unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution (Count II), racial discrimination (Count III), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV), conspiracy (Count V), and libel (Count VI). This matter is currently before the Court on two motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, improper service of process, and failure to state a claim; one filed by Defendants WTMX Radio Network ("WTMX") and Dave Fogel, and a second filed by Defendant Boogie Night Club. In response, Plaintiff filed two "motions for summary judgment." For the reasons stated in an Opinion issued this date,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants WTMX and Fogel's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs claims against Defendants WTMX and Fogel are DISMISSED, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Boogie Night Club's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs claims against Defendant Boogie Night Club are DISMISSED, and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs motions for summaryjudgment are DENIED AS MOOT.