Opinion
No. 14-06-00010-CV
Memorandum Opinion filed August 29, 2006.
On Appeal from the Probate Court at Law Number Two, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 338,742-401.
Affirmed.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this medical malpractice case, appellants challenge a take-nothing judgment entered after a jury determined that defendant Dr. Michael Caraway did not negligently cause the death of his patient, Jacquelyn Patten Miles. In two issues, appellants challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support this finding and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jacquelyn Miles arrived at the emergency room of Memorial Hermann Southwest Hospital at 1:45 a.m. on February 24, 2003 primarily complaining of abdominal pain. She was seen by Dr. Caraway at 3:50 a.m. Dr. Caraway reviewed Miles's history, conducted a physical examination, and ordered blood work, an EKG, and a chest x-ray. Although the tests revealed some abnormalities, Dr. Caraway testified that the test results were consistent with Miles's age, her history of hypertension, and her use of hypertension medication. Dr. Caraway noted "no acute changes" in his report and did not order any additional tests. He diagnosed Miles as having "acute abdominal pain" and gave her a small dose of Demerol.
When Dr. Caraway met with Miles at 8:00 a.m., she was ambulatory, drinking fluids, her pain had resolved, and her blood pressure was normal. She told Dr. Caraway and a nurse that she would like to go home and sleep in her own bed. Dr. Caraway prescribed additional pain medication, asked Miles to return to the hospital if her condition worsened in any way, and discharged her from the hospital at 8:15 a.m.
At 2:48 p.m., a member of Miles's family called 911 after finding Miles's condition had deteriorated. When Miles arrived at the hospital for the second time, she was no longer responsive, and her blood pressure had become unstable. Tests showed that Miles had blood in her pericardium, which is the sac around the heart. Miles was accordingly diagnosed with a thoracic aortic dissection. She was life-flighted to another facility for emergency surgery, but pronounced dead after the failure of cardiopulmonary resuscitation shortly following her arrival.
Appellants filed suit against Dr. Caraway, claiming he was negligent in failing to diagnose the aortic dissection and sending Miles home, and that this negligence proximately caused Miles's death. The case was tried to a jury. In response to the broad form question of whether "the negligence, if any, of Michael D. Caraway, M.D. proximately cause[d] the occurrence in question," the jury answered "No." The court entered a take nothing judgment, and appellants moved for a new trial on factual sufficiency grounds. The court denied appellants' motion for a new trial, and this appeal ensued.
II. ISSUES Presented
Appellants assert two issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To attack the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue for which a party has the burden of proof, the party must show that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241B42 (Tex. 2001) (explaining standards as they apply to review of findings on adverse issues upon which the party has the burden of proof). When reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence in the record. Id. We may set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. See id.; see also Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). It is fundamental that in conducting this review "an appellate court cannot merely substitute its judgment for that of a jury, because the court cannot exercise its constitutional authority to the detriment of the right of trial by jury, which is of equal constitutional stature." Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1998).
IV. ANALYSIS
Appellants contend that the jury's finding must be overturned because the overwhelming weight of the evidence established that Dr. Caraway was negligent in sending Miles home instead of keeping her in the hospital for further testing and diagnosis of her condition. Appellants' argument is centered around testimony elicited from both Dr. Caraway and his expert Dr. Zimmerman during cross-examination. Specifically, appellants contend that Dr. Caraway and Dr. Zimmerman admitted Dr. Caraway's negligence, and therefore a finding of negligence was the only conclusion the jury could have reached. Having reviewed the evidence in the record, we disagree.
During cross-examination, Dr. Zimmerman testified as follows:
Q: If [Dr. Caraway] looked at this [x-ray] film and said to himself, `I cannot rule out an aneurysmal dilatation,' in order to be reasonable and prudent, you would either: (1) have a radiologist look at the film; (2) have someone else look at the film; or (3) order some other kind of other study, correct?
A: That's correct.
Q: Right here we know it says that aneurysmal dilatation is not excluded. And [Dr. Caraway] testified in his deposition that he saw exactly what the radiologist put in his report, but [Dr. Caraway] didn't ask someone else to review the x-ray for him, did he?
A: No.
Q: [Dr. Caraway] didn't order another x-ray to repeat it, did he?
A: No.
Q: And [Dr. Caraway] did not order any other study, did he?
A: Not that I'm aware of, no.
Because Dr. Caraway admitted on cross-examination that he did not have a radiologist or other expert look at Miles's x-rays, and he did not order additional tests, appellants argue that Drs. Caraway and Zimmerman agree that Dr. Caraway breached the standard of care, and therefore, the evidence must be factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
At the outset, we do not accept the premise that the testimony of Drs. Zimmerman and Caraway amounts to an admission of negligence and renders the evidence factually insufficient. A review of the testimony at trial, taken in context, demonstrates that neither Dr. Caraway nor Dr. Zimmerman conceded that Dr. Caraway had been negligent. To the contrary, both doctors explained why Dr. Caraway had not been negligent in the treatment of Ms. Miles. The testimony introduced at trial established that emergency care focuses on "problem oriented treatment." Miles presented with a chief complaint of mild abdominal pain, which is not consistent with the classic presentation of a thoracic aortic dissection. Dr. Caraway's physical examination of Miles did not reveal problems that were characteristic of a thoracic aortic dissection, but demonstrated abdominal tenderness which she rated as only two or three on a scale of one to ten. Miles responded to pain medication, and improved after her admission to the emergency room. Based on the "entire clinical picture" Miles presented in the emergency room, both Dr. Zimmerman and Dr. Caraway testified that further testing to rule an aortic dissection was not indicated. Both Dr. Caraway and Dr. Zimmerman testified that Dr. Caraway met the standard of care applicable to emergency medicine physicians.
The evidence at trial included testimony that the classic symptoms of aortic dissection include intense chest pains rather than mild abdominal pain.
We also must reject appellants' argument for a second reason. At trial, appellants bore the burden to establish (1) the standard of care applicable to Dr. Caraway; (2) his breach of that standard; (3) injury; and (4) a reasonably close causal connection between the breach of the standard and the injury suffered by Miles. See Wheeler v. Yettie Kersting Mem'l Hosp., 866 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (describing elements of a medical negligence claim). Because expert testimony is required to establish the elements of medical negligence, this case is essentially a "battle of the experts." In a battle of competing expert testimony, it is the sole prerogative of the jury to determine the weight and credibility of the witnesses. See Magee v. Ulery, 993 S.W.2d 332, 336 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding the failure to find a physician negligent was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence where the jury could have believed the defense expert that diagnosis was erroneous but not negligent); Cruz ex rel. Cruz v. Paso Del Norte Health Found., 44 S.W.3d 622, 646 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied) (holding that the failure to find a nurse negligent was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence where opinions of experts for both parties conflicted).
See Am. Transitional Care Ctrs of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 876 (Tex. 2001).
At trial, the experts offered conflicting opinions on the applicable standard of care and causation. Thus, the jury was authorized to find the testimony indicating negligence less credible than the testimony supporting Dr. Caraway. See Winkle v. Tullos, 917 S.W.2d 304, 318 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ denied) (holding that the jury's failure to find negligence was supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence because conflicting expert testimony was offered on the use of a tourniquet during knee surgery). As the trier of fact, the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Banner Life Ins. Co. v. Pacheco, 154 S.W.3d 822, 829B30 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The jury may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another and resolve any inconsistencies in the testimony. Eberle v. Adams, 73 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). Because there is evidence in the record to support the jury's determination that Dr. Caraway was not negligent, the verdict is not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Pacheco, 154 S.w.3d at 829B30 ("we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if we would reach a different answer on the evidence.").
Dr. Caraway testified that Miles's test results were consistent with Miles's age, medical history, and medication; Dr. Caraway's expert, Dr. Zimmerman, agreed that Miles's x-ray results were "not unexpected" in someone with long-standing hypertension. Dr. Zimmerman further testified that Miles's pain was not consistent with aortic dissection. Appellants' expert Dr. Fromm testified that a reasonable emergency medicine physician would have admitted Miles to a cardiac or intensive care unit based on her complaints of epigastric pain and her abnormal EKG results, but did not contradict Dr. Caraway's testimony that the test results were explained by Miles's known hypertension and medication. Appellants' experts Drs. Fromm and Bhatia testified that Dr. Caraway should have ordered a CT scan, but neither testified that the scan would have shown that Miles had an aortic dissection.
Finally, we are unpersuaded by appellants' argument because it is logically flawed. Even if we agreed with appellants that Dr. Caraway essentially admitted breaching the standard of care, the jury still could have found that the breach did not proximately cause Miles's death. Significantly, no witness testified that Dr. Caraway should have been aware of the need for emergency surgery based on his examination of the patient, her history, her test results, or her complaints. No witness testified Dr. Caraway breached the standard of care by failing to order emergency surgery; rather, appellants' witnesses testified that Dr. Caraway was required to perform additional actions that, appellants imply, would in turn have indicated the need for surgery. But, appellants offered no evidence that if Dr. Caraway had obtained a second interpretation of the x-ray from a radiologist or "someone else," or had ordered "some other kind of other study," he would have discovered that Miles had an aortic dissection requiring emergency surgery. In fact, the x-ray was reviewed by a radiologist after Miles's death, and the radiologist's report did not indicate that Miles had an aortic dissection or required emergency surgery; to the contrary, the radiologist's report was consistent with Dr. Caraway's interpretation of the x-ray. Although appellant also offered the testimony of Drs. Fromm and Bhatia that a reasonable emergency medicine physician would have ordered a CT scan on the morning of February 24 based on Miles's complaints, x-ray, and test results, neither doctor testified that a CT scan would have revealed the aortic dissection or the need for surgery. Moreover, Dr. Bhatia admitted that one can only speculate regarding what the CT scan would have shown at that time. Thus, even if the jury found that Dr. Caraway breached the standard of care, the jury was also entitled to find that Dr. Caraway's negligence, if any, did not proximately cause Miles's death.
Appellants argue that Chumley v. Barhorst, No. 01-03-01342-CV, 2005 WL 856887 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] April 14, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) is directly on point and dictates reversal in this case. Chumley sued Barhorst for negligently driving through an intersection against the light and colliding with Chumley's vehicle. Barhorst was in the midst of a seizure at the time of the accident, and admitted that, given his history of seizures, it was foreseeable that he might have a seizure while driving. Moreover, when asked if he knew "beyond any doubt" that the crash was his fault and "no one else's fault" but his, Barhorst agreed. Id. at *4. Here, neither Dr. Caraway nor Dr. Zimmerman testified that it was or should have been foreseeable to Dr. Caraway that Miles would die without emergency surgery, and neither testified that Miles's death was Dr. Caraway's fault.
We accordingly overrule appellants' first issue.
In their second issue, appellants claim that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a new trial. The trial court's denial of a motion for new trial will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. 1984). Here, we have held that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the verdict. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial. See, e.g., In re D.J., 100 S.W.3d 658, 668 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (denying motion for new trial on basis of factual sufficiency).
IV. CONCLUSION
We hold the evidence is factually sufficient to support the jury's findings. We further hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion for new trial. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.