Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 14-0532
09-24-2015
DEJAN MILADINOVIC, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. CHARLES FLANAGAN, in his personal capacity, Defendant/Appellee.
COUNSEL Dejan Miladinovic, Peoria Plaintiff/Appellant Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson By Marjorie S. Becklund Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2014-070633
The Honorable Eileen S. Willett, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Dejan Miladinovic, Peoria
Plaintiff/Appellant
Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson
By Marjorie S. Becklund
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Donn Kessler and Judge Patricia K. Norris joined. GOULD, Judge:
¶1 Dejan Miladinovic ("Miladinovic") appeals from the trial court's grant of Charles Flanagan's ("Flanagan") motion to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 At all times relevant to this case, Flanagan was serving as the Director of the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections ("ADJC"). As Director, Flanagan was responsible for enforcing ADJC Policy 4052.03, which prohibited ADJC employees from bringing guns onto ADJC school premises and parking lots. This Policy was based on Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-2514.
A.R.S. §§ 13-2514(A)(1), (C) provides, in relevant part, that: "A person, not otherwise authorized by law, commits promoting secure care facility contraband by knowingly doing any of the following... [t]aking contraband onto the grounds of or into a secure care facility under the jurisdiction of the department of juvenile corrections... [p]romoting secure care facility contraband if the contraband is a deadly weapon, dangerous instrument or explosive is a class 2 felony. . ."
¶3 Miladinovic, a temporary employee at ADJC's Adobe Mountain School, wrote a letter to Flanagan questioning the Policy. Specifically, Miladinovic argued the Policy violated A.R.S. § 12-781 by preventing him from storing his gun in his vehicle in the ADJC parking lot. Miladinovic also asserted the Policy violated A.R.S. § 12-781 because ADJC did not provide him with a secure storage facility to store his gun while he was working at the school. A.R.S. § 12-781(C)(3)(c)
A.R.S. § 12-781(A) states that "A property owner, tenant, public or private employer or business entity shall not establish, maintain or enforce a policy or rule that prohibits a person from lawfully transporting or lawfully storing any firearm that is both ...[i]n the person's locked and privately owned motor vehicle or in a locked compartment on the person's privately owned motorcycle" and "[n]ot visible from the outside of the motor vehicle or motorcycle." --------
¶4 Flanagan informed Miladinovic by letter that he could not bring his gun onto ADJC school property. Flanagan advised Miladinovic that he would pursue criminal charges if he brought his gun to work. However, when Miladinovic subsequently brought his gun into the ADJC school parking lot, Flanagan took no action. Flanagan did not file a disciplinary action or pursue criminal charges against Miladinovic.
¶5 Miladinovic filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief seeking a declaration of his rights under A.R.S. §§ 12-781 and 12-2514 against Flanagan in his personal capacity. Specifically, Miladinovic alleged:
This action shall in no way be construed as an action against a state, department, agency or office of a state or any political subdivision thereof, or against an officer or agent of the state in his official capacity or other lawful capacity. Instead this is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against another person... (emphasis added).
¶6 Soon after filing his lawsuit, Miladinovic's temporary work assignment with ADJC was terminated. Flanagan filed a motion to dismiss Miladinovic's complaint, and the trial court granted the motion. Miladinovic timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
¶7 We review a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 (2012). We will affirm the dismissal of a complaint "only if the plaintiff is not entitled to relief 'under any facts susceptible of proof under the claims stated.'" Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 189 Ariz. 398, 402 (App. 1997) (quoting Donnelly Constr. Co. v. Oberg/Hunt/Gilleland, 139 Ariz. 184, 186 (1984) (overturned on other grounds)). We assume the truth of all of the complaint's material allegations and give the plaintiff "the benefit of all inferences which the complaint can reasonably support." Luchanski v. Congrove, 193 Ariz. 176, 179, ¶ 17 (App. 1998) (quoting Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins. Co., 154 Ariz. 502, 508 (App. 1987)).
¶8 The superior court dismissed Miladinovic's complaint, in part, because there is "no legal relationship" between the parties. We agree.
¶9 Here, Miladinovic seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against Flanagan personally, and not in his official capacity as Director of ADJC. However, Flanagan only had the authority to enforce or change ADJC Policy 4052.03 in his official capacity as Director of ADJC; he had no such authority in his personal capacity. See A.R.S. § 41-2804 (stating that the Director for ADJC has the authority to establish and enforce the overall operation and policies of the department). Indeed, Flanagan no longer is employed as the Director for ADJC.
¶10 Accordingly, because Miladinovic did not seek declaratory and injunctive relief against the current Director of ADJC in his official capacity, the superior court properly dismissed his complaint.
CONCLUSION
¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. Because we affirm the trial court, we deny Miladinovic's request for fees under A.R.S. § 12-349(A).