Opinion
No. 5-951 / 05-0169
Filed March 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Robert E. Sosalla, Judge.
Miell Property Management appeals the district court's ruling denying its petition for judicial review. AFFIRMED.
Paula M. Roby and Robert L. Hogg of Elderkin Pirnie, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Anita Garrison, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Miell Property Management (Miell) appeals the district court's ruling denying its petition for judicial review. Miell argues there was not substantial evidence for the Employment Appeal Board to find (1) the claimant provided Miell with notice that she intended to quit and (2) Miell created an intolerable working condition. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Terri Sparks began working for Miell in November 2002. Throughout her employment, she advised owner Robert Miell about various adverse working conditions. Her complaints were disregarded. In September 2003, Sparks was given a supervisory position, which included a raise, a week of paid vacation, a cell phone, and mileage. She was also given the responsibility of hiring individuals. On November 19, 2003, however, Robert Miell presented Sparks with a written list of reprimands. Among other things, Robert Miell accused Sparks of having called her subordinates "circus animals." According to the written warning, Sparks was given two days of suspension without pay and required to write six apology letters to various employees. Failure to comply with these requirements was, according to the reprimand, "gross and willful misconduct" and "will result in loss of employment." Sparks told Robert Miell the allegations were unfounded and she would not write the letters. Sparks took the two days of suspension, skipped work two more days, and then resigned on November 25, 2003.
Initially, the Iowa Workforce Development deputy denied Sparks's claim for unemployment benefits. On appeal, the administrative law judge (ALJ) reversed the deputy's decision and granted Sparks benefits. The ALJ determined Miell had created an intolerable situation when it required Sparks to either apologize for an offensive comment she did not make or face termination. The Employment Appeal Board and the district court upheld the ALJ's decision. Miell appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court decision by applying Iowa Code section 17A.19 (2003) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those reached by the district court. Univ. of Iowa Hosp. Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004). We may affirm, remand, reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief if the agency action is in violation of any of the fourteen grounds listed in section 17A.19(10). Miell specifically claims the board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) (f).
We are bound by the agency's findings if they are "supported by substantial evidence when the record is viewed as a whole." Simonson v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 588 N.W.2d 430, 434 (Iowa 1999). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would find it adequate to reach a conclusion. Id. Substantial evidence need not amount to a preponderance, but must be more than a scintilla. Elliot v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 377 N.W.2d 250, 256 (Iowa Ct.App. 1985). Furthermore, we must consider all of the evidence; even that which detracts from the agency's findings is not insubstantial merely because it supports a contrary conclusion. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Iowa 2003). However, if there is enough evidence to support the findings, we must affirm the agency's decision even if we might have found otherwise. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 420 (2001).
Finally, we give deference to the fact-finding of the agency as we would a jury verdict. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d at 414 (Iowa 2001). This deference includes the agency's credibility determinations. Clark v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue Fin., 644 N.W.2d 310, 315 (Iowa 2002).
III. Merits
Generally, an individual who voluntarily quits work without good cause attributable to the individual's employer is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Iowa Code § 96.5(1). However, the Code provides circumstances in which the individual may be entitled to benefits. See Iowa Code § 96.5(1)(a)-(j). The claimant has the initial burden to show these circumstances, but the employer has the burden of proving the claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits. Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.25 (2003).
Iowa Administrative Code rule 871-24.26 was promulgated pursuant to Iowa Code section 96.5(1). According to rule 871-24.26, good cause attributable to the employer includes (1) unsafe working conditions; (2) unlawful working conditions; (3) intolerable or detrimental working conditions; (4) lay-off due to pregnancy; (5) separation due to illness, injury, or pregnancy; (6) lack of work after the employee left to care for a family member; (7) mandatory retirement; (8) transfer to another locality that would cause the employee personal hardship; (9) compelled resignation; (10) completion of contract of hire where contract was for a specific time period; (11) misrepresentation of work; (12) lack of work following temporary active military duty; and (13) refusal to exercise bumping privilege. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.26(2)-(28).
Sparks argues, and the ALJ, board, and district court concluded, she left her employment with Miell Properties due to intolerable working conditions. See Iowa Admin. Code r. 871-24.26(4). She claims Miell created an intolerable working condition when she was required to apologize for something she did not do or be fired. Because intolerable working conditions constitute good cause attributable to the employer, Sparks claims she is eligible for unemployment benefits.
Miell argues Sparks failed to give notice of her intent to quit as required by Cobb v. Employment Appeal Board, 506 N.W.2d 445, 447-78 (Iowa 1993), Suluki v. Employment Appeal Board, 503 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 1993), and Swanson v. Employment Appeal Board, 554 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). These cases require an employee to give an employer notice of intent to quit, thus giving the employer an opportunity to cure working conditions. Accordingly, in 1995, the Iowa Administrative Code was amended to include an intent-to-quit requirement. The requirement was only added, however, to rule 871-24.26(6)(b), the provision addressing work-related health problems. No intent-to-quit requirement was added to rule 871-24.26(4), the intolerable working conditions provision. Our supreme court recently concluded that, because the intent-to-quit requirement was added to 871-24.26(6)(b) but not 871-24.26(4), notice of intent to quit is not required for intolerable working conditions. Hy-Vee, Inc. v. Employment Appeal Bd., ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (2005). We therefore conclude Miell's argument fails.
We are left to determine whether substantial evidence supports the finding that Miell's ultimatum was an intolerable working condition. First, testimony does not support Miell's contention that Sparks referred to her subordinates as circus animals. One employee testified that Sparks told her Robert Miell had called them circus animals, though he later denied doing so. Another employee testified that another person had also told her Robert Miell called the workers circus animals. Second, Sparks herself testified she had never referred to her subordinates in that way, but that Robert Miell had. The ALJ heard testimony from both parties and considered Sparks to be credible. Finally, the written reprimand itself states that Sparks would be fired if she did not comply with all of the requirements of the reprimand, including writing apology letters. Sparks told Robert Miell the accusations were unfounded, and told him she would not write the letters, but received no offer to negotiate the terms of the reprimand in return. In essence, Sparks was asked to either be dishonest or be fired. We conclude substantial evidence supports the board's determination that Miell's requirement that Sparks write the apology letters constituted an intolerable working condition. The district court's ruling is upheld.