Defendants also contend that the guaranty is not an instrument for the payment of money only because, in addition to guaranteeing Sullivan Law's obligation to make payment under the note, it contains language obligating the guarantors to guarantee performance under the note. We decline to follow the First Department precedent advanced by defendants (see e.g.PDL Biopharma, Inc. v. Wohlstadter , 147 A.D.3d 494, 495-496, 47 N.Y.S.3d 25 [1st Dept. 2017] ), and we conclude that the guaranty's references to ensuring the performance of the note's obligations do not negate its status as an instrument for the payment of money only (seeCooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank, B.A., "Rabobank Intl.," N.Y. Branch v. Navarro , 25 N.Y.3d 485, 488, 492, 15 N.Y.S.3d 277, 36 N.E.3d 80 [2015] ; see generallyNorthwoods, L.L.C. v. Hale , 201 A.D.3d 1357, 1357-1358, 158 N.Y.S.3d 701 [4th Dept. 2022] ; Midtown Mkt. Mo. City, Tx. LLC v. Tavakoli , 192 A.D.3d 1646, 1647-1648, 141 N.Y.S.3d 382 [4th Dept. 2021] ). In any event, the guaranty "required no additional performance by plaintiff[ ] as a condition precedent to payment [nor] otherwise made [the guarantors’] promise to pay something other than unconditional" ( iPayment, Inc. v. Silverman , 192 A.D.3d 586, 587, 146 N.Y.S.3d 51 [1st Dept. 2021], lv dismissed 37 N.Y.3d 1020, 154 N.Y.S.3d 27, 175 N.E.3d 909 [2021] [emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted])