Jefferson Lake Sulphur Company v. United States, D.C.E.D.La., 207 F. Supp. 124, 126; Midland Valley R. Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 10 Cir., 105 F.2d 201, 203; Barnes v. Townley, Okla., 448 P.2d 468, 471;
Ordinarily, if a trial judge find the facts on all the evidence, the judgment will stand. Cf. Midland Valley R. Co. v. Railroad Express Agency, Inc., 10 Cir., 105 F.2d 201, 204; Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Brown, 60 Fla. 83, 53 So. 838; Goodale v. Thorn, 199 Cal. 307, 312-313, 249 P. 11; Thon v. Stiles, 259 Mich. 145, 242 N.W. 869; Adams v. Tamaqua Underwear Co., 105 Pa. Super. 339, 161 A. 416; Alger v. Brighter Days Mining Corporation, 63 Ariz. 135, 160 P.2d 346; Title Guarantee Trust Co. v. Pam, 232 N.Y. 441, 134 N.E. 525; Shaffer v. Govreau, 36 Okla. 267, 128 P. 507; Louisville Nashville R. Co. v. Strickland, 219 Ala. 581, 122 So. 693. There were also assignments of error upon the ground that the trial court failed to hold that appellants did not lose their United States citizenship by reason of their renunciations at Tule Lake, that there was failure to find these renunciations were under duress and coercion, and that the findings that these renunciations were voluntary and not under duress and coercion are not supported by the evidence.
See United States v. Keach, 480 F.2d 1274, 1284 (10th Cir. 1973) ("It is a well-settled rule of construction that where a word is used in one part of a document, the same word used later has the same meaning, unless the context clearly shows the contrary."); Angel Fire Resort Operations, L.L.C. v. Corda, 138 N.M. 50, 54 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting McLane & McLane v. Prudential Ins. Co., 735 F.2d 1194, 1195 (9th Cir. 1984)) ("we may presume that words have the same meaning throughout the contract"); Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A., 773 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2014) (rejecting contract interpretation that would "cause[] the term to mean different things in different instances of its appearance"); Thompson v. Amoco Oil Co., 903 F.2d 1118, 1121 (7th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation and citation omitted) ("unless a contrary intent is evident, words used in one sense in one part of a contract are deemed of like significance in another part"); Midland Valley R.R. Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 105 F.2d 201, 203 (10th Cir. 1939) (citations omitted) ("It is an inveterate rule in the construction of a written instrument that ordinarily the same word occurring more than once is to be given the same meaning unless the context indicates that it was used in a different sense."). Despite professing a limitation to the "four corners," the Scungio court stated that "[i]n addition, 'a contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the matter to which it relates.'"
" 4 Williston, Contracts, 715-716, ยง 618 (3d Ed. 1961). "* * * [T]he same word occurring more than once is to be given the same meaning unless the context indicates that it was used in a different sense." Midland Valley R. Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 10 Cir., 1939, 105 F.2d 201; accord, Willingham v. Life and Casualty Insurance Co. of Tenn., 5 Cir., 1954, 216 F.2d 226, 47 A.L.R.2d 1017. Since "costs" in Article VIII and "costs" in Article IX are to be given the same meaning the question becomes: Which meaning, that of Article VIII or that of Article IX? If a word is defined in an earlier clause in a contract and not defined in a later clause, the defined meaning will be used in both places.
With this first meaning of "handling" as reasonably clear or conceded, it is a familiar rule that a word used in a certain sense in one part of a contract will be deemed used in the same sense in another part unless the context indicates otherwise. Jensen-Salsbery Laboratories v. O. M. Franklin Blackleg Serum Co., 10 Cir., 74 F.2d 501, Midland Valley R. Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 10 Cir., 105 F.2d 201, 203. This must be especially true when the two words are in the same sentence.
Assuming without deciding that it was error for the Commission not to allow plaintiff to introduce evidence supporting its theory of value, it was harmless error and not prejudicial to the plaintiff's case. See United States ex rel. Lindenau v. Watkins, D.C., 73 F. Supp. 216; Midland Valley R. Co. v. Railway Express Agency, 10 Cir., 105 F.2d 201; Williams v. Great Southern Lumber Co., 277 U.S. 19, 48 S.Ct. 417, 72 L.Ed. 761. The fifth specification of error of law complains that the Commission disregarded the plaintiff's pleas for relief under categories numbered (2), (3), (4), and (5) of section 2 of the Indian Claims Commission Act, supra. There is no merit in this specification.