The trial court's conclusory statement that it had previously warned McDaniel about the risks of self-representation fails to provide details about the information actually provided to McDaniel, and therefore cannot be used to satisfy the State's burden. See Middleton v. State, 254 Ga.App. 648, 649(1), 563 S.E.2d 543 (2002). Cf. Allison v. State, 288 Ga.App. 482, 490(2)(b), 654 S.E.2d 628 (2007) (trial court's conclusory affidavit failed to establish knowing and intelligent waiver of right to jury trial).

(Citation omitted.) Middleton v. State, 254 Ga. App. 648(1) ( 563 S.E.2d 543) (2002). The state has the burden of demonstrating that the defendant received "sufficient information and guidance from the trial court" to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Hamilton v. State, 233 Ga. App. 463, 467(1)(b) ( 504 S.E.2d 236) (1998).

Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.") (citation and punctuation omitted); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII ("No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or by an attorney, that person's own cause in any of the courts of this state.").Middleton v. State , 254 Ga. App. 648 (1), 563 S.E.2d 543 (2002) ; see also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XIV ("Every person charged with an offense against the laws of this state shall have the privilege and benefit of counsel[.]").Thaxton , 260 Ga. at 142 (2), 390 S.E.2d 841.

See Clarke v. Zant, 247 Ga. 194, 195 ( 275 S.E.2d 49) (1981). As this court recently reaffirmed in Middleton v. State, 254 Ga. App. 648 (1) ( 563 S.E.2d 543) (2002), although the trial court need not use any "magic words" to determine if a valid waiver was made, the State has the burden of showing from the record that the accused understood (1) the nature of the charges against him, (2) any statutory lesser-included offenses, (3) the range of possible punishments for the charges, (4) possible defenses, (5) mitigating circumstances, and (6) any other facts necessary for a broad understanding of the matter. Otherwise, there is no valid waiver.

"To establish harmless error, the State has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict." Middleton v. State , 254 Ga. App. 648, 650 (2), 563 S.E.2d 543 (2002). And this Court has held that "such error was not harmless where the record showed that the defendant did not mount an able defense—even though the evidence of guilt was ample."

See Cook v. State, 297 Ga. App. 701, 702, 678 S.E.2d 160 (2009) (State failed to meet burden where "[n]o evidence was presented that [the defendant] was adequately informed of the nature of the charges against her, the possible punishments she faced, the dangers of proceeding pro se, and other circumstances that might affect her ability to adequately represent herself") (citation and punctuation omitted); Davis v. State, 279 Ga. App. 628, 631 (1), 631 S.E.2d 815 (2006) (State failed to meet burden where, inter alia, there was no evidence presented that the trial court informed defendant of "the nature of the charge against him, the punishments he might receive, the possible defenses to the charge or potentially mitigating circumstances"); Middleton v. State, 254 Ga. App. 648, 649 (1), 563 S.E.2d 543 (2002) (State failed to prove knowing waiver where there was nothing in the record to show "that the trial court—or anyone else—ever warned [the defendant] about the dangers of proceeding pro se or explained to him the nature of the charges against him, the potential penalties he faced, and possible defenses or mitigating circumstances."). Compare Cain v. State, 310 Ga. App. 442, 443 (1), 714 S.E.2d 65 (2011) (no reversible error when defendant proceeded pro se during voir dire, after trial court informed defendant of dangers of proceeding pro se, including the sentence he could face if found guilty).

Id. at 868 (2), 545 S.E.2d 396. See also Middleton v. State , 254 Ga. App. 648, 649 (1), 563 S.E.2d 543 (2002) ("The trial court need not use any ‘magic words’ to determine whether a waiver of counsel is valid, as long as the facts and circumstances of the case show that the defendant has been given sufficient information and guidance to make a knowing and intelligent decision whether to proceed pro se.") (footnote omitted). In this case, the record clearly demonstrates that Pugh knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.

"We have repeatedly found that [the trial court's failure to establish a valid waiver of counsel] was not harmless where the record showed that the defendant did not mount an able defense—even though the evidence of guilt was ample." Middleton v. State , 254 Ga. App. 648, 650–651 (2), 563 S.E.2d 543 (2002) (emphasis omitted). And Martin–Argaw did not mount an able defense in this case.

"We have repeatedly found that [the trial court's failure to establish a valid waiver of counsel] was not harmless where the record showed that the defendant did not mount an able defense — even though the evidence of guilt was ample." Middleton v. State, 254 Ga. App. 648, 650-651 (2) (563 SE2d 543) (2002) (citations omitted). And Martin-Argaw did not mount an able defense in this case.

(Footnote omitted.) Middleton v. State, 254 Ga.App. 648, 648(1), 563 S.E.2d 543 (2002). Nevertheless, “it is not incumbent upon the trial court to make each of these inquiries.”