Opinion
NBSP064455
04-04-2016
Cathie Middleton v. Robert Monzon et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON LAPSE OF TIME SUMMARY PROCESS COMPLAINT
Nicola E. Rubinow, J.
This memorandum of decision addresses the issues raised through the summary process complaint filed by the plaintiff Cathie Middleton (Middleton) seeking possession of premises alleged to be in the possession of the defendants Meghan Monzon and Robert Monzon. The memorandum of decision also addresses Monzon's special defenses.
Unlike the defendant Robert Monzon, the defendant Meghan Monzon has not appeared in the matter and did not participate in the summary process trial. Hereinafter, the court has used the term " Monzon" to refer to Robert Monzon alone.
Middleton is represented by counsel; Monzon filed an appearance on his own behalf. The case was tried to the court on September 24; October 1, 16 and 19; and on December 11, 2015. Middleton testified on her own behalf and was subject to cross examination; Monzon called one witness, Michelle Green, who also was subject to cross examination. The court accepted nineteen documentary exhibits.
Robert Monzon actively participated at the summary process trial and vigorously promoted the special defenses he alleged, but elected not to testify at trial. Middleton's counsel did not request, and the court has drawn, any adverse inference from that election.
As the plaintiff, Middleton bears the burden of proving the operative allegations of her complaint by a fair preponderance of the evidence. Monzon bears a like burden of proof insofar as his special defenses are concerned.
The standard of proof, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is " properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394, 440 A.2d 952(1981). " The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential allegations of the complaint." Gulycz v. Stop & Shop Cos., 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, 615 A.2d 1087, cert. denied, 224 Conn. 923, 618 A.2d 527 (1992), citing Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 211, 439 A.2d 949 (1981). " While a plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that may be legitimately drawn from the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the plaintiff must still sustain the burden of proof on the contested issues in the complaint and the defendant need not present any evidence to contradict it. Lukas v. New Haven, supra, 184 Conn. 211.
See Civil Jury Instructions Civil Jury Instructions, 2.6-2 Burden of Proof-Affirmative Defenses.
For the reasons stated herein, the court finds all issues in favor of Middleton, and enters a judgment of possession in her favor.
I
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The court has reviewed the pleadings and considered the evidence in its entirety using the applicable principles of law and equity. The facts as found and set forth throughout this decision were proved at trial by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
" The [fact-finding] function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties . . ." Cavolick v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005). " It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). " [T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible . . . It is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses . . . The trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness . . . The trier can, as well, decide what--all, none, or some--of a witness' testimony to accept or reject." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Osborn, 41 Conn.App. 287, 676 A.2d 399 (1996). The trial court's function as the fact finder " is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, 505 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808, 508 A.2d 769; 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986).
In early 2015, Middleton became an owner of the property known as 115 Main Street in Terryville, CT (the property). A number of dwelling units are located upon this property, including the apartment 1A, which is the subject of this pending summary process action (the dwelling unit).
Monzon had resided at the property for more than fifteen years when, approximately two to three years before Middleton became an owner of the property, he became the occupant of apartment 1A along with his then-wife Meghan Monzon. Monzon's residence at the property was pursuant to oral month-to-month tenancy and required monthly payment of rent.
In February 2015, Michelle Green became a month-to-month tenant of an apartment, separate from dwelling unit 1A, upon the property 115 Main Street in Terryville, CT. Green and Monzon have a child in common; Green moved to that location to be nearer to Monzon. (Tes. Green.)
From time to time, using the screen name " Kathy Broadwell, " Middleton engaged in " texting" to communicate with others, including Monzon. Also from time to time after she acquired an ownership interest in the property, Middleton established tenant rules requiring the occupants to, among other things, to park in driveways, keep their children safe, and utilize their appliances without causing damage. Middleton was aware, during the first months after she became an owner of the property, that unspecified had complained to unspecified individuals about the status of the property and repairs needed; during this period, Monzon was the acknowledged person responsible for supervising the property and effectuating repairs, as discussed below. During this period, Middleton also was aware that some tenants had met as a group, but there is no evidence that Middleton had any information as to the purpose of the meetings, e.g., whether the tenants had gotten together for social or other purposes. Middleton also was aware during this period, that a housing inspector and/or the health department had been called to inspect the wiring and lead paint conditions at the property. However, as further discussed in Part III, there is no credible or reliable evidence to establish that Monzon had made any complaints to Middleton or any prior owner concerning the status of dwelling unit 1A; that these inspections were directed at any conditions within the dwelling unit 1A that Monzon had leased; that the inspections of wiring or lead paint upon the property resulted from any attempts or actions taken by Monzon to remedy conditions within dwelling unit 1A that he and his family used and occupied; or that these inspections resulted in any government-issued notice, complaint or order directing Middleton to remedy any condition on any part of or dwelling unit upon the property, including dwelling unit 1A. (Ex. A; Tes. Middleton.)
July 23, 2015, following June 30, 2015 lapse of Monzon's tenancy, a two year old child named " Soliyi Green" was found to have a blood lead level of 10, a result that has been " associated with adverse health effect in children ages 6 years and younger." (Ex. B-2.) The evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion that Soliyi Green is the child of Monzon and Michelle Green, and that the child lives with Green, not Monzon. (Tes. Green.) However, the court received insufficient evidence from which it could ascertain the circumstances that led to the reported lead levels in the child's blood, and no evidence from which it could conclude that the lead levels resulted from the child's contact with the dwelling unit from which Middleton seeks to evict Monzon. (See Exs. B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7; Tes. Green.)
As further discussed in Part III, there is no evidence that Monzon ever requested Middleton to make any repairs to the dwelling unit he used and occupied, or that he ever commenced a code enforcement action to compel the landlord's compliance with statutory responsibilities.
Prior to the end of May 2015, starting when he had occupied dwelling unit 1A under a lease agreement with the prior owner, Monzon had been asked by the prior owner to perform certain services at the property. Middleton continued to utilize Monzon in this role for a time. He served as the property manager, functioning as a communication conduit between the landlord and the tenants; he served as a maintenance superintendent and had access to a shed where equipment to maintain the property was stored. Voluntarily, Monzon built a wishing well structure upon the property. However, as discussed above and again in Part III, notwithstanding his relation to the property, there is no evidence that Monzon ever complained to the prior owner, to Middleton, or to any responsible authority concerning conditions affecting dwelling unit 1A. (Exs. F, I, J; Tes. Middleton.)
Under date of May 6, 2015, Middleton wrote to one tenant informing her that " [a]ny property issues must be made to Robert Monzon aka Lucky." (Ex. D.)
Prior to Middleton's acquisition of the property Monzon had stored undesignated belongings in a portion of that shed in which the property's maintenance equipment was housed. Monzon had never been given permission to store his personalty there, although he had access to the shed in the course of his work maintaining the property. Middleton notified Monzon in late May 2015 that he should remove his possessions from this shed, but Monzon did not do so, choosing instead to leave the personalty in that place. During the summer of 2015, after Monzon's position as a maintainer had been terminated and the present litigation was commenced, Middleton changed the lock to the shed. By September 2015, the relationship between Middleton and Monzon had so deteriorated that the landlord obtained police supervision during the process of Monzon's removal of his belongings from the shed. (Exs. K, L, M, N; Tes. Middleton. Compare Exs. B, G, H, J.)
On May 6, 2015, Middleton elected to increase the rent for some dwelling units on the property; she asked Monzon to communicate the rent increase to the other tenants. (Exs. A, D.) Middleton thereafter elected to increase the rent for Monzon's apartment 1A by $50 per month, and informed him about the pending increase in his month-to-month oral lease terms. (Tes. Middleton.)
At some time prior to learning about the proposed rent increase, Monzon had erected an inflatable, above ground swimming pool upon the property. In the process of preparing to obtain renewal of liability insurance that had been in effect for the property, as a new owner Middleton allowed a homeowner's insurance representative to inspect the property. After that inspection, and just before Memorial Day in May 2015, in a reasonable effort to minimize water costs for the property, and in a reasonable effort to enhance her opportunity to maintain liability insurance upon the property without the financial hardship burden attributable to the presence of a swimming pool, Middleton asked Monzon to remove the structure. Monzon refused to comply with Middleton's reasonable request, and caused the pool to remain in place throughout the summer. (Ex. M; Tes. Middleton.)
Monzon did not remove the swimming pool until September 2015. In December 2015, Middleton was able to secure a renewal of the property liability policy that had remained in effect until this renewal, so that the property was not uninsured during the pendency of this summary process litigation. (Tes. Middleton.)
At the end of May 2015, as she was in the process of introducing herself to all the tenants and informing them about her position as the new property owner, after she recognized that Monzon would not remove the swimming pool despite her request, Middleton terminated Monzon's role as the provider of any services for the property. At the very end of May of 2015, Middleton also decided not to renew Monzon's month-to-month lease, electing to obtain possession of dwelling unit 1A so she, as the new landlord, could select a new tenant for that apartment after Monzon's June 2015 occupancy had ended. (Exs. A, M; Tes. Middleton.)
To further her election, on June 1, 2015, at Middleton's direction, a state marshal served Robert Monzon and Meghan Monzon with a notice to quit possession of the premises. In relevant part, Middleton's notice to quit stated: " I hereby terminate your lease and give you notice that you are to quit possession or occupancy of the premises now occupied by you on or before June 30, 2015, for the following reason: LAPSE OF TENANCY. Any payments made by you after service of this Notice to Quit will be accepted for use and occupancy only and not as rental payments . . ." Monzon paid the rent due for June 2015, but did not vacate dwelling unit 1A. Instead, he remained in residence at, using and occupying the premises after June 30, 2015, and through the time of trial. (Tes. Middleton, Green.)
On July 2, 2015, at Middleton's direction, a state marshal served Robert Monzon and Meghan Monzon with the summary process (eviction) summons, complaint. The summary process action was filed with the court on July 13, 2015. Monzon filed his special defenses that same day.
Prepared under date of July 1, 2015, the complaint alleges, in relevant part, that on or about June 1, 2013, Middleton as lessor, Monzon and Meghan Monzon as lessees entered into an oral month-to-month lease for the use and occupancy of Apartment 1A at 115 Main Street, Terryville, CT that the lessee's agreed to pay $700 as monthly rent due on the first day of each month; that the lessee's took possession pursuant to the oral lease and still occupy the premises; that the lease has expired by lapse of tenancy; that on May 29, 2015, Middleton caused the lessees to be served with a notice to quit requiring them to vacate the premises on or before June 30, 2015; and that the lessees continue in possession although the time given in the notice to quit has passed. As relief, Middleton claims immediate possession of the premises.
For equitable purposes, the court finds: that Monzon has remained in residence at dwelling unit 1A during the entire course of this summary process litigation; that one or more of Monzon's children live or have lived with him at dwelling unit 1A; that pursuant to a court order, Monzon paid $700 into court as use and occupancy for the month December 2015; that Monzon has not paid any other use and occupancy as ordered, and has not compensated the landlord for his July, August, or September, October, or November 2015 use and occupancy of dwelling unit 1A, or for any months in 2016; and that Middleton was deprived of the opportunity to obtain a new tenant for dwelling unit 1A and deprived of the opportunity to secure rent payments from a new tenant as Monzon has remained in possession of that dwelling unit. (Tes. Middleton.)
II
RESOLUTION OF THE SUMMARY PROCESS CLAIMS
Summary process may properly be pursued when the owner or lessor of any property, or the owner's or lessor's legal representative, desires to obtain possession or occupancy of any dwelling unit upon that property, and when a written or oral rental agreement or lease of such property has been terminated by lapse of time. General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(1)(A). " To prevail on a claim for lapse of time, the plaintiff must establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the following essential elements: 1. The existence of an oral or written weekly, monthly or yearly rental agreement; 2. The Plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the subject premises; 3. The address of subject premises; 4. The date of the rental agreement that has terminated; 6. Notice to quit: service date and termination date; and 7. That the defendant is still in possession. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-23(a)(1)(A) et seq. 'Termination of lease [by lapse of time] signifies that the lease--whether express or implied or whether oral or written--will lapse at the end of the current period and will not be renewed.' Yale University v. Valinho, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. SPN 9407-20487 (October 13, 1994, DiPentima, J.) (Hartford #1033) ." Beech Tree Ranch, LLC v. Soto, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Housing Session, Docket No. HDSP-165127, (June 11, 2012, Oliver, J.).
Based on the facts as found in Part I, above, incorporating those factual findings into its resolution of the summary process claims and relying upon those findings as well as the factual findings made in Part III to address Monzon's special defenses, the court concludes that Middleton has met her burden of proof on each essential allegation of the complaint pending against Robert Monzon and against Meghan Monzon. Monzon had a month-to-month lease for use of dwelling unit 1A at 115 Main Street in Terryville, CT; Middleton is the landlord for the property. Through service of the notice to quit upon these defendants on June 1, 2015, Middleton took the clear and unequivocal action that terminated the existing month-to-month lease based on lapse of time, or using words of similar import. The notice to quit established that, as was the landlord's prerogative given the month-to-month status of the existing rental agreement for Apt. 1, Middleton had informed any person then occupying the dwelling unit, including Robert Monzon, that his lease lapse at the end of June 2015 and would not be renewed, so that he had to leave the premises on or before June 30, 2015. Thus, the lease expired by lapse of time or, in words of similar import, by lapse of tenancy. See Beech Tree Ranch, LLC v. Soto, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. HDSP-165127 Although there is no evidence that Meghan Monzon resided as, used or occupied the dwelling unit after service of the notice to quit, Monzon does not contest the evidence supporting the court's conclusion that he has remained on the premises, in possession of the dwelling unit, despite service of the notice to quit and despite the expiration of his tenancy by lapse of time.
See General Statutes § 47a-23(a)(1)(A).
See Beech Tree Ranch, LLC v. Soto, supra, Docket No. HDSP-165127. See also Pollansky v. Pollansky, 144 Conn.App. 188, 194 71 A.3d 1267 (2013) (referencing termination of lease relative to § 47a-23(a)(1) by service of the notice to quit in discussing similar impact of notice to quit in summary process action brought under § 47a-23(a)(3)).
As to Meghan Monzon, Middleton had filed a Motion for Default for failure to appear. On July 21, 2015. On the first day of trial, this court granted the motion, finding that Meghan Monzon had never appeared, that the military affidavit submitted by Middleton was sufficient, and that this defendant was in default as contemplated by Practice Book. As Meghan Monzon's default effectively admits of each of the allegations brought against her, Middleton has met her burden of proof on the summary process issues by this legal mechanism as to this defendant. The default renders Meghan Monzon susceptible to a judgment upon the default.
" As our Supreme Court has explained, the entry of a default judgment conclusively establishes the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. Smith v. Snyder, 267 Conn. 456, 468, 839 A.2d 589 (2004)." Dziedzic v. Pine Island Marina, LLC, 143 Conn.App. 644, 645, 72 A.3d 406, 407 (2013). In other words, " [t]he entry of a default constitutes an admission by the defendant of the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint." DeBlasio v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 186 Conn. 398, 400, 441 A.2d 838 (1982). See also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000) (" A default admits the material facts that constitute a cause of action . . . and entry of default, when appropriately made, conclusively determines the liability of a defendant, " [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).
See General Statutes § 47a-26 et seq.; Practice Book § 17-30. See also Practice Book § § 17-20(a), (f) and 17-21.
Accordingly, Middleton has met her burden of proving the essential allegations of her summary process complaint against each defendant.
III
Incorporating the factual findings set forth in Part I and the additional findings described below, the court had concluded that Monzon has failed to meet his burden of proving any of the special defenses he alleged in response to Middleton's summary process complaint.
In a civil case such as the present summary process action, where several special defenses have been presented, court acknowledges that the weight of Middleton's proof may be overcome by establishing, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, any one of Monzon's alternative allegations. See Civil Jury Instructions 3.6-10 Specifications of Negligence--Complaint (plaintiff in a civil matter may prevail if it has met " just one of the ways claimed" as the basis for its cause of action); Civil Jury Instructions, § 3.5-2 Defendant's Specifications of Negligence. See also Milford Bank v. Phoenix Contracting Group, Inc., 143 Conn.App. 519, 523 n.2, 72 A.3d 55 (2013).
First, although the court fully credits the evidence establishing that although Monzon paid the rent as due for June 2015, ¶ 2.1 of his special defenses, that " all rent has been paid to my landlord, " has no application given the nature of the pending summary process action which is effectively based on lapse of time and not on nonpayment of rent. As previously found, Middleton caused Monzon to be served, on June 1, 2015, with a notice to quit based on lapse of time or words of similar import, clearly informing Monzon that he was to vacate the dwelling unit on or before June 30, 2015, yet Monzon has thereafter remained in possession; with the service of that notice to quit, Monzon's tenancy was unequivocally terminated by the landlord. Thus, even though Monzon paid rent for the month of June 2015 within the last month of the effective month-to-month lease, such payment does not protect against summary process based on lapse of time and this special defense provides no succor for the defendant.
Similarly Monzon has not met his burden of proving that he has " a written lease that is still in effect . . ." as alleged in ¶ 2.8 of his special defenses. Despite the multiple documentary exhibits Monzon presented at trial, no written lease was ever produced for the court's examination. The better, weightier and more credible evidence is that during the months of 2015 before the notice to quit was served upon him, Monzon resided at dwelling unit 1A pursuant to an oral month-to-month lease. As that month-to-month lease was terminated, due to lapse of time as indicated through the notice to quit, Monzon has failed to prove that he is protected by any " written lease" notwithstanding his allegation in ¶ 2.8 of his special defenses.
Although Monson also alleged, in special defense ¶ 2.8, that he is protected because he " never received a 90 day letter (notice) before the notice to quit was delivered (served), Monzon has not shown that such a letter is a necessary predicate to this summary process action, which is based on lapse of time and unrelated to foreclosure proceedings. Accordingly, Monzon has failed to meet his burden of proof on this aspect of this special defense.
In addition, Monzon has failed to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, any of his allegations in special defense ¶ ¶ 2.4 or 2.5, which assert the existence of that conditions affecting dwelling unit 1A that relieved him of the obligation to pay rent pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-4. Although Monzon generally alleged that the " property ([his] section only) has not been upkept. Also fire hazards and Repairs denied by Landlord, " no aspect of the evidence, either on its own or in combination with other evidence, is sufficient to support Monzon's claim that was statutorily relieved of the obligation to pay rent due after June 2015 due to violations affecting the dwelling unit he had leased. (Special Defense, Additional Information.) As discussed in Part I, the court does not credit any testimony presented by Green or other documentary evidence tendered Monzon in an effort to establish that, Monzon he had ever requested the landlord to make repairs or to take remedial action there; there is no evidence to support Monzon's allegation that he " notified" either the landlord or the municipal building department of any such conditions. (Special Defense, ¶ 2.4.) The court further attributes no weight to evidence of inspections offered to establish that safety or fire issues affected Monzon's access to a portion of the basement he used and occupied as a dwelling unit; the testimony of lay persons is insufficient to establish that there were electrical issues on the property, even in the attic, that in any way affected the dwelling unit 1A. Although Middleton was aware that some portions of the buildings at 115 Main Street in Terryville, CT were the subject of government officials' interest concerning the potential presence of lead paint, there is no evidence whatsoever sufficient to establish that dwelling unit 1A, used and occupied by Monzon, was affected by this condition.
See General Statutes § 47a-7.
In sum, the court received no credible or reliable evidence adequate to establish that, prior to service of the notice to quit, Monzon can access the benefit of protection of the special defenses alleged in ¶ ¶ 2.3, 2.4 and/or 2.5. The court received insufficient evidence that Monzon had, himself or through any agent, informed the landlord, any authorized representative of the landlord, any municipal Building Department or any public officials, of any " housing or health code violations" affecting the dwelling unit that is the subject of this summary process action. (Special Defenses, ¶ 2.3.) While the evidence indicates that a municipal Building Inspector visited the dwelling unit used and occupied by Monzon, the court received no credible details or documentation sufficient to determine the exact or even the approximate date on which the inspection occurred; similarly, the court received no credible details or documentation concerning the specific nature of the allegedly unlawful room to which that Monzon and/or his family had accessed in the basement area of dwelling unit 1A. The evidence is insufficient to permit the conclusion that the Building Inspector came to the premises in response to a complaint by Monzon or even whether the Building Inspector was contacted concerning dwelling unit before the notice to quit was served on June 1, 2015. Moreover, although the evidence supports a finding that the Building Inspector brought the municipal Fire Marshal to inspect dwelling unit 1A, the evidence again is insufficient to permit the court to conclude that such actions occurred due to Monzon's provision of notice to that official, whether that official was notified of the conditions complained of before the notice to quit was served; the court further received insufficient evidence from which it could conclude that such inspection led any official to the conclusion that dwelling unit 1A was in in violation of any fire codes or, if it was, that such violation was due to any action or inaction on the part of the landlord or due to action or inaction on the part of the occupant. Even if there were status issues related to the division of the dwelling unit Monzon used and occupied into separate spaces, with the heat supply, the plumbing or the electrical service to that dwelling unit, that rendered conditions within that dwelling unit inconsistent with applicable building codes, the court received insufficient evidence to establish is that these conditions materially affected the health or safety of Monzon or any persons residing at dwelling unit 1A, or that such conditions rendered dwelling unit 1A unfit or uninhabitable.
There is, however, persuasive evidence that Monzon was the property manager for the premises until May 20, 2015, ten days prior to the issuance of the notice to quit and that he thereby had the opportunity to inform the landlord, the landlord's representative, the Building Department, or any public officials or agencies of any conditions requiring remediation before June 1, 2015. Under these circumstances, if any such violations were present or apparent, Monzon had the opportunity to contact the landlord and the other designated authorities, yet there is no evidence supporting the inference or finding that he did so. (Ex. A; Tes. Middleton.)
Furthermore the court fully credits Middleton's testimony establishing that prior to the issuance of the notice to quit, she was never told that there were plumbing or heating or any other issues with the dwelling unit used and occupied by Monzon, and further credits Middleton's testimony establishing that prior to May 20, 2015, when she terminated Monzon's caretaking position at the premises, it was his assigned responsibility to address all such issues and to effect repair all such conditions. (Tes. Middleton.)
Thus, Monzon has not met his burden of proving either that he notified the landlord, the landlord's representative, the Building Department, any public officials or agencies of conditions affecting dwelling unit 1A, or that any health code or housing code violations on the premises specifically related to dwelling unit 1A were of such nature and extent that he was excused from paying rent in accordance with § 47a-4a. (See Special Defenses, ¶ ¶ 2.3, 2.4, 2.5.) Accordingly, he cannot prevail on these special defenses as alleged.
Monzon also appears to allege, as a special defense, that Middleton's summary process action was brought in retaliation for many reasons, each of which must fail. See, e.g., General Statutes § § 47a-20, 47a-20a. As discussed above, Monzon has claimed that housing code or health code violations existed upon the premises; he has argued that Middleton brought the pending summary process action in retaliation because he notified her and/or government officials of such conditions. However, as the evidence does not support a finding that Monzon ever notified either Middleton and/or the government officials about such conditions, whether or not any violations existed, the court cannot reasonably conclude that the summary process was brought in retaliation for such conduct on the part of the defendant. As there is inadequate evidence to support a finding that at any time " any municipal agency or official has filed a notice, complaint or order regarding . . ." any violations at the dwelling unit used and occupied by Monzon, as contemplated by § 47a-20(2), and as court records do not reflect that Monzon had ever filed an action against the landlord pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-14h, as contemplated by § 47a-20(4), this defendant cannot prevail on any of the special defenses in ¶ ¶ 2.3, 2.4 and/or 2.5 as alleged.
Not only is the evidence is insufficient to establish either that Monzon had in good faith requested the landlord to make repairs as contemplated by § 47a-20(3) prior to the June 1, 2015 service of the notice to quit, or that he had notified government officials of violations affecting dwelling unit 1A prior to that date, the evidence as a whole supports the inference that it was Monzon, himself, who had proudly accepted the responsibility for making such repairs and keeping the premises safe before Middleton took affirmative action to terminate his services as of May 20, 2015. (Ex. A.)
Moreover, there is no evidence sufficient to support Monzon's preferred conclusion that Middleton instituted the summary process action against him, with the six month period proscribed by § 47a-20 in retaliation because he was uncooperative with Middleton's proposed rent increases. As found in Part I, Middleton had informed Monzon of a rent increase during the month of May 2015; she did not cause the notice to quit to be served for the month of May but to obtain access to dwelling unit 1A after the end of June 2016. (Ex. A.) Accordingly, given the timely nature of service of the notice to quit in the context of Monzon's oral month-to-month lease for dwelling unit 1A, this defendant cannot access any protection against summary process through this aspect of his argued special defenses.
The better and weightier evidence in this case supports the finding that the landlord was lawfully permitted to pursue her summary process action in this case, through service of the notice to quit on June 1, 2015 and through service of the eviction complaint and related documents on July 2, 2015, after Monzon's month-to-month lease had ended due to lapse of time, or lapse of tenancy. Here, the landlord properly sought to recover possession of the dwelling unit used and occupied by Monzon " on the basis of a notice to terminate a period tenancy, which notice was given to the tenant before " any complaint, if any, was made to the landlord, to the landlord's representative, or to the municipal Building Department or to any public officials or agencies of that municipality regarding the status of the dwelling, so that the present summary process action is not retaliatory as a matter of law. (Emphasis added.) § 47a-20a(a)(4).
Finally, as a special defense, Monzon argues that the landlord brought this summary process action in retaliation because he " has organized or become a member of a tenants' union. § 47a-20(5). Again, this aspect of Monzon's defense must fail. There is no evidence sufficient to support the defendant's vigorously promoted proposition that he had taken any action to create or develop a " tenants' union" as contemplated by the statute, prior to service of the notice to quit on June 1, 2015. Green's testimony on the subject of such an organization was unclear, inconsistent, without detail, seemed clearly intended to please Monzon, the father of her child, and thus lacked either reliability or credibility; even if Green's testimony about the existence of a " tenants' union" was believable in any part, she provided no credible or reliable evidence as to when Monzon and/or other residents of the landlords' property came together to begin organizing or to become members of such a group as is contemplated by § 47a-20(5). The court accepted as full exhibits two documents Monzon tendered in an unsuccessful attempt to prove that he had, in fact, " organized or become a member of a tenants' union" within a time frame sufficient to support his special defense on the subject. Id. Neither document contained in Exhibit C is dated; there is insufficient evidence to establish the source of the information contained on the first page of the exhibit, to ascertain when it was prepared, or whether it even pertained to the dwelling unit Monzon used and occupied at 115 Main Street in Terryville, CT. While the second page of the document is entitled " Main/Wall St. Tenents union" and contains a number of signatures, the court received no testimony from any person who ostensibly signed that page other than Green. Under the circumstances, the court attributes little weight to either the first page of the document, or to the second page, which presents a number of signatures appearing to be in the same hand. Even if Monzon organized and/or was a member of a tenants' union, as contemplated by § 47a-20(5), a conclusion not reached by the court, there is no credible or reliable evidence to support a finding that the union had been formed prior to the institution of Middleton's summary process action. As there is insufficient evidence to establish that Middleton knew, prior to service of the notice to quit, that such a " tenants' union" had been formed, as contemplated by the statute, the court could not reasonably conclude that Middleton had brought the action in retaliation for the organization of or membership in such a union. Rather, the highly credible, reliable, and consistent evidence, discussed in Part I, establishes that Middleton sought to terminate Monzon's oral month-to-month lease for the lawful purpose of regaining possession of dwelling unit 1A so she could rent it to a tenant of her choice, not allow it to be occupied by an individual who had come to the premises upon the agreement of a predecessor owner.
In reaching this determination, the court has taken note of the emphatic inquiries presented by Monzon of both Middleton and Green on the subject of a " tenants' union" that he claimed was formed prior to issuance of the notice to quit. Notwithstanding the intensity and repetitive nature of these inquiries, however, when considering the facts that have been proved by a fair preponderance of the evidence in this case, the court has remained aware that under Connecticut's jurisprudential protocol, even when presented on cross-examination, " a question is not evidence; it is the answer, not the question or the assumption made in the question, that is evidence . . ." (Emphasis added.) Civil Jury Instructions § 2.1-3 [Factfinder's] Duty to Decide on the Evidence.
The court does not credit Green's testimony that she had spoken to Monzon about a tenants' union or that she had drafted documents related to such an organization prior to May 25, 2015. The court does, however, credit Green's testimony that she never gave Middleton any documents related to a tenants' union, and that she is highly aligned with Monzon, desiring to live near him because she wants him to co-parent their son. (Tes. Green.)
The transcript of proceedings on October 1, 2015 references Monzon's proffered 2 page document as " Exhibit 1"; the preliminary list of exhibits identifies the documents as " Exhibit I"; and the documents are marked " Defendant's Exhibit C." The transcript makes it clear that after hearing Middleton's objection, the court accepted the 2 pages as full exhibits on October 1, 2015. (Tr. 10/1/15.)
In reaching this conclusion, the court does not credit Green's testimony that she drafted Exhibit C, finding her to be so biased in favor of Monzon that most evidence adduced through her carries little, if any, weight in this summary process matter.
The credibility of this second page is sorely limited by the fact that, for instance, the " signatures" of both " Jennifer Castonguay" and " Brian Castonguay" clearly appear to have been written in exactly the same hand. No separate " signatures" appear for the individuals represented to be occupants of " Apt 3"; instead, the second page of the " Tennents union" document presented what was supposed to be the signature of " Michelle & Jason Green." The court received insufficient evidence from which it could reasonably be ascertained that an individual named " Jason Green" was an adult who actually resided with Michelle Green. (Ex. C.)
Therefore, § 47a-20(5) provides no relief for Monzon, and this aspect of his special defenses must fail, as well.
Apparently related to his special defenses, Monzon also has alleged: " I was property manager until suspicious financial dealings." (Special Defenses, ¶ 2. Additional Information.) The court received credible evidence of Middleton's proposed rent increases for month-tomonth tenants at the premises, but no " suspicious financial dealings" were proved. Thus, even if such circumstances were relevant to Monzon's special defenses, he has failed to meet his burden on this allegation, as well.
IV
CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth herein: the plaintiff Cathie Middleton has met her burden of proof as to the summary process complaint brought against the defendants Robert Monzon and Meghan Monzon; the defendant Monzon has failed to meet his burden of proof on any of his special defenses; and neither defendant has shown a title in herself or himself which accrued after the giving of the lease or that existed at the time the notice to quit possession or occupancy was served upon them.
See General Statutes § 47a-26d.
AND WHEREFORE, having found the facts, applied the law and balanced the equities, the court now enters judgment in favor of the plaintiff Cathie Middleton and against the defendants Robert Monzon and Meghan Monzon.
AND WHEREFORE, the court now ORDERS that the plaintiff Cathie Middleton shall recover possession of the premises known as 115 Main Street, Apt. 1, Terryville, CT from the defendants Robert Monzon and/or Meghan Monzon, subject to a FINAL STAY OF EXECUTION through May 2, 2016 which is hereby ORDERED contingent upon Robert Monzon's compliance with the following conditions, any breach of which shall subject him to immediate execution as permitted by law:
1. Monzon shall not enter or be upon any portion of 115 Main Street, Terryville, CT other than dwelling unit 1A and the sidewalks or driveway leading to that dwelling, after the entry of this judgment and during the stay of execution.
2. On or before April 15, 2016, Monzon shall pay $700 to Middleton as use and occupancy for the month of April 2016 through May 2, 2016.