Thus, since claimant's duties were unconnected with "laundries operated by power", petitioner argues that claimant's injuries did not occur in the course of hazardous employment. As authority for this conclusion petitioner relies upon the so-called departmental rule, expressed in Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, Okla., 289 P.2d 147, that an employer may conduct different departments within his operation, some of which are hazardous and within the Act, while others are not. Also cited is Board of Education, Ind. School District No. 1, Tulsa County, v. Wright, Okla., 460 P.2d 422, holding a school district employee engaged in hazardous employment is not covered for injury sustained in performing non-hazardous work. Finally petitioner urges application of the test, stated in Oklahoma City v. Acosta, Okla., 488 P.2d 1258, to-wit: whether employee was engaged in hazardous employment at the time of injury is not what an employee was required to do on other occasions, but what he was doing when alleged accidental injury occurred. From this position petitioner concludes claimant was engaged only in picking up soiled linens when injury occurred, which was not hazardous employment within the Act. We are of the opinion neither authorities cited nor the conclusions asserted are controlling.
The test is not what claimant was required to do on other occasions but what he was doing at the time of the alleged accident. Board of Education, Independent School Dist. No. 1, Tulsa, Okla. v. Wright, supra; Woods v. Perryman, Okla., 452 P.2d 588; Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, Okla., 289 P.2d 147; King v. Carl B. King Drilling Co., 194 Okla. 71, 147 P.2d 463. In cases involving the question of whether or not the injured employee, at the time of his alleged injury, was engaged in a hazardous employment as defined by the Workmen's Compensation Act, we are not bound by the findings of the State Industrial Court, but are authorized to weigh and review the evidence in determining if the employment was hazardous.
The test is not what claimant did on other occasions but what he was doing at the time he contends he hurt his back. The evidence is conclusive that on the date of the alleged injury he was assisting in the loading of a washing machine for a retail merchant and therefore was not within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Vieth v. Cook, Okla., 331 P.2d 476; Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v. Harris, Okla., 289 P.2d 147; E.M. Mildred Agency v. Yates, 200 Okla. 168, 191 P.2d 581; King v. Carl B. King Drilling Co., 194 Okla. 71, 147 P.2d 463. The award of the State Industrial Court is vacated.
An injured employee is not entitled to recover compensation, if injured while performing tasks not within the scope of his employment at work coming within the Act although he may on other occasions perform services for his employer coming within the provisions of the Act. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v. Harris, Okla., 289 P.2d 147; E.M. Mildred Agency v. Yates, 200 Okla. 168, 191 P.2d 581; King v. Carl B. King Drilling Co., 194 Okla. 71, 147 P.2d 463. Claimant in support of his position cites the sole case of Spraker v. Carroll, Okla., 416 P.2d 946, wherein we held that an employee burned in a fire which occurred while he was siphoning gasoline from a car to be used for the purpose of cleaning another car in a used car lot was working at work "more hazardous than the work usually performed in filling stations, and that his place of employment was a workshop within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Law.
Pope v. Safeway Stores, Inc., supra, 91 P.2d at 66. It is further well settled that an employer's business may be covered as to some phases by workmen's compensation, and not covered as to other phases. Maley v. Martin, 111 Colo. 545, 144 P.2d 558, 560; Reed v. Russell, 67 Idaho 84, 172 P.2d 853, 854; Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation v. Harris, Okla., 289 P.2d 147, 148-149. Also, the fact that the hunting was being done by the employer under an agreement with the board, rather than the board performing the work by its own employees, would not of itself relieve the employer from responsibility.
We find ample competent evidence to support the finding made by the State Industrial Court. The next proposition urged is that the deceased was not, at the time of his fatal injury, engaged in an employment covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Employer places principal reliance on Black, Sivalls Bryson, Inc. v. Foree, Okla., 289 P.2d 649, and Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, Okla., 289 P.2d 147. These decisions are clearly inapposite. In the former there was no evidence that the deceased production manager had performed any duties at the plant of a mechanical or manual character, and in the latter, employee was engaged by the transportation division of the marketing department whose activities, separate and apart from production processes, were not then within the ambit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Pemberton Bakery v. State Industrial Commission, supra. He was therefore entitled to an award as an employee engaged in hazardous employment. The rule established in Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, Okla., 289 P.2d 147, is not applicable to this case as no departmentalization is established here. Award sustained.