Opinion
Wormwood, Wolvington & Dosh, Robert C. Miller, Charles M. Dosh, Denver, for plaintiff in error.
Wood, Ris & Hames, Philip E. Pankoff, Denver, for defendant in error.
ENOCH, Judge.
This case was originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado and subsequently transferred to the Court of Appeals under authority vested in the Supreme Court.
The parties appear here in reverse order of their appearance in the trial court and will be referred to by name.
The facts relative to the issue on appeal were stipulated to by the parties prior to the ruling made by the trial court.
Rocco A. Villani (Villani) was insured under an automobile liability policy issued by Mid-Century Insurance Company (Mid-Century). The policy in question had a termination date in July 1967. However, on February 6, 1967, Mid-Century mailed a notice of cancellation to Villani, advising Villani that the policy of insurance would be cancelled as of February 18, 1967. The policy contained a provision that Mid-Century could cancel the policy by giving a 10 day written notice to the insured. Villani's automobile was involved in an accident March 17, 1967.
The trial court ruled that the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--7--1 et seq., was controlling in determining the validity of the cancellation. The court then held that the notice given by Mid-Century was not effective because it did not meet the requirements for cancellation as set forth in 1965 Perm.Supp., C.R.S.1963, 13--7--37(2)(d).
It was agreed by the parties that the policy in question was not certified as proof of future financial responsibility pursuant to the Colorado Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act. However, the court ruled that all automobile insurance sold in Colorado is subject to the provisions of the Act. Judgment was entered for Villani for $2,231.50, the amount of the agreed damages.
The only issue on appeal is whether the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act should have been applied in this case.
We hold that the Act does not apply to all policies issued in Colorado and should not have been applied in this case. The Colorado Supreme Court answered this question in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Gonacha, 142 Colo. 170, 350 P.2d 189, and later affirmed its position in American Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Parviz, 153 Colo. 490, 386 P.2d 982. In the Safeco case, the court held that the Colorado Financial Responsibility Law:
'* * * applies to a driver having prior accidents, who has manifested financial irresponsibility and submits to the Director a policy 'as proof' of Future responsibility in order that he may continue to operate an automobile. Substantially identical enactments have been construed to apply only to 'mandatory policies' as distinguished from 'voluntary policies'. This is manifest from a careful reading of C.R.S. '53, 13--7, commonly referred to as 'Colorado Financial Responsibility Law ". (Emphasis added)
Villani contends that Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Conacha, Supra, is not controlling because it was decided in 1960 and the Act was amended in 1965. We have compared the Act, as amended, with the former law and find that as applied to this case, the pronouncements in Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Gonacha and American Service Mutual Insurance Co. v. Parviz, Supra, are equally applicable to the amended Act.
The 'Declaration of Purpose' as stated by the general assembly was not changed in the 1965 amendment. A study of the amended Act indicates that this purpose is even more clearly spelled out by the following sections:
'13--7--3 Definitions. * * * (12) 'Motor Vehicle liability policy', 'operators' policy of liability insurance' or 'financial responsibility bond' means a policy or bond Certified as proof of financial responsibility for the future.'
'(13) 'Proof of financial responsibility for the future,' referred to in this article as proof of financial responsibility, means proof of ability to respond in damages for liability, On account of accidents occurring subsequent to the effective date of said proof arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle * * *.' (Emphasis added)
Motor vehicle liability policies which are intended to be subject to the provisions of this Act are only those which have been certified as proof of financial responsibility for the future.
Section 13--7--37(1)(a) provides:
'Except as provided in Section 13--7--40 (not here applicable) no Such vehicle liability policy or operator's policy of liability insurance shall hereafter be issued in this state unless and until all the following requirements of this section shall be complied with:' (Emphasis added)
Section 13--7--37(2)(a) provides:
'Every motor vehicle liability policy and every operator's policy of liability insurance Accepted as proof under this article shall be subject to the following provisions whether or not contained therein.' (Emphasis added)
And, Section 13--7--37(2)(d), relied on by the trial court, provides:
'No Such policy shall be cancelled except as provided herein * * *.' (Emphasis added)
These sections read together clearly indicate that 'such policy' means a policy which has been accepted and certified as proof of financial responsibility for the future and this is not required until there has been a determination that a motorist is financially irresponsible.
Judgment is reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings as stipulated to by the parties before the trial court.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and DUFFORD, J., concur.