We believe it is significant the legislature has, in consecutive chapters dealing with related subject matter, expressly provided a cause of action for injunctive relief and damages under the Antitrust Act, expressly provided an action for injunctive relief but not damages under the Unfair Trade Practices Law, and provided no private right of action under the Unfair Discrimination Law. The express inclusion of a private right of action for damages in the Antitrust Act indicates the legislature knew how to create such a remedy if that was its intent. See State ex rel. Kusler v. Sinner, 491 N.W.2d 382, 388 (N.D. 1992); Mid-America Steel, Inc. v. Bjone, 414 N.W.2d 591, 596 (N.D. 1987); Hennum v. City of Medina, 402 N.W.2d 327, 332 n. 3 (N.D. 1987). When a statute that fails to expressly provide a private right of action is flanked by a related statute that does expressly create such a remedy, it is an indication the legislature did not intend to create a private right of action by implication.
The last sentence of N.D.C.C. § 35-27-07 shows the legislature intended the statute to deal with both contract vendors and lessors. See Mid-America Steel, Inc. v. Bjone, 414 N.W.2d 591, 596 (N.D. 1987) (last sentence of N.D.C.C. § 35-27-07 shows the legislature could have adopted an acquiescence rule for contract vendors as it did for lessors, but did not do so). The last sentence of N.D.C.C. § 35-27-07 clearly and unambiguously deals with leases.
Peterson Mechanical and the Engnesses stipulated that the Engnesses' interest in the property was superior to Peterson Mechanical's mechanic's lien. See Mid-America Steel, Inc. v. Bjone, 414 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1987). Nereson claimed that Peterson Mechanical waived its mechanic's lien for all labor and materials furnished before November 11, 1985. The trial court found that Peterson Mechanical was estopped from asserting a mechanic's lien against Nereson for labor, skill, and materials furnished before November 11, 1985.
One who sells real property under a contract for deed and retains legal title as security for the debt has a vendor's lien against the property for the unpaid purchase price. Mid-America Steel, Inc. v. Bjone, 414 N.W.2d 591 (N.D. 1987). See also Section 35-20-01, N.D.C.C. As its rationale for reducing the amount Burt and Ruth may claim against the Griggs County property, State Bank asserts that Burt and Ruth's lien on the Foster County property was destroyed when Gerald conveyed that property to State Bank, and therefore the contract price must be proportionately reduced by the price of the Foster County quarter-section.
Summary judgment is a procedural device available for the prompt and expeditious disposition of a controversy without a trial if there is no dispute as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if only a question of law is involved. Mid-America Steel, Inc. v. Bjone, 414 N.W.2d 591, 592 (N.D. 1987). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is sought, and summary judgment is not appropriate if reasonable differences of opinion exist as to the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts.