In arguing that a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification existed here, Ford relies on cases which involve a pretrial identification procedure which the appellant contended tainted the witness's subsequent in-court identification. See, e.g., Bates v. State, 259 Ga. App. 232, 233-234 (2) ( 576 SE2d 619) (2003); Mickel v. State, 257 Ga. App. 421, 422 (2) ( 571 SE2d 439) (2002). However, "even if a pretrial identification is tainted, an in-court identification is not constitutionally inadmissible if it does not depend upon the prior identification but has an independent origin."

(Citation and footnote omitted.) Mickel v. State, 257 Ga. App. 421, 422 (2) ( 571 SE2d 439) (2002). We held in James that the agent was "a trained investigator who was, during the brief time of the sale, professionally focused on the identity of the perpetrator" and that this constituted "an adequate evidentiary basis for admitting her subsequent in-court identification testimony."