Opinion
A22-1383
03-27-2023
Stephen Michael Michuda, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CR-94-006534
Considered and decided by Reilly, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Florey, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Denise D. Reilly, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In 1994, appellant Stephen Michael Michuda pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct. The district court convicted him and, after two probation violations, executed Michuda's 21-month sentence. Michuda did not file a direct appeal.
2. In 1996, Michuda filed his first petition for postconviction relief. Michuda argued he was innocent, he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and his guilty plea was invalid. The postconviction court denied the entire petition, concluding his claims were meritless and his guilty plea was voluntarily, accurately, and intelligently made. Michuda did not appeal this decision.
3. In 2007, Michuda pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, failure to register as a sex offender, deprivation of parental rights, and terroristic threats. State v. Michuda, No. A08-1037, 2009 WL 2225477, at *1 (Minn.App. July 28, 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2009). On respondent State of Minnesota's motion, the district court departed from the sentencing guidelines and imposed an enhanced sentence under the engrained sex offender statute. Id. Michuda appealed and sought to reopen his 1994 conviction for criminal sexual conduct. Id. at *4. This court declined to do so, as the time to appeal from that conviction had expired. Id. at *5.
4. Michuda filed a second pro se postconviction petition in 2015, seeking relief from his 1994 expired conviction. Michuda v. State, No. A16-0779 (Minn.App. Dec. 8, 2016) (order op.), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 14, 2017). Michuda argued his petition was not time-barred and asserted that the newly-discovered-evidence exception was satisfied by his 2014 discovery that the prosecutor on his case was unauthorized to practice law when she had prosecuted him and had been disciplined in 2008. Id. He also contended he met the mental-disease and interests-of-justice exceptions to the two-year statutory requirement. Id.
5. In a "thorough and well-reasoned order" the postconviction court held Michuda's claims were time-barred, his ineffective-assistance and invalid-plea claims were procedurally barred, and his remaining claims related to double punishment, discovery or Brady violations, and the public-defender system were meritless or not properly before the court. Id. On appeal, this court affirmed. Id. Notably, his prosecutor's licensure status did not establish Michuda's innocence by clear and convincing evidence and Michuda failed to show that, despite his due diligence, he could not discover the license restriction within two years of his prosecutor's public reprimand in 2008. Id.; see also In re Graham, 744 N.W.2d 19, 19 (Minn. 2008) (detailing the disciplinary action taken against the prosecutor in this matter); State v. Ali, 752 N.W.2d 98, 108-09 (Minn.App. 2008) (declining to reverse a conviction solely because his prosecutor's license was on restricted status), rev. denied (Minn. May 27, 2009).
6. In 2022, Michuda filed two pro se motions under the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure seeking reversal of his conviction or a new trial. The postconviction court construed the documents as a petition for postconviction relief, which constitutes this case and his third postconviction petition. He argued he (1) received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) was entitled to the help of appellate counsel for his postconviction proceedings; (3) was coerced and entered an invalid guilty plea; (4) was subjected to double punishment; (5) suffered a violation of his plea agreement; (6) was entitled to reversal of his conviction because of his prosecutor's misconduct and invalid licensure; and (7) was not shown his victim's statements as exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
7. The postconviction court denied Michuda's petition, reasoning he raised nearly identical arguments in his second petition and they were "time-barred for the same reasons." The postconviction court determined Michuda did not argue any enumerated exceptions to Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2022), and the issues he raised were procedurally barred as raised in a prior petition.
8. We review the denial of postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. State, 784 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Minn. 2010). A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its "decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record." Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
9. A postconviction petition must be filed no more than two years after an appellate court's disposition of a direct appeal, if one took place, unless the petitioner meets a statutory exception. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4. "We liberally construe the petition in determining whether the petitioner has invoked one of the statutory exceptions." Griffin v. State, 961 N.W.2d 773, 776-77 (Minn. 2021). But when a petitioner fails to assert a timebar exception in his petition, we need not consider them. Id. at 777.
10. When liberally construed, Michuda's petition invokes the newly-discovered-evidence exception related to his claims of prosecutorial misconduct and invalid guilty plea. But he relies on the same evidence he supplied in his second petition. "A new legal argument based on old evidence does not satisfy the newly-discovered-evidence exception." Id. Thus, these claims are time-barred.
11. Moreover, a claim is procedurally barred, or Knaffla-barred, when it was raised in a previous postconviction petition or should have been known but was not raised. State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2022). There are two exceptions to the Knaffla-bar: (1) when a novel legal issue arises that was unavailable at the time of direct appeal; or (2) when the interest of justice requires review. Zumberge v. State, 937 N.W.2d 406, 411-12 (Minn. 2019). To qualify for the interest-of-justice exception, the petitioner must have not "deliberately and inexcusably" failed to raise the claim previously and the claim must have substantive merit. Deegan v. State, 711 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). We decline to apply the Knaffla exceptions if they are not raised by the petitioner. Hooper v. State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 788 (Minn. 2013).
12. In his first and second postconviction petitions, Michuda claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel and challenged his guilty plea. In Michuda's second postconviction petition he claimed: a plea agreement violation, double punishment, a Brady violation, prosecutorial misconduct, and entitlement to postconviction representation. Now in this third petition, Michuda raises identical claims and does not explicitly argue that either Knaffla exception applies. To the extent his various assertions that injustice occurred from 1994 until present invoke the interest-of-justice exception, Michuda has not shown by fact or law that his claims have substantive merit. Thus, Michuda's claims are procedurally barred. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741.
13. For the first time on appeal, Michuda asserts it is unconstitutional to timebar and Knaffla-bar an indigent layperson's postconviction petition for relief when ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are at issue. Because Michuda did not raise this argument in district court, his argument is not properly before us. And we do not reach the issue. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996) (holding an appellate court will not decide issues not raised before the district court).
14. The postconviction court's denial of Michuda's petition for postconviction relief was not "based on an erroneous view of the law or . . . against logic and the facts in the record." Riley, 792 N.W.2d at 833. We discern no abuse of discretion.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.