Opinion
CV106013127.
12-13-2012
Christopher MICHOS et al. v. PLANNING & ZONING COMMISSION OF THE TOWN OF EASTON.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
GILARDI, Judge.
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs Christopher Michos, Amalia Michos and Colleen Adriani from the decision of the defendant Easton Planning & Zoning Commission (commission), granting, with conditions, the special permit of the New England Prayer Center (prayer center), brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield. The plaintiffs are neighboring property owners challenging the special permit.
All subsequent references to the plaintiffs will be to all three plaintiffs collectively, unless otherwise noted.
The court has carefully reviewed the record, listened to the trial of this matter held on May 10, 2012, and considered the briefs of the parties. For the following reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
The record reflects the following factual and procedural background. On May 18, 2010, the prayer center submitted a special permit application to the commission, seeking to establish a place of worship on land that it leased from the town of Easton. (Return of Record [ROR], Exhibit [Exh.] 24.) The land is located in an area of town that is zoned for single-family residences. At its meeting of August 23, 2010, the commission approved the prayer center's special permit application subject to eleven special conditions, enunciated in a " Resolution of Approval." (ROR, Exh. 56.)
The prayer center has challenged five of the commission's special conditions in a separate, companion appeal. See New England Prayer Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 10 6012793.
On November 18, 2011, the plaintiffs filed their appeal brief. The plaintiffs argue that the prayer center's application failed to comply with the Easton zoning regulations (regulations), specifically § 7.3.4, in that parking for the facility is located in the front yard of the property. The plaintiffs contend that, at a public hearing held on August 9, 2010, they raised the defect in the application, but that the commission never addressed it and granted the special permit anyway. The plaintiffs urge the court to interpret the phrase " front yard" in the regulations as meaning the entire area in front of a structure, the phrase's commonly understood ordinary meaning according to any dictionary. The plaintiffs argue that § 5.4.1 FN4 of the regulations creates minimum front yards of no less than fifty feet, but that a front yard, in general, can be larger than fifty feet. Thus, they posit that a front lot setback is what results from the imposition of a minimum front yard, but that " front yard" is not equivalent to " front yard setback." Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that the commission showed " [overwhelming] concern for the environmental sensitivity of the site" and that " [i]n rebuttal to the plaintiffs' argument during the public hearing in favor of prohibiting parking in front of the structure, [A]pplicant [C]orporation's counsel went out of his way to talk about the potential deleterious environmental effects of placing the parking behind the structure as is required by the [R]egulation." They state that " [i]n failing to require the applicant to place its parking outside the front yard, as is required by [Section] 7.3.4(A) of the [R]egulations, the defendant [C]ommission went beyond its legal authority and violated its own [R]egulations."
Section 73.4 of the regulations provides: " Location of off-street parking shall be determined according to the following standards: (A) No parking shall be permitted in the front yard except for necessary access drives. (B) No parking area shall be located within 50 feet of any property line. (C) All parking areas and access drives shall be located so as not to adversely affect the character of the neighborhood in which the premises are located. (D) Should the layout of the property including the improvements and the parking warrant parking to be located in front of the structure, the Commission may permit up to 10% of the off-street parking in front of the structure provided that the parking is designed and limited to visitor use and the foregoing standards."
The commission filed its trial brief on January 25, 2012. The commission argues that it has reasonably and consistently interpreted § 7.3.4(A) of the regulations to mean that once the minimum fifty-foot setback is applied, parking beyond the setback is permitted, and that it is entitled to reasonably interpret its own regulation, which it clearly did in this situation. It contends that this has historically been the interpretation of this regulation for previous religious institutions, allowing for proper balance and compliance with other provisions of the regulations. The commission posits that there is no definition of " front yard" in the regulations, and that arguably, the area in front of the proposed structure is not a front yard at all, as the site plan shows the prayer center at an angle to the street with no parking immediately within 50 to 110 feet of the building entrance. Additionally, the commission argues that it must fairly interpret § 7.3.4(A) so as to not run afoul of the unreasonable burden provisions in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and that the strict interpretation advocated by the plaintiffs, which would disallow all parking in front of a religious structure, may impose a series of unreasonable burdens on such religious applicants.
The prayer center also filed its reply brief on January 25, 2012. The prayer center argues that its application for a special permit complied in all respects with the technical requirements of the regulations, and that the commission so found and granted the application. It asserts that a local zoning commission has broad discretion with regard to the interpretation and application of its own regulations, and that if there are two plausible interpretations of a regulation, the court gives deference to the construction of the language adopted by the commission. The prayer center contends that the commission acted within its legal discretion in interpreting § 7.3.4(A) and applied the term " front yard, " in a manner consistent with the provisions of the regulations as a whole, including § 5.4.1 and the rest of § 7.3.4. The prayer center argues that the commission's action should not be overruled simply because the plaintiffs suggest an alternate interpretation of the regulations. It contends that with regard to this application involving a house of worship on a 30.5-acre parcel, the plaintiffs' suggestion that § 7.3.4(A) should be interpreted to preclude totally and absolutely any parking whatsoever on any portion of the property located anywhere in the front of the proposed building is not a rational or reasonable interpretation of the regulation. Additionally, the prayer center posits that when more than one interpretation of a zoning regulation is possible, restrictions upon the use of land should not be extended by implication and doubtful language and terms subject to different interpretations should be construed against rather than in favor of restricting the use of property.
On February 17, 2012, the plaintiffs filed their brief in reply to the defendants. The plaintiffs counter that the issues in this appeal require only construction of regulatory language, which construction is in the sole province of the court. The plaintiffs contend that the proper standard of review for the court is a de novo statutory analysis. They maintain that § 5.4.1 of the regulations establishes minimum front, side and rear yards and simply sets a minimum depth for the yards rather than defining them; rather, the common dictionary meaning of the term " front yard" should be relied on since the term is not explicitly defined in the regulations and no ambiguity exists. The plaintiffs argue that the notion that the commission has historically relied on prohibiting parking only in the minimum fifty-foot setback is immaterial, since it is not in the record, and that RLUIPA is not implicated here because the regulations apply equally to churches, places of worship, museums, art galleries, private schools, private recreation clubs and nursery schools. Additionally, the plaintiffs posit that prohibition of parking in the front yard yields reasonable results aligned with Easton's town plan.
The original return of record was filed on September 9, 2011. A supplemental return of record was filed on September 29, 2011. The court held a trial on May 10, 2012. A second supplemental return of record was filed on August 23, 2012. Other facts and arguments are set forth herein as needed.
As previously noted, this case has a companion appeal, New England Prayer Center, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 10 6012793. While the return of record was not filed for this appeal specifically, the two appeals have been consolidated and share a record. Therefore the court considers the whole record for purposes of this appeal.
JURISDICTION
Appeals from decisions of a planning and zoning commission to the Superior Court are governed by General Statutes § 8-8, which provides in relevant part: " (b) ... [A]ny person aggrieved by any decision of a board, including a decision to approve or deny ... a special permit or special exception pursuant to [section] 8-3c, may take an appeal to the [s]uperior [c]ourt for the judicial district in which the municipality is located ..." " A statutory right to appeal may be taken advantage of only by strict compliance with the statutory provisions by which it is created." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cardoza v. Zoning Commission, 211 Conn. 78, 82, 557 A.2d 545 (1989).
Aggrievement
" [P]leading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites to a trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of an administrative appeal ... It is [therefore] fundamental that, in order to have standing to bring an administrative appeal, a person must be aggrieved." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bongiorno Supermarket, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 266 Conn. 531, 537-38, 833 A.2d 883 (2003). " Aggrievement presents a question of fact for the trial court and the party alleging aggrievement bears the burden of proving it." Id., at 538-39. " Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory." Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 288 Conn. 143, 156, 953 A.2d 1 (2008). " [E]ither type will establish standing, and each has its own unique features." Soracco v. Williams Scotman, Inc., 292 Conn. 86, 92, 971 A.2d 1 (2009).
" Classical aggrievement ... requires an analysis of the particular facts of the case in order to ascertain whether a party has been aggrieved and, therefore, has standing to appeal." Fleet National Bank's Appeal from Probate, 267 Conn. 229, 242 n .10, 837 A.2d 785 (2004). " Classical aggrievement requires a two-part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share ... Second, the party must also show that the agency's decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Moutinho v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 278 Conn. 660, 665, 899 A.2d 26 (2006).
" Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation." Pond View, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission, supra, 288 Conn. at 156. Thus, under § 8-8(a)(1), " any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board" is statutorily aggrieved.
General Statutes § 8-8(a)(1) provides in full: " ‘ Aggrieved person’ means a person aggrieved by a decision of a board and includes any officer, department, board or bureau of the municipality charged with enforcement of any order, requirement or decision of the board. In the case of a decision by a zoning commission, planning commission, combined planning and zoning commission or zoning board of appeals, ‘ aggrieved person’ includes any person owning land that abuts or is within a radius of one hundred feet of any portion of the land involved in the decision of the board."
In the present case, the plaintiffs argue that the plaintiff Colleen Adriani is the owner of real property commonly known as 47 South Park Avenue, Map 5501A, Block 64, Lot 109, and that pursuant to § 8-8(a)(1), she is defined as an aggrieved person for the purpose of the appeal. The plaintiffs argue that the plaintiffs Amalia and Christopher Michos are the owners of real property commonly known as 8 Princess Pine Lane, Easton, Map 5501A, Block 63, Lot 102, and that that property is located " within 500 feet of the lot where the Special Permit was granted." They contend that development of the subject property under the grant of a special permit will significantly and negatively affect the value of the Michos' real property and their quiet enjoyment thereof, and that thus they are aggrieved persons pursuant to § 8-8(a)(1). The plaintiffs Colleen Adriani and Amalia Michos testified at trial as to their standing as aggrieved persons. The defendants do not challenge the plaintiff's aggrievement in this appeal. Therefore the court finds, as it previously determined at the time of the trial, that the plaintiffs are aggrieved and have standing to prosecute this appeal.
Section 8-8(b) provides that " [an] appeal shall be commenced by service of process in accordance with subsections (f) and (g) of this section within fifteen days from the date that notice of the decision was published as required by the general statutes." Section 8-8(f) states in relevant part: " Service of legal process for an appeal under this section shall be directed to a proper officer and shall be made as follows ... (2) For any appeal taken on or after October 1, 2004, process shall be served in accordance with subdivision (5) of subsection (b) of [section] 52-57. Such service shall be for the purpose of providing legal notice of the appeal to the board and shall not thereby make the clerk of the municipality or the chairman or clerk of the board a necessary party to the appeal." General Statutes § 52-57(b) provides in relevant part that " [p]rocess in civil actions against the following-described classes of defendants shall be served as follows ... (5) against a board, commission, department or agency of a town, city or borough, notwithstanding any provision of law, upon the clerk of the town, city or borough, provided two copies of such process shall be served upon the clerk and the clerk shall retain one copy and forward the second copy to the board, commission, department or agency ..."
In the present case, the commission's decision was published in the Easton Courier on August 26, 2010. (ROR, Exh. 55.) The marshal's return attests that he served the Easton town clerk two copies of process on September 10, 2010, fifteen days later. The marshal also served process on the prayer center on September 10, 2010. Accordingly, the court finds this appeal to be timely and that service of process was proper.
" In the absence of a statutory definition, we turn to General Statutes § 1-1(a), which provides in relevant part: ‘ In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language ...’ To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, we look to the dictionary definition of the term." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone-Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 677-78, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). " When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted .) Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 181-82, 914 A.2d 533 (2007). " When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 182.
General Statutes § 1-2z provides: " The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
" A local ordinance is a municipal legislative enactment and the same canons of construction which we use in interpreting statutes are applicable to ordinances ... A court must interpret a statute as written ... and it is to be considered as a whole, with a view toward reconciling its separate parts in order to render a reasonable overall interpretation ... A zoning ordinance is a local legislative enactment, and in its interpretation the question is the intention of the legislative body as found from the words employed in the ordinance ... The words employed are to be interpreted in their natural and usual meaning ... The language of the ordinance is construed so that no clause or provision is considered superfluous, void or insignificant ... The regulations must be construed as a whole and in such a way as to reconcile all their provisions as far as possible ... [R]egulations are to be construed as a whole since particular words or sections of the regulations, considered separately, may be lacking in precision of meaning to afford a standard sufficient to sustain them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fedus v. Zoning & Planning Commission, 112 Conn.App. 844, 849-50, 964 A.2d 549, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 904, 973 A.2d 104 (2009).
" Our Supreme Court has stated that [b]ecause the interpretation of the regulations presents a question of law, our review is plenary ... Additionally, zoning regulations are local legislative enactments ... and, therefore, their interpretation is governed by the same principles that apply to the construction of statutes ... Ordinarily, [appellate courts afford] deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes ... Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion ... Furthermore, when [an] agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny ... the agency is not entitled to special deference ... [I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law ... Further, a court cannot take the view in every case that the discretion exercised by the local zoning authority must not be disturbed, for if it did the right of appeal would be empty ... [O]n appeal from [the] zoning board's application of [a] regulation to [the] facts of [a] case, [the] trial court must decide whether the board correctly interpreted the regulation and applied it with reasonable discretion." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fedus v. Zoning & Planning Commission, supra, 112 Conn.App. at 848-49.
As previously noted in this decision, § 7.3.4(A) of the regulations states: " No parking shall be permitted in the front yard except for necessary access drives." The court finds that there is no precise definition of " front yard" in the regulations. " Frontage" is defined as " the land between the front of a building and the street" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed.1998). Again, as previously noted, § 5.4.1 of the regulations states: " The minimum front yard shall measure no less than 50 feet at any point when measured perpendicularly to the street line, but in no case shall the structure be less than 75 feet from the center line of the paved surface of any street. The minimum side and rear yards shall measure no less than 40 feet when measured perpendicularly to the respective yard lines." The court agrees with the plaintiffs' reading of these regulations, in that § 5.4.1 does not explicitly define " front yard, " but instead creates a minimum requirement that potentially allows for a front yard larger than fifty feet.
The court notes that there is no definition of " front yard" in the dictionaries it has consulted. In their appeal brief, the plaintiffs offer several definitions of " front yard" from electronic dictionaries to the same effect as this definition of " frontage."
Where the court does not agree with the plaintiffs, however, is the impact of § 7.3.4(D) of the regulations on the outcome of this appeal. The plaintiffs state, in citing § 7.3.4(D), that " [i]n drafting its regulations, the Commission itself equates parking ‘ in the front yard’ [§ 7.3.4(A) ] with parking ‘ in front of the structure’ [§ 7.3.4(D) ]." While the court agrees that this is a valid interpretation of §§ 7.3.4(A) and (D) read together, the plaintiffs fail to realize what § 7.3.4(D) allows. As previously noted, § 7.3.4(D) states: " Should the layout of the property including the improvements and the parking warrant parking to be located in front of the structure, the Commission may permit up to 10% of the off-street parking in front of the structure provided that the parking is designed and limited to visitor use and the foregoing standards." Section 7.3.4(D) explicitly allows parking in front of the structure, ironically the plaintiffs' favored definition of " front yard, " in some circumstances. Under the rules of statutory construction, the plain meaning of this specific regulation allows parking in front of the structure. As there is no argument addressed to the merits of § 7.3.4(D), the court does not need to address whether the circumstances enunciated in that regulation are met in this case. Section 7.3.4(D) plainly allows parking in front of a structure. As to the commission's RLUIPA argument, the court addresses the relevancy of RLUIPA to this case in the companion decision filed under Docket No. CV 106012793. For purposes of this appeal, the court need not make a determination regarding RLUIPA because the case is disposed of on other grounds.
" It is a well-settled principle of [statutory] construction that specific terms covering the given subject matter will prevail over general language of the same or another statute which might otherwise prove controlling ... Where there are two provisions in a statute, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one case or subject within the scope of a general provision, then the particular provision must prevail; and if both cannot apply, the particular provision will be treated as an exception to the general provision." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 305 Conn. 529, 552-53, 46 A.3d 112 (2012).
There is no argument in any brief addressed to the 10 percent requirement or the " designed and limited to visitor use" requirement of § 7.3.4(D). The plaintiffs do point out in their initial brief that " in determining whether the defendant [C]ommission violated its own [R]egulations, [Section] 7.3.4(A), in granting this [S]pecial [P]ermit, it is not unfair for the [C]ourt to note throughout the transcript of both the public hearings and the deliberative session the [C]ommission's [overwhelming] concern for the environmental sensitivity of the site. In rebuttal to the plaintiffs' argument during the public hearing in favor of prohibiting parking in front of the structure, [A]pplicant [C]orporation's counsel went out of his way to talk about the potential deleterious environmental effects of placing the parking behind the structure as is required by the [R]egulation. (Rec. # 59 at pp. 19-21.)
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs' appeal is dismissed.
" In failing to require the applicant to place its parking outside the front yard, as is required by [Section] 7.3.4(A) of the [R]egulations, the defendant [C]ommission went beyond its legal authority and violated its own [R]egulations." This argument would seem to support the notion that the layout of the property would warrant parking to be located in front of the structure, in accordance with § 7.3.4(D). Because this argument is not briefed as to its relation to § 7.3.4(D), however, the court declines to address it.