Opinion
Civil No. TMD 19-3499
01-12-2021
MICHELLE P., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR REMAND
Plaintiff Michelle P. seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or the "Commissioner") denying her application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and alternative motion for remand (ECF No. 13) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff contends that the administrative record does not contain substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision that she is not disabled. No hearing is necessary. L.R. 105.6. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's alternative motion for remand (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED.
The Fourth Circuit has noted that, "in social security cases, we often use summary judgment as a procedural means to place the district court in position to fulfill its appellate function, not as a device to avoid nontriable issues under usual Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards." Walls v. Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 289 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002). For example, "the denial of summary judgment accompanied by a remand to the Commissioner results in a judgment under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), which is immediately appealable." Id.
I
Background
On November 19, 2018, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Paul R. Armstrong held a hearing where Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. R. at 31-55. The ALJ thereafter found on December 17, 2018, that Plaintiff was not disabled from her alleged onset date of disability of October 22, 2015, through the date of the ALJ's decision. R. at 12-30. In so finding, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial, gainful activity since October 22, 2015, and that her degenerative disc disease, degenerative joint disease, fibromyalgia, venous insufficiency, obesity, and chronic pain syndrome were severe impairments. R. at 17-18. She did not, however, have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. R. at 18-19.
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") "to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) where [Plaintiff] lifts or carries 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stands or walks for six of eight hours during the workday, and sits for six of eight hours during the workday." R. at 19-20. In light of this RFC and the VE's testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a customer complaint clerk and telephone answering operator. R. at 22. The ALJ alternatively found that Plaintiff could perform other work in the national economy, such as an office helper, mail clerk, document preparer, or addresser. R. at 22-23. The ALJ thus found that Plaintiff was not disabled from October 22, 2015, through December 17, 2018. R. at 23-24.
"Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). "Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls." Id.
After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, Plaintiff filed on December 9, 2019, a complaint in this Court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. Upon the parties' consent, this case was transferred to a United States Magistrate Judge for final disposition and entry of judgment. The case then was reassigned to the undersigned. The parties have briefed the issues, and the matter is now fully submitted.
II
Disability Determinations and Burden of Proof
The Social Security Act defines a disability as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is "not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B).
To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25, 124 S. Ct. 376, 379-80 (2003). "If at any step a finding of disability or nondisability can be made, the [Commissioner] will not review the claim further." Thomas, 540 U.S. at 24, 124 S. Ct. at 379; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The claimant has the burden of production and proof at steps one through four. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2294 n.5 (1987); Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 2013).
First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i).
Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner looks to see whether the claimant has a "severe" impairment, i.e., an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1522(a), 416.920(c), 416.922(a).
The ability to do basic work activities is defined as "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1522(b), 416.922(b). These abilities and aptitudes include (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. Id. §§ 404.1522(b)(1)-(6), 416.922(b)(1)-(6); see Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141, 107 S. Ct. at 2291.
Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will consider the medical severity of the impairment. If the impairment meets or equals one of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is considered disabled, regardless of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d), 416.920(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(d); see Radford, 734 F.3d at 293.
Fourth, if the claimant's impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the claimant's RFC to determine the claimant's "ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements" of the claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4)(iv), 416.945(a)(4). RFC is a measurement of the most a claimant can do despite his or her limitations. Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 562 (4th Cir. 2006); see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). The claimant is responsible for providing evidence the Commissioner will use to make a finding as to the claimant's RFC, but the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant's "complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [the claimant's] own medical sources." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3). The Commissioner also will consider certain non-medical evidence and other evidence listed in the regulations. See id. If a claimant retains the RFC to perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv).
Fifth, if the claimant's RFC as determined in step four will not allow the claimant to perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant's RFC as determined at step four, age, education, and work experience. See Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012). The Commissioner must prove not only that the claimant's RFC will allow the claimant to make an adjustment to other work, but also that the other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See Walls, 296 F.3d at 290; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the Commissioner will find that the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v).
III
Substantial Evidence Standard
The Court reviews an ALJ's decision to determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). In other words, the issue before the Court "is not whether [Plaintiff] is disabled, but whether the ALJ's finding that [Plaintiff] is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law." Id. The Court's review is deferential, as "[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under this standard, substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion. See Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472; see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court does "not conduct a de novo review of the evidence," Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986), or undertake to reweigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Hancock, 667 F.3d at 472. Rather, "[t]he duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ, not with a reviewing court." Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). When conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
IV
Discussion
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ applied an improper standard in evaluating her subjective complaints. Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 3-5, ECF No. 13-1 (citing Hines, 453 F.3d at 563). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred in requiring her to provide objective evidence to substantiate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her subjective complaints. Id. at 5. She further maintains that the ALJ erroneously relied upon her daily activities and work history to discount her credibility. Id. at 5-7. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erroneously assessed her RFC. Id. at 7-13. For the reasons discussed below, the Court remands this case for further proceedings.
The Fourth Circuit recently reiterated the standard used by ALJs to evaluate a claimant's symptoms:
When evaluating a claimant's symptoms, ALJs must use the two-step framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and [Social Security Ruling ("SSR")] 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016). First, the ALJ must determine whether objective medical evidence presents a "medically determinable impairment" that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimant's alleged symptoms.Arakas v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., ___ F.3d ___, No. 19-1540, 2020 WL 7331494, at *6 (4th Cir. Dec. 14, 2020) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Second, after finding a medically determinable impairment, the ALJ must assess the intensity and persistence of the alleged symptoms to determine how they affect the claimant's ability to work and whether the claimant is disabled. At this step, objective evidence is not required to find the claimant disabled. SSR 16-3p recognizes that "[s]ymptoms cannot always be measured objectively through clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques." Thus, the ALJ must consider the entire case record and may "not disregard an individual's statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical evidence does not substantiate" them.
SSRs are "final opinions and orders and statements of policy and interpretations" that the Social Security Administration has adopted. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). Once published, these rulings are binding on all components of the Social Security Administration. Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 873 n.3, 104 S. Ct. 1532, 1534 n.3 (1984); 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). "While they do not have the force of law, they are entitled to deference unless they are clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the law." Pass, 65 F.3d at 1204 n.3. --------
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [her] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision." R. at 21. "To [Plaintiff's] credit, she had a consistent work history prior to her onset date. This shows that factors other than severe impairments may have prevented [her] from working." R. at 21 (citation omitted). "Further, testing in the record showed normal gait and no neurological deficits. Also, spinal imaging did not show significant abnormalities." R. at 21 (citations omitted). "Lastly, [Plaintiff] is still able to perform activities of daily living, as [she] cooks for an hour, does laundry, does some cleaning, drives, shops, and pays bills." R. at 21. "The above factors show that [Plaintiff's] impairments are not disabling." R. at 21. The ALJ found that his assessment of Plaintiff's RFC was "supported by evidence in the record of full strength and normal walking. The record shows minor abnormalities in imaging and otherwise [Plaintiff] responded well to conservative treatment." R. at 22.
As noted above, however, there does not need to be objective evidence of the claimant's pain itself or its intensity. Arakas, 2020 WL 7331494, at *6. Rather, the claimant is entitled to rely exclusively on subjective evidence to prove the second part of the test above. Id. Among Plaintiff's impairments found by the ALJ to be severe was her fibromyalgia, which is a disease whose symptoms are entirely subjective, with the exception of trigger-point evidence. Id. at *7. Physical examinations of fibromyalgia patients usually yield normal results—a full range of motion, no joint swelling, and normal muscle strength and neurological reactions. Id. The ALJ's analysis here appears to have misunderstood the disease. The ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff's symptoms was based on an incorrect legal standard because "ALJs may not rely on objective medical evidence (or the lack thereof)—even as just one of multiple factors—to discount a claimant's subjective complaints regarding symptoms of fibromyalgia or some other disease that does not produce such evidence." Id. at *8. Remand is thus warranted.
Further, the ALJ erred by discrediting Plaintiff's subjective complaints as inconsistent with her daily activities. "An ALJ may not consider the type of activities a claimant can perform without also considering the extent to which she can perform them." Woods v. Berryhill, 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018). The ALJ found that Plaintiff "is still able to perform activities of daily living, as [she] cooks for an hour, does laundry, does some cleaning, drives, shops, and pays bills." R. at 21. Plaintiff testified, however, that she shopped only monthly and had weekly help in cleaning her home. R. at 42. She also testified that she drove only to her medical appointments and cooked only once every two weeks. R. at 41-42. The ALJ "did not acknowledge the limited extent of those activities as described by [Plaintiff] or explain how those activities showed that [she] could sustain a full-time job." Brown v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 873 F.3d 251, 269 (4th Cir. 2017); see Arakas, 2020 WL 7331494, at *11. The ALJ "must both identify evidence that supports his conclusion and 'build an accurate and logical bridge from [that] evidence to his conclusion.'" Woods, 888 F.3d at 694 (alteration in original) (quoting Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2016)). An ALJ's failure to do so constitutes reversible error. Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868 (4th Cir. 2017). Because "meaningful review is frustrated when an ALJ goes straight from listing evidence to stating a conclusion," the Court remands this case for further proceedings on this ground as well. Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, 311 (4th Cir. 2019) (citing Woods, 888 F.3d at 694).
Because the Court remands this case on other grounds, the Court need not address Plaintiff's remaining arguments. In any event, the ALJ also should address these other issues raised by Plaintiff. See Tanner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 602 F. App'x 95, 98 n.* (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) ("The Social Security Administration's Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual 'HALLEX' notes that the Appeals Council will vacate the entire prior decision of an administrative law judge upon a court remand, and that the ALJ must consider de novo all pertinent issues.").
V
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) is DENIED. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 13) is DENIED. Plaintiff's alternative motion for remand (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED. Defendant's final decision is REVERSED under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. A separate order will issue. Date: January 12, 2021
/s/_________
Thomas M. DiGirolamo
United States Magistrate Judge