Opinion
CIVIL 1:22cv293
05-23-2023
MICHELLE J.[1], Plaintiff, v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM C. LEE, JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
This matter is before the court for judicial review of a final decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security Administration denying Plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, and for Supplemental Sescurity Income under Title XVI of the Act. Section 405(g) of the Act provides, inter alia, "[a]s part of his answer, the [Commissioner] shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have the power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the [Commissioner], with or without remanding the case for a rehearing." It also provides, "[t]he findings of the [Commissioner] as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive...." 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
The law provides that an applicant for disability benefits must establish an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous period of no less than 12 months...." 42 U.S.C. §416(i)(1); 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(3). It is not enough for a plaintiff to establish that an impairment exists. It must be shown that the impairment is severe enough to preclude the plaintiff from engaging in substantial gainful activity. Gotshaw v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963); Garcia v. Califano, 463 F.Supp. 1098 (N.D.Ill. 1979). It is well established that the burden of proving entitlement to disability insurance benefits is on the plaintiff. See Jeralds v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 36 (7th Cir. 1971); Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970).
Given the foregoing framework, "[t]he question before [this court] is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the [Commissioner's] findings." Garfield v. Schweiker, 732 F.2d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 1984) citing Whitney v. Schweiker, 695 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1982); 42 U.S.C. §405(g). "Substantial evidence is defined as 'more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Rhoderick v. Heckler, 737 F.2d 714, 715 (7th Cir. 1984) quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1410, 1427 (1971); see Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781, 784 (7th Cir. 1977). "If the record contains such support [it] must [be] affirmed, 42 U.S.C. §405(g), unless there has been an error of law." Garfield, supra at 607; see also Schnoll v. Harris, 636 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1980).
In the present matter, after a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") made the following findings:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2023.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 31, 2019, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: anxiety disorder, depression/severe early onset dysthymic disorder with intermittent major depressive episodes, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), obesity, neuropathy, polyarthralgia, and migraine (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant should avoid concentrated exposure to vibration; cannot work in a loud or very loud work environment; can frequently climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; and must avoid unprotected heights and dangerous machinery with unprotected moving mechanical parts. The claimant can perform work involving simple instructions and routine, repetitive tasks, defined as tasks and instructions that can be learned through short demonstration, up to and including one month. The claimant cannot perform work requiring a specific production rate, such as assembly-line work; can meet production requirements that allow a flexible and goal oriented pace; can maintain the focus, persistence, concentration, pace, and attention to engage in such tasks for two-hour increments, for eight-hour workdays, within the confines of normal work breaks and lunch periods; and can make simple work-related decisions. Furthermore, the claimant can deal with changes in a routine work setting and can tolerate brief and superficial interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public, which is defined as occasional and casual contact with no prolonged conversations but contact with supervisors still includes what is necessary for general instruction, task completion, or training.
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant was born on December 10, 1974 and was 44 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8. The claimant has a limited education (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because the claimant's past relevant work is unskilled (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968).
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and 416.969a).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from August 31, 2019, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).(Tr. 19-27).
Based upon these findings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits, leading to the present appeal.
Plaintiff filed her opening brief on February 1, 2023. On April 12, 2023 the defendant filed a memorandum in support of the Commissioner's decision, to which Plaintiff replied on May 15, 2023. Upon full review of the record in this cause, this court is of the view that the Commissioner's decision should be remanded.
A five step test has been established to determine whether a claimant is disabled. See Singleton v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 710, 711 (7th Cir. 1988); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2290 91 (1987). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has summarized that test as follows:
The following steps are addressed in order: (1) Is the claimant presently unemployed? (2) Is the claimant's impairment "severe"? (3) Does the impairment meet or exceed one of a list of specific impairments? (4) Is the claimant unable to perform his or her former occupation? (5) Is the claimant unable to perform any other work within the economy? An affirmative answer leads either to the next step or, on steps 3 and 5, to a finding that the claimant is disabled. A negative answer at any point, other than step 3, stops the inquiry and leads to a determination that the claimant is not
disabled.Nelson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 503, 504 n.2 (7th Cir. 1988); Zalewski v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 160, 162 n.2 (7th Cir. 1985); accord Halvorsen v. Heckler, 743 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1984). In the present case, Step 5 was the determinative inquiry.
In support of remand, Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the physical therapy records in evidence. The ALJ relied on a few select physical therapy records to opine that Plaintiff's ailments were improving. (Tr. 24). However, other physical therapy records indicate that Plaintiff continued to have a wide variety of functional limitations, such a prolonged standing, turning head, looking up, looking over shoulder, and so on. (Tr. 390-93). As it appears the ALJ cherry-picked the evidence regarding Plaintiff's functional limitations and failed to evaluate records supporting Plaintiff's claims, remand is warranted on this issue.
Similarly, with respect to Plaintiff's mental health, the ALJ relied on a few statements in the record that Plaintiff was showing improvement (Tr. 24), while ignoring other evidence showing that Plaintiff reported increased anxiety and depression with occasional suicidal ideation. (Tr. 414, 517; see also Tr. 406, 417, 421, 469, 499, 508). As the ALJ failed to consider important parts of the record supporting Plaintiff's claims, remand is warranted on this point.
As the decision is not supported by substantial evidence, remand is required.
Conclusion
On the basis of the foregoing, the decision of the Commissioner is hereby REVERSED AND REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.