their equivalent, was valid and proper in every respect, and was not at variance with the published notice of intention to issue said bonds given to the taxpayers of Perry County. Secs. 2926-21 — 2926-37, 10127, Code 1942; Chap. 196, Laws 1960. III. The Board of Supervisors of Perry County has made proper provision and security for the payment of the above mentioned obligations in the manner authorized by law, which security is protected from subsequent impairment by Section 16 of the Mississippi Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of the United States. Cone v. Hope-Fulton-Emmett Road Improvement Dist., 169 Ark. 1032, 277 S.W. 544; Forsdick v. Board of Levee Comrs., supra; Highway District v. Fremont County, 32 Idaho 473, 185 P. 66; Hubell v. Leonard, 6 F. Supp. 145; Jasper County v. Town of Heidelberg, 204 Miss. 780, 38 So.2d 97; Love v. Humphreys County, 190 Miss. 365, 200 So. 245; Love v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of Yazoo City, 162 Miss. 65, 138 So. 600; Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175, 188 N.E. 921; Pryor v. Goza, supra; Street v. Town of Ripley, 173 Miss. 225, 161 So. 855; Town of Heidelberg v. Jasper County, 218 Miss. 147, 65 So.2d 463; Von Zondt v. Town of Braxton, 149 Miss. 461, 115 So. 557; Art. I Sec. 10, U.S. Constitution; Sec. 16, Constitution 1890; Sec. 2926-21 — 2926-37, Code 1942; Chap. 196, Laws 1960; Anno. 115 A.L.R. 220. IV. The decree in the Chancery Court validating the state-aid road bonds of Perry County was valid and proper in every respect and should be sustained.
Thus, the imposition of maintenance charges is lawful, and the funds collected become public funds to be used by the legislature for such public purposes as it may determine. ( Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175.) The fact that the legislature may provide that amounts, when collected, shall be placed in a certain fund does not ordinarily preclude a later General Assembly from ordering it paid into another fund or from abolishing the fund altogether.
Plaintiff further interposes the argument that the statute violates section 13 of article IV of the Illinois constitution, since the subjects included in the act are not fully expressed in its title. The constitutional provision that no act shall embrace more than one subject is designed to prevent the joinder of incongruous and unrelated matters in one act. ( Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175.) However, if all the provisions of an act relate to one subject, indicated in the title, and are reasonably connected with it, so as not to mislead the General Assembly or the public, there is a sufficient compliance with the constitutional provision, which must be liberally construed.
Careful examination discloses that paragraph one refers to executive-administrative actions whereas paragraph two pertains to legislative action. The former (executive) type transfer is generally prohibited whereas the latter (legislative) type transfer is within the power of the Legislature unless such diversion would conflict with a constitutional provision or would impair the obligation of contract.Michaels v Barrett, 355 Ill. 175; 188 N.E. 921 (1934), is factually closest to the instant situation. There, the Legislature had enacted a motor fuel tax and provided that the revenues derived therefrom should be used for the purpose of constructing and improving roads.
In Gates v. Sweitzer, 347 Ill. 353, 179 N.E. 837 (1932), we held that “[m]unicipal officers have no right to divert moneys from one fund to another and different fund for which it was not appropriated. But the word ‘divert’ is used in the sense of turning such fund permanently from its purpose or the final appropriation of it to some other use.” Id. at 359, 179 N.E. 837 ; see also Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175, 185–86, 188 N.E. 921 (1934). Based on this reasoning, we held in People ex rel. Brenza v. Gilbert, 409 Ill. 29, 97 N.E.2d 793 (1951), that an improper diversion of funds occurred where funds were used for a different purpose than that allowed by statute.
However, we believe that the effect of the Authority's lawful acts is analogous in principle to the right of the State to control the use and disposition of its property and funds without impairment of the contractual obligations of its bonds, except in those instances where contract rights have been acquired to the particular property or funds. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 289, p. 1310. See Guardian Savings Trust Co. v. Dillard, 8th Circuit, 15 F.2d 996, 998, 999, 1001; Cone v. Hope-Fulton-Emmett Road Improvement Dist., 169 Ark. 1032, 277 S.W. 544, 546; Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175, 188 N.E. 921. It is our conclusion that Protestant's contention is without merit and that there was no impairment of the contractual provisions of Will Rogers Turnpike bonds as prohibited by Art. 1, Sec. 10, of the United States Constitution and Art. 2, Sec. 15, of the Oklahoma Constitution.
The constitutional provision does not, of course, require the title of a statute to contain all the detailed provisions of an act or to serve as an index to its contents. ( Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175.) Inclusion of the words "fair value" in the title of the Amendatory Act was not required.
Where the title of an original act is repeated in the title of an amendatory act, the amendatory act is as broad and comprehensive as the act amended, and any provision which might have been inserted in the original act may be inserted in the amendatory act without violating the constitutional provision that the subject of the act be expressed in the title. ( Malloy v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 97; City of Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198; Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175.) The title to the original act, in the present case, related to the acquisition and control of lands for State parks and, measured by past decisions, was sufficient to meet the constitutional provision.
The following decisions support our position, and we are unable to find cases opposed to our conclusion: The petition, in Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175, 188 N.E. 921, sought to restrain expenditures from the motor fuel tax fund to pay the principal and interest on bonds issued to provide relief for destitute persons. The supreme court of Illinois decided the question in the following language:
(Werner v. Martin, 359 Ill. 213.) Bonds and notes secured by and to be paid from revenues derived from the specific income-bearing property, for which the bonds are issued, differ very materially from notes issued in anticipation of the collection of the public revenue for the construction of highways which return no revenue but are a constant liability for maintenance and repair. In the latter case the State is pledging its faith that revenues paid to it, which may be used for general governmental purposes (Werner v. Martin, supra; Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175;) if the General Assembly should so direct, shall, however, be used to pay such notes. An essential element of a debt is the obligation to pay.