Opinion
1785-2021
08-02-2022
MARK ROBERT MICHAEL WOZAR v. GAYLE LYNN WOZAR
UNREPORTED
CHILD ACCESS
Circuit Court for Harford County Case No. 12-C-16-000549.
Graeff, Leahy, Ripken, JJ.
OPINION [*]
Leahy, J.
In November 2016, a judgment of absolute divorce was entered in the underlying family law case in the Circuit Court for Harford County. The parties, Mr. Mark Robert Michael Wozar ("Father") and Ms. Gayle Lynne Wozar ("Mother") entered into a "Final Parenting Plan" which was incorporated into a consent order by the circuit court on August 31, 2016. Under the Parenting Plan, the parties agreed to share joint legal custody, and Mother was awarded primary physical custody with Father having either weekly or biweekly visitation periods.
Father filed an appeal in 2019 from his petition to modify the visitation schedule and unsuccessful petition to hold mother in contempt. On August 6, 2020, we affirmed the circuit court's order. Since then, Father has filed dozens of motions related to the conduct of Mother and the custody and visitation of their two sons.
Relevant to this appeal, on July 22, 2021, Father filed a petition to modify child support. Mother consented to the modification and on December 8, 2021 the circuit court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order reducing Father's child support obligation, reasoning that one of the parties' two children had reached the age of majority and that Mother's income had substantially increased. Father filed a motion to reconsider on December 22, 2021, which the circuit court denied.
The parties' oldest child, born on November 19, 2002, reached the age of majority on November 19, 2020. The parties' younger child, born on October 23, 2004, will reach the age of majority later this year, on October 23, 2022.
The following month, Mother informed Father that their younger child, still a minor, had contracted COVID-19. Father subsequently filed, beginning on January 6, 2022, several motions and addenda thereto, collectively requesting the court to: 1) grant him medical decision-making authority over the child; 2) order Mother to provide him with information and documentation relating to the child's health, and "inform [Father] of all medical matters involving the minor child"; and 3) shorten the time for filing a response to Father's motion to "0 days." On January 13, 2022, the court denied Father's request for medical decision-making authority, but granted his request to order Mother to provide the requested medical information. On the same day, Father filed a notice of appeal and presents five questions for our review:
"I. Did HCCC err and/or abuse its discretion and/or violate Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights by indefinitely suspending the Appellant's ability to participate [in] medical decisions (to include treatment for sexual assaults, malnutrition, and/or false imprisonment) without stating why those rights were removed nor providing a timetable/condition for re-in-statement?
II. Did the trial court err in its not allowing "exculpatory" evidence violating Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights?
III. Did the trial court err in its [sic] by disallowing the Appellant's [sic] to receive credit for payment of medical insurance violating Maryland Family Law 12-204(1)?
IV. Did the court abuse its discretion by not receiving testimony that was for the best interest of the child(ren) when requested as the undisputed material showed serious and immediate danger impacting the safety and welfare of the child(ren)?
V. Did HCCC commit trial by ambush as HCCC did not follow procedures?"
We hold that questions II, IV and V are barred by the law of the case doctrine because they challenge the circuit court's December 2019 Custody and Visitation Order, which was reviewed and affirmed by this Court in an opinion issued in Father's first appeal, Wozar v. Wozar ("Wozar I"), No. 2286, Sept. Term. 2019. Next, we discern two components to Question I as presented in Father's briefing: one requesting medical decision making authority, which is also barred under law of the case doctrine; and the other requesting medical information, which is not properly before this Court because Father was not aggrieved by the circuit court's decision from which he appeals. Finally, Father seeks to challenge the circuit court's modified child support order in question III; however, because he failed to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of that order, we may only consider the circuit court's disposition of the motion for reconsideration, filed 14 days after entry of the court's order. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration as Father did not supply any evidence that he provided health insurance for the children and his argument that the circuit court did not clarify his visitation rights is barred by the law of the case doctrine.
BACKGROUND
The Marriage, Divorce, and Consent Order
Mother and Father were married in September of 2000. They are the natural parents of two children, born November 19, 2002 and October 23, 2004. The parties separated in January of 2015 and, on November 7, 2016, the circuit court entered a judgment of absolute divorce. On August 30, 2016, the parties entered into a "Final Parenting Plan," which the circuit court incorporated into a consent order the following day. The plan specified that Mother and Father "agree[ed] to share joint legal custody of the children[.]" As part of the joint custody arrangement, the parents agreed to confer regarding "educational decisions" and "any extraordinary medical decisions" except emergency medical treatment, which was to be "procured by the parent with whom the children [were] with at the time[.]"While Mother was awarded primary physical custody, the order specified that the Children would be with their Father "at any . . . times that are mutually agreed upon" as well as "the first Tuesday of every month from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and Sundays from 8:30 a.m. until noon (or to extra-curricular activity)." If the Children had an "away tournament" during Father's visitation period on Sundays, the plan specified that they "will attend the tournament[.]"
Should emergency medical treatment be procured, the plan required that "the other parent will be contacted as soon as possible."
The Petition for Contempt and to Modify
Father filed a contempt petition in February 2018 claiming that Mother was "unilaterally" violating the Parenting Plan by, among other things, denying him visitation during the agreed upon time on Sundays. He claimed that Mother "blocked" him and "refuse[d] to discuss pickups," resulting in him seeing his sons only once during a six-week span. Mother filed an answer denying the allegations in Father's complaint. In July 2018, Father filed an amended contempt petition in which he identified 16 dates on which he alleged that Mother interfered with his scheduled visitation.
Father also filed a petition to modify visitation in May 2018 after moving to New York state for a new employment opportunity. Mother filed an answer, in which she asked that the circuit court dismiss the petition.
A hearing on Father's petitions was held before a magistrate on October 25, 2018. Ms. Kathryn Rogers, an evaluator with the Office of Family Court Services, testified that although her evaluation was "incomplete" as she had insufficient time to review Father's "440 page notebook of information," she had gathered "enough information . . . to raise concerns regarding [the children's] emotional well-being." A thread that ran through her interviews with the Children, Ms. Rogers explained, was "their father's unrelenting questions about their mother." The children advised Ms. Rogers that Father "has shown them documents and discussed inappropriate information" and that Father's behavior made them, at times, "anxious[.]" She suggested that the children "need time to stabilize" and, to do so, needed "a reprieve . . . from this situation." Shortly after this recommendation, Father walked out of the hearing. After Ms. Rogers finished testifying to her preliminary findings, the magistrate indicated "that on a pendente lite basis, only the joint legal custody" arrangement in the Parenting Plan was to continue.
The magistrate issued a report and recommendations on January 7, 2019 in which he recommended, among other things, that, except for telephonic contact and letters delivered by the United States Postal Service, Father's access to the minor children "be suspended pending further proceedings." The circuit court held an immediate order hearing on January 15, 2019 and, on January 22, 2019, entered a temporary order which specified that Father's access to the Children was suspended "pending further order of court" but allowed Father to communicate with the Children via telephone and email "no more than once a day." The order further specified that "the parties shall continue to have the joint legal custody of the minor children except that all decisions pertaining to the participation of the minor children regarding counseling" shall be at the discretion of Mother.
The circuit court held a merits hearing on Father's petitions on December 2 and 3, 2019. The court issued a memorandum opinion and order on December 19, 2019 granting in part Father's petition to modify visitation and denying his contempt petition. The opinion explained that the court heard from "multiple witnesses" including Ms. Rogers and received into evidence transcripts of two prior hearings before a magistrate. The court determined that Father's move to New York constituted "a material change in circumstances which could warrant a modification to the visitation schedule." Adhering to the "parties' consistent requests," the court ordered that Father "have liberal visitation" with the children. And, to guarantee that Father was kept abreast of the children's health and education, it ordered that Mother provide Father "with monthly updates" and clarified that "[e]arlier [and] more frequent reports may be warranted in the case of significant changes[.]" With respect to his contempt petition, the court accepted Father's allegations that he "has regularly traveled from New York to Maryland seeking visitation" with the children; however, it denied the petition as it was "unable to reach the conclusion that [Mother] caused any of the missed visitation opportunities to occur." Father moved to alter or amend the judgment on December 27, 2019. The circuit court denied the motion, and Father appealed to this Court.
In an unreported opinion, this Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County. While Father presented two multipart questions, this Court explained that many of Father's arguments were deficient, as his brief did not "provide sufficient information and [did] not comply with the Maryland Rules governing appellate proceedings." Wozar I, No. 2286, Sept. Term. 2019, slip op at 9. These deficiencies, we held, were "material in [the] case" as Father's "failure to provide citations to the record supporting his arguments [left] us unable to discern, much less resolve, his wide-ranging complaints." Id. at 10. Although dismissal of the entire appeal was permissible, the Court addressed whether the circuit court erred in restricting Father's visitation with his sons. Id. at 2. After clarifying that the court's December 19, 2019 order supplanted the Temporary Order entered in January 2019, the Court explained that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by providing Father with "liberal visitation with his children[.]" Id. at 14. To the contrary, the circuit court ordered visitation "as Father requested[.]" Id. This Court also determined that the circuit court did not "abuse its discretion in ordering that Mother provide Father with monthly email updates regarding the health and education of the children, in the absence of significant change." Id. Father subsequently filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was denied on September 25, 2020.
Specifically, we explained that Father's brief did not comply with Maryland Rule 8-504 as it did not contain "'[a] clear concise statement of the facts material to a determination of the questions presented,' with '[r]eference . . . to the pages of the record extract supporting the assertions'" and did not "provide '[a]rgument in support of [his] position on each issue.'" Wozar I, No. 2286, Sept. Term 2019, at 9.
Post-Appeal Proceedings
Following the resolution of his first appeal, Father filed, among dozens of other motions, a petition to modify child support in which he requested that the court decrease his monthly child support obligation. The reduction was proper, Father argued, because his oldest son had graduated from high school and Mother's income had substantially increased as she had started a new job. Father's financial statement indicated that his monthly income was $7,206.00 and that he did not pay any "monthly health insurance premium," "[w]ork-related monthly child care expenses," "[e]xtraordinary monthly medical expenses," or "[s]chool and transportation expenses." In her answer, Mother admitted the allegations in Father's petition and asked that the court grant the child support modification. Her financial statement provided that she made $7,916.66 in monthly income and paid $183.22 for the minor child's monthly health insurance premium.
The circuit court held a hearing on Father's petition on December 2, 2021. The court preliminarily denied Father's request to sanction Mother for not responding to Father's interrogatories, as it found that the propounded interrogatories did not "have any bearing or are relevant to the proceedings before the [c]ourt today." The parties and the court agreed that only one of the couple's children was "subject to a child support obligation," as the older child had reached the age of majority and had graduated high school. Father and the court could not, however, agree on what Father's monthly obligation should be reduced to, as Father contested the court's child support guidelines calculation.Father also argued that he was entitled to receive child support back from Mother, as he had "overpaid" for several months after their oldest child reached the age of majority. In Father's view, he was also entitled to a $250.00 a month reduction in child support as compensation for expenses that he incurs when he travels from New York to Maryland to visit the Children. Finally, although he agreed that Mother was responsible for procuring health insurance for the children, Father claimed (without any documentary evidence) that he consistently maintained health insurance policies for the children and requested that he receive an $86.00 dollar per month child support reduction to account for the costs of the minor child's policy. The court held the matter sub curia.
"The calculation of a child support award is governed by FL § 12-204. The statute includes a schedule for the calculation of child support, commonly referred to as the 'Guidelines[.]'" Kaplan v. Kaplan, 248 Md.App. 358, 386 (2020).
The parties' "Separation and Marital Settlement Agreement" states that "Mother shall continue to maintain the existing hospital and medical, dental, vision, and major medical insurance policy, program or coverage for the benefit of the minor children for so long as the minor children are insurable within the terms of the policy and said policy is available through [the] employer at a reasonable cost.
The court issued a memorandum opinion and order on December 8, 2021. Using the uncontested financial figures presented in the parties' financial statements and the applicable child support guidelines, it explained that "no deviation from the child support guidelines [was] warranted" and modified Father's child support obligation from $2,100.00 to $1,021.00 a month. The court declined to credit Father for any overpayment or voluntary financial contributions that he made to the children. The court also found that Father "voluntarily elected to relocate to the state of New York for employment purposes," and, even if the court were to accept that each trip to Maryland cost him $250.00, it explained that the expenses are not reimbursable because they "are for [Father] to travel to Maryland and not for the transportation of the children between the homes of the parents."
Father filed a motion for reconsideration on December 22, 2021 arguing that the court did not "address the material fact that [Father] has always paid monthly premiums [for] medical expenses." He restated his argument that his support obligation should be reduced to reflect his health insurance premium payments. In Father's view, the court's opinion was also deficient because it did not "articulate what [Father] may and may not do with the minor child." The circuit court denied Father's motion on January 10, 2022.
After the court decided the child support matter, in January 2022, Father filed an assortment of motions and addenda after Mother informed him that their son had contracted COVID-19. In the motions, Father argued that Mother was not communicating essential medical information to him. He requested that the court order Mother to "inform [him] of all medical matters involving the minor child" and that he be awarded "sole and complete medical authority to make decisions as [Mother] refuse[d] to provide details to include but not restricted to strain [of the COVID-19 virus], name of provider, treatment plan, and supporting information." On January 13, 2022, the court ordered that Mother "immediately provide [Father] with contact information and treatment summaries for all medical providers currently treating [their son]" but denied Father's request for medical decision-making authority.
Father noted an appeal on January 13, 2022.
Although Mother appeared at the circuit court proceedings, she did not file a brief in this Court.
DISCUSSION
I.
Question I: Medical Decision-Making Authority
Father appeals from the circuit court's order granting, in part, and denying, in part, his motion for medical communication and medical decision-making authority. As a threshold matter, we must first address whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal because, generally, a party may only appeal from a final judgment. See Md. Code (1973, 2020 Repl. Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings ("CJP"), § 12-301; Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 323 (2005) ("The general rule as to appeals is that, subject to a few limited exceptions, a party may appeal only from a final judgment."). However, a party may appeal from certain interlocutory orders as authorized by law, such as in a civil case from an order "[d]epriving a parent, grandparent, or natural guardian of the care and custody of his child, or changing the terms of such an order[.]" CJP §12-303(3)(x). Here, Father's appeal is a permissible interlocutory appeal, as it challenges the court's order denying him medical decision-making authority, which relates to the care of his minor child.
In his notice of appeal, Father argued that his son was "battling a life-threatening virus" and that Mother had refused to provide him with medical information and "provided inaccurate and incomplete medical information to medical personnel."
In his first question presented to this Court, Father avers that the circuit court erred by "indefinitely suspending [his] ability to participate in medical decisions (to include treatment for sexual assaults, malnutrition, and/or false imprisonment)." This question, and the corresponding arguments, do not challenge the circuit court's January 13, 2022 order denying Father medical decision making. Instead, the question attacks the circuit court's December 2019 visitation order, and the orders and hearings that proceeded it. Because this argument was raised in Father's first appeal, it is now barred by the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case doctrine is a "rule of appellate procedure whereby, 'once an appellate court has answered a question of law in a given case, the issue is settled for all future proceedings.'" Long v. Burson, 182 Md.App. 1, 15 n.8 (2008) (quoting Stokes v. Am. Airlines, 142 Md.App. 440, 446 (2002)). "Not only are lower courts bound by the law of the case, but '[d]ecisions rendered by a prior appellate panel will generally govern the second appeal' at the same appellate level as well, unless the previous decision is incorrect because it is out of keeping with controlling principles announced by a higher court and following the decision would result in manifest justice.'" Scott v. State, 379 Md. 170, 183 (2004) (quoting Hawes v. Liberty Homes, 100 Md.App. 222, 231 (1994)). In Maryland, law of the case "applies to both questions that were decided and questions that could have been raised and decided." Holloway v. State, 232 Md.App. 272, 282 (2017). Courts may raise the law of the case doctrine sua sponte even if not raised by the parties. See id. at 280 ("Accordingly, even if the parties fail to raise law of the case as a defense, the court may still choose to apply it.").
Although the issue may well be moot, we also hold that Father cannot appeal the circuit court's favorable ruling instructing Mother to provide him with medical information related to the COVID-19 diagnosis and care of their minor child. Generally, a party is not able to challenge a favorable ruling, as he or she is not aggrieved by the ruling. See Rush v. State, 403 Md. 68, 95 (2008) (A party "cannot appeal from a favorable ruling"); Adm'r, Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Vogt, 267 Md. 660, 664 (1973) ("[G]enerally, a party cannot appeal from a judgment or order which is favorable to him, since he is not thereby aggrieved.") (citations omitted). The circuit court's ruling in regard to medical communication was favorable to Father, as the court ordered that Mother immediately provide Father "with contact information and treatment summaries for all medical providers currently treating [the child][.]" Consequently, Father cannot challenge it on appeal.
Because Mother is not actively participating in this appeal, and Father fails to submit any relevant medical records, we are unable to discern the minor child's current medical status. However, given that the child contracted COVID-19 more than seven months ago, it is likely that the parties no longer need to share medical information related to his diagnosis. See Lisa Maragakis, Coronavirus Diagnosis: What Should I Expect?, Johns Hopkins Medicine, (updated Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/health/conditions-and-diseases/coronavirus/diagnosedwith-covid-19-what-to-expect ("Those with a mild case of COVID-19 usually recover in one to two weeks. For severe cases, recovery can take six weeks or more[.]").
II. Questions II, IV, and V
Several of Father's other questions seek to challenge proceedings or orders that were or could have been brought in his first appeal before this Court. His second question asserts that the circuit court erred by entering the Temporary Order without allowing him to present "exculpatory evidence." The circuit court, he alleges, removed his parental rights based on an incomplete evaluation performed by "unqualified persons." In his view, the court chose to ignore that his doctors had declared that his medical conditions were in "[f]ull remission."
Father, in his fourth question, asserts that the circuit court "abused its discretion by not receiving testimony that was for the best interest of the child[ren]" which "denied [him] a fair trial[.]" He argues that the circuit court "admits the investigation was incomplete and will not allow the evidence/testimony to be presented to seal the breach." The additional testimony, Father avers, would have uncovered facts related to "false imprisonment, sexual assaults, malnutrition, [and] denial of food."
Father articulates a similar argument in a contempt petition filed on February 10, 2022. The circuit court denied the motion "as frivolous" on the same day. Because Father's notice of appeal was filed with this Court before this contempt petition was filed and ruled upon, it is not properly before us and we decline to consider it.
Finally, in his fifth question, Father argues that the circuit court committed "trial by ambush" as, in his view, it committed "four procedural infractions." First, he contends that the circuit court erred when it denied a motion he filed on November 29, 2019 requesting complimentary transcripts of an October 25, 2018 hearing before a magistrate. He argues that under Maryland Rule 9-205.3(i)(1) he was entitled to a complementary transcript, because his petitions were not resolved at a pretrial or settlement conference, as neither hearing was held. Second, he argues that the circuit court erred in admitting the evaluator's report at the visitation and contempt hearing as it was "incomplete" because the evaluator had not reviewed "all documents." He also argues that he was not provided a copy of the report before the hearing and asserts that it is deficient as it did not state what Father "did wrong and ignored what [Mother] did wrong[.]" Third, he argues that the circuit court "tried to introduce fabricated evidence about [him] at proceedings without advance knowledge." Finally, he contends that he received the magistrate's report and recommendations "only provided hours before" a hearing "depriving [Father] and children of due process . . . as [Father] [did] not have time to get the transcript request in let alone file the exceptions[.]" Each of these questions is barred by the law of the case doctrine.
The Court of Appeals, in Fidelity-Baltimore National Bank & Trust Co. v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., clarified the scope of the law of the case doctrine. 217 Md. 367 (1958). There, an employee of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. "presented false claims in behalf of fictitious claimants on insurance policies" to Fidelity-Baltimore National Bank & Trust Co. Id. at 370. The case was originally brought by John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. "as the drawer of the checks against [Fidelity-Baltimore National Bank & Trust Co.] as collecting banks that had cashed or deposited the checks that had forged endorsements upon them[.]" Id. The trial court "sustained demurrerss," and the Court of Appeals reversed after holding that "the demurrers were improperly sustained[.]" Id. at 371. On a second appeal, Fidelity-Baltimore National Bank & Trust Co. attempted to raise two questions: (1) whether a collecting bank is liable to the drawer of a check issued to a fictitious payee if the drawer is unaware of the fictitious payee and the check bears a fraudulent endorsement and (2) whether the "imposter rule" barred John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. from recovery. Id. The Court of Appeals explained the first question was raised in the first appeal and was specifically answered. Id. It characterized the first question as "an effort on the part of the appellants to reintroduce" an issue decided in the first appeal. Id. While acknowledging that the second question was not raised in the first appeal, the Court noted that "there can be no doubt that it was available in that proceeding as a ground to sustain the demurrers[.]" Id. Therefore, the Court reasoned that both claims were barred by the law of the case doctrine as:
It is the well-established law of this state that litigants cannot try their cases piecemeal. They cannot prosecute successive appeals in a case that raises the same questions that have been previously decided by this Court in a former appeal of that same case; and, furthermore, they cannot, on the subsequent appeal of the same case raise any question that could have been presented in the previous appeal on the then state of the record, as it existed in the court of original jurisdiction. If this were not so, any party to a suit could institute as many successive appeals as the fiction of his imagination could produce new reasons to assign as to why his side of the case should prevail, and the litigation would never terminate. Once this Court has ruled upon a question properly presented on an appeal, or, if the ruling be contrary to a question that could have been raised and argued in that appeal on the then state of the record, as aforesaid, such a ruling becomes the 'law of the case' and is binding on the litigants and courts alike, unless changed or modified after reargument, and neither the questions decided nor the ones that could have been raised and decided are available to be raised in a subsequent appeal.Id. at 371-72.
Stripped of their rhetoric, Father's second, fourth, and fifth questions presented in his brief challenge the circuit court's December 19, 2019 Visitation Order and the hearings and orders that proceeded it. Father's arguments that the circuit court erred in not allowing "exculpatory evidence" and "not receiving testimony that was for the best interest of the child(ren)" challenge the December 2019 merits hearing that formed the basis of the court's December 2019 Custody and Visitation Order. And, each of Father's alleged procedural deficiencies challenge the actions of magistrates and circuit court judges who assisted in resolving his contempt and visitation modification petitions and, therefore, could have been raised in the appeal that he took in Wozar I.
This Court affirmed the December 2019 Order in Wozar I after determining that the circuit court did not err in restricting Father's visitation with his children. Slip op at 2, 14. Consequently, all three of these questions are barred. Were we to decide otherwise, Father would be free to "institute as many successive appeals as the fiction of his imagination could produce new reasons to assign as to why his side of the case should prevail, and the litigation would never terminate." Fidelity-Balt. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co., 217, Md. at 371-72.
III. Question III: Child Support Modification
Father argues that the trial court erred by failing to deduct health insurance expenses that he incurred on behalf of the children in its modified child support order. The circuit court entered its Memorandum Opinion and Order modifying Father's child obligation on December 8, 2021 and Father filed a motion for reconsideration on December 22, 2021. Because "the 'motion for reconsideration' was not filed within ten days of the order . . . the time within which to note an appeal was not extended." Hossainkhail v. Gebrehiwot, 143 Md.App. 716, 723 (2002). Father filed his notice of appeal on January 13, 2022, which was 36 days after the circuit court's order was entered. Consequently, the only issue to consider is whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for reconsideration. See Md. Rule 8-202(a) ("Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by law, the notice of appeal shall be filed within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken."); Rosales v. State, 463 Md. 552, 568 (2019) ("We now recognize that Maryland Rule 8-202(a) is a claim-processing rule . . . . Despite this recognition, Maryland Rule 8-202(a) remains binding on appellants, and this Court will continue to enforce the rule.").
"A trial court's decision to deny a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Snydor v. Hathaway, 228 Md.App. 691, 708 (2016). In his motion for reconsideration, Father argues that the trial court did not "address the material fact that [he] has always paid monthly premiums [for] medical expenses" and that the court did not articulate what he "may and may not do with the minor child."
First, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to credit Father for medical insurance expenses incurred on behalf of the minor children as Father did not produce any admissible evidence of such contributions. Indeed, Father's own financial statement does not support his contention. The financial statement, which was filed by Father concurrently with his motion to modify child support, does not declare any monthly health insurance payments, as the line for "monthly health insurance premium" was left blank. Mother's financial statement, on the other hand, represented that she was paying $183.22 a month in health insurance premiums for their minor child. Although Father pre-filed three exhibits to present at the modification hearing, none of these exhibits makes reference to, or contains admissible evidence of, health insurance costs that he incurred on behalf of the children. On appeal, Father does not cite to any evidence in the record supporting his claim that he maintains health insurance policies on behalf of the Children.
Father's second contention is barred by the law of the case doctrine, as the circuit court issued a Visitation Order on December 19, 2019 explaining when Father would have visitation with the children, which this Court affirmed in Wozar I.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
[*] This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.