Opinion
3:23-cv-00654-LL-DTF
07-23-2024
MICHAEL W. U., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING JOINT MOTION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
Hon. D. Thomas Ferraro United States Magistrate Judge
On May 23, 2023, Plaintiff Michael W. U.commenced this action against Defendant Commissioner of Social Security for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the February 22, 2022, decision of Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Eric V. Benham finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 1, AR 13, 31.) In turn, Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ's decision by submitting a request to the Appeals Council, which denied review on April 13, 2022. (AR 8-9.) On December 4, 2023, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Judicial Review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. (ECF No. 13.)
The Court refers to Plaintiff using only his first name and last initial pursuant to the Court's Civil Local Rules. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(e)(6)(b).
AR” refers to the Administrative Record filed on June 12, 2023 (ECF No. 6.) The Court's citations to the AR use the page references on the original document rather than the page numbers designated by the Court's case management/electronic case filing system (“CM/ECF”). For all other documents, the Court's citations are to the page numbers affixed by CM/ECF.
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Linda Lopez under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c). For the following reasons, the Court recommends that the final decision of the Commissioner be REVERSED, and the case be REMANDED for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Report and Recommendation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits on May 20, 2019. (AR 16.) Plaintiff alleges disability resulting from coronary artery disease (“CAD”). (AR 20.) Plaintiff's claim was denied on initial review on November 1, 2019, and then again upon reconsideration on March 13, 2020. (AR 16.) Consequently, Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing. (AR 16.) On November 17, 2020, ALJ Eric V. Benham conducted an administrative hearing where both Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”) Victoria Rei testified. (AR 31.) The ALJ issued a Notice of Decision on February 22, 2022, that determined Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 13.) In turn, Plaintiff sought review of the ALJ's decision by submitting a request to the Appeals Council. (AR 8-9.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, stating “[w]e found no reason under our rules to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision.” (AR 1.) Thus, Plaintiff initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
B. Medical Background
Plaintiff has a long history of significant health issues. Plaintiff had his first myocardial infarction (MI), also known as a heart attack, when he was 28 years old. (AR 315.) In 2012, at 51 years old, Plaintiff suffered another heart attack and underwent a cardiac stent placement. (AR 334.) Doctor Tri Nguyen, a cardiologist at the Linda Vista Health Center, stated the underlying cause of the heart attack was Plaintiff's coronary artery disease (“CAD”). (Id.) Following the stent placement, Doctor Nguyen noted Plaintiff tolerated the stent placement well. (Id.)
See https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK537076/#:~:text=Myocardial%20infarction%20(MI)%2C%20colloquially,hemodynamic%20deterioration%20and%20sudden%20death. (website last visited July 23, 2024.)
In February 2014, Doctor Nguyen, who Plaintiff was seeing for follow-up care, noted that Plaintiff had been physically active, and Plaintiff had reduced his cigarette usage. (AR 333.) Similarly, he had no significant chest pain or dizziness, and his cardiac exam produced regular results. Moreover, it was noted Plaintiff had not experienced any significant cardiac symptoms since his heart attack in June 2012. (AR 333.) In a May 2014 follow-up, Doctor Johnathn Walters noted Plaintiff was doing well with his CAD and stent placements. (AR 318.) After Plaintiff's heart attack in 2012, Plaintiff consistently denied chest pain and stated he exercised regularly. (AR 262, 313, 317.) Cardiovascular examinations of the Plaintiff during this time period showed regular rate and rhythm, and he did not appear to be in acute distress. (Id.)
However, in May 2017, Plaintiff suffered from another myocardial infarction. (AR 255.) Consequently, Plaintiff underwent stent placements. (Id.) In September 2017, Plaintiff sought a referral to a cardiologist, and he informed his doctor that he had “been doing fine since discharge.” (Id.) Again, Plaintiff consistently denied chest pain, shortness of breath, and palpitations. (AR 255, 298, 294.) During this visit, Plaintiff appeared in no acute distress and his cardiovascular exam showed regular rate and rhythm. (Id.) Plaintiff was referred to his previous Cardiologist, Doctor Nguyen, who he visited in October 2017. (AR 331.) During this visit, Doctor Nguyen noted that Plaintiff had “restarted medical therapy and he has done well since from a cardiovascular standpoint.” (Id.) Plaintiff's cardiac exam also showed regular heart rate and mild apical systolic murmur. (Id.) Plaintiff reported being physically active and smoking cessation, which began a few months prior to his appointment. (Id.)
In April 2018, Plaintiff had another follow-up appointment where his primary complaint was itchy skin resulting from his Losartan usage. (AR 294.) Doctor Phuong Nguyen instructed Plaintiff to discuss alternate medications with his cardiologist, Doctor Nguyen. (AR 296). At this visit, Plaintiff was instructed to continue dieting and exercising, and he was encouraged to eliminate caffeine from his diet. (Id.) Because Plaintiff reported he smoked five or fewer cigarettes a day, he was encouraged to cease smoking. (AR 295, 296.) During an appointment to address hemorrhoids on August 6, 2018, his doctor noted that Plaintiff was “[g]eneral[ly] able to do usual activities” and had “good exercise tolerance, good general state of health, no fatigue, no fever, no weakness.” (AR 290.) Similarly, Plaintiff appeared in no acute distress and his cardiovascular exam showed regular rate and rhythm. (AR 291.) Notably, Plaintiff reported he had stopped smoking for approximately 1-3 months and reports quitting crystal methamphetamine use around June or July of 2018. (AR 290, 291.) Plaintiff's lab order was performed the following day. (AR 288-289.)
On August 20, 2018, Plaintiff had a follow-up appointment to review his lab results. (AR 285.) His doctor again noted that Plaintiff was “[g]eneral[ly] able to do usual activities” and had “good exercise tolerance, good general state of health, no fatigue, no fever, no weakness.” (Id.) Once again, Plaintiff appeared in no acute distress and his cardiovascular exam showed regular rate and rhythm. (AR 286.)
In October 2018, Plaintiff received an echocardiogram. (AR 266.) This echocardiogram revealed mild left ventricular hypertrophy, normal left and right ventricular size and systolic function, mild left atrial enlargement, and abnormal left ventricular relaxation. (Id.)
Plaintiff's November 2018, December 2018, and January 2019 appointments all provided similar information. At each of these appointments, Plaintiff appeared in no acute distress and his cardiovascular exam showed regular rate and rhythm. (AR 274, 277, 280.) Similarly, Doctor Banuelos noted at each of these appointments that “[g]eneral[ly] able to do usual activities” and had “good exercise tolerance, good general state of health, no fatigue, no fever, no weakness.” (AR 273, 276, 279.)
Most recently, in August 2020, Plaintiff sought treatment following an injury he received when he accidentally shot a nail through his left index finger with a nail gun. (AR 328-330.) Plaintiff's doctor noted that Plaintiff appeared in no acute distress, and Plaintiff's cardiovascular exam showed a normal heart rate. (AR 329.)
C. Plaintiff's Hearing Testimony
Plaintiff testified that he had his first heart attack in 2012 and a stent was placed in his heart. (AR 37.) Following his second heart attack in 2017 while he was surfing, he received four more stents and was hospitalized for three days. (AR 36.) He no longer goes surfing or does anything “too strenuous” because he does not feel as though he can. (AR 39.) Plaintiff tends to break out in a sweat if he stands too long. (AR 41) When he walks for too long, he becomes very sweaty and his pulse races. (Id.) He gets daily headaches on the right side of his head. (AR 43.) He injured his left ankle and his pain has gotten so bad that he can hardly walk on it. (Id.)
D. ALJ's Decision
In rendering his decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner's five-step sequential evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999) (describing five steps). At the first step, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity from Plaintiff's alleged onset date of April 1, 2017, through his date last insured of December 31, 2017. (AR 18.) At step two, he identified Plaintiff's impairment as coronary artery disease status post several stent placements. (Id.) He found that this impairment significantly limits the ability to perform work activities. (Id.) The ALJ categorized Plaintiff's hypertension and history of left ankle fracture as “‘non-severe impairments'” because neither condition “resulted in any significant limitation in his ability to do basic work activities.” (AR 19.) The ALJ determined at step three that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment. (AR 19.) He then found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:
perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) except he is able to occasionally climb ladders and scaffolds. He is able to frequently climb stairs, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl. He needs to avoid concentrated exposure to cold, heat, and hazards such as heights and dangerous moving machinery.(Id.)
At step four, the ALJ notes a history of employment at Southwest between 2002 and 2004, but Plaintiff failed to submit other past work experience. (AR 21.) Therefore, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “is unable to perform past relevant work.” (Id.) At step five, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff “was capable of making a successful adjustment to other work that existed in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 22.) Provided Plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and work experience the vocational expert (“VE”) found Plaintiff could work as a laundry worker, industrial cleaner, and kitchen worker. (Id.) Therefore, the ALJ found Plaintiff was “not under a disability” at any time from April 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017.
E. Disputed Issue
The parties have briefed one issue in their joint motion which Plaintiff asserts is grounds for remanding for further administrative proceedings and development of the record: (1) whether the ALJ was required to develop the record in evaluating Plaintiff's physical RFC, and whether his RFC determination was cut from whole cloth.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek judicial review of a final agency decision of the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of judicial review is limited, however, and the denial of benefits “‘will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.'” Brawner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Green v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 528, 529 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence means “‘more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Sandgathe v. Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (“[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial' in other contexts, the threshold for . . . evidentiary sufficiency [under the substantial evidence standard] is not high.”). The court must consider the entire record, including the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusions. Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). If the evidence supports more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the ALJ's decision. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020). The district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the Commissioner's decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter may also be remanded to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to “develop the record as needed to fill the evidentiary gap of the record” and further erred by “relying upon his lay interpretation of the raw medical evidence in crafting his RFC determination.” (ECF No. 13 at 6.) Finally, the ALJ erred by failing to provide any explanation as to how the evidence in the record supported his RFC finding. (Id. at 13.)
A. Failure to Develop the Record
It is an issue of legal error when determining whether an ALJ satisfied their duty to develop the record. See Garcia v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2014.) A Social Security hearing is “inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.” Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111 (2000). That duty “extends to the represented as well as to the unrepresented claimant.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001). “In Social Security cases, the ALJ has a special duty to develop the record fully and fairly and to ensure that the claimant's interests are considered, even when the claimant is represented by counsel.” Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001). “The ALJ is responsible for studying the record and resolving any conflicts or ambiguities in it.” Diedrick v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 634, 638 (9th Cir. 2017).
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the only medical opinions in the record were the findings of the state agency medical consultants, Drs. R. Bitonte and M. Amado's. Specifically, on October 28, 2019, state agency consultant Doctor Bitonte found that there was “insufficient evidence to evaluate” Plaintiff's claim of “acute myocardial infarction.” (AR 56.) On March 13, 2020, state agency consultant Doctor Amado reviewed the record and concurred with Doctor Bitonte's opinion that there was insufficient evidence to “make a determination of Plaintiff's physical impairment.” (AR 64.) However, the ALJ found their opinions to be unpersuasive on the basis that “the record supports a finding of severe impairments, though not so severe as to be disabling.” (AR 21.) The ALJ went on to find that “a review of the record in this case reveals no restrictions recommended by the treating doctor.” (Id.) As a result, the ALJ found that based on the “objective evidence” Plaintiff had a “greater sustained capacity than the claimant alleges.” (Id.)
“In general, [the Plaintiff is] responsible for providing the evidence . . . use[d] to make a finding about [the Plaintiff's] residual functional capacity.” However, the ALJ is also “responsible for developing [the Plaintiff's] complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary.” 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(3). “[A]n [ALJ also has a] duty to develop the record further . . . when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence.” Mayes v Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001); see Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1151. If triggered, the ALJ may “discharge this duty in several ways, including: subpoenaing the claimant's physicians, submitting questions to the claimant's physicians, continuing the hearing, or keeping the record open after the hearing to allow supplementation of the record.” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150; Smolen v. Chater, 80F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1991).
In the present case, the evidence provided to the ALJ was inadequate to allow for proper evaluation; therefore, the ALJ's duty to further develop the record was triggered. As in Tonapetyan, the medical experts were unable to reach a conclusion based on the evidence presented, thus triggering the ALJ's duty to further develop the record. Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150. The initial failure to reach an opinion due to the lack of evidence demonstrates that the record was inadequate to allow for proper evaluation. In fact, the ALJ remarked at the hearing that there was “86 pages of medical stuff, and there's no opinions, the DDS wasn't able to think there is enough evidence to come to . . . any kind of estimate as to what Mr. Usry's limitations are and there [are] no doctors' opinions in the file.” (AR 49.) The ALJ then found it would be “helpful to have additional or some kind of an opinion from a doctor” and suggested that Plaintiff be sent for a consultative examination. (Id.)
While there is no evidence in the record that the ALJ actually ordered a consultative examination, on December 23, 2021, the Office of Hearings Operations did send Plaintiff a request for additional evidence, including recent medical treatment, medications, and work background. (AR 248-254.) Therefore, the ALJ fulfilled their duty to further develop the record by “keeping the record open after the hearing to allow for supplementation of the record.” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150.
B. RFC is not Supported by Substantial Evidence
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in his formulation of his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) by relying on his own lay opinion of the raw medical evidence when there is an absence of medical opinions. (Jot. Mot. at 10.) Defendant argues in response that the ALJ “has a duty to translate and incorporate clinical findings into a succinct residual functional capacity.” (Id. at 15.) As a result, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly pointed to treatment notes, electrocardiograms, a normal exercise treadmill test, and other evidence in determining a reasonable RFC. (Id. at 15-16.)
RFC is defined as “the most you can still do despite your limitations.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). “Ordinarily, RFC is the individual's maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis, . . . mean[ing] 8 hours per day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule." SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (emphases omitted). The RFC assessment is first used at step four of the sequential evaluation process to decide if the claimant can perform his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(5)(i). If the ALJ decides that the claimant cannot perform his past relevant work, the same RFC assessment is used at step five of the sequential evaluation process to decide if the claimant can adjust to any other work that exists in the national economy. Id. § 404.1545(a)(5)(ii). In determining a claimant's RFC at steps four and five, the ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record, including medical history; medical signs and laboratory findings; lay evidence; the effects of treatment, including disruption to routine and side effects of medication; and the effects of symptoms, including pain. SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *5; see also Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006).
However, the ALJ “may not rely on his own unsupported interpretation of the medical evidence.” Peter B. v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 21-cv-0437-YY, 2022 WL 3010162, at *3 (D. Or. July 28, 2022) (quoting Davis v. Colvin, No. 3:15-cv-00843-SI, 2016 WL 8674265, at *8 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2016)); see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding error where “[t]here is no medical evidence to support the ALJ's finding that [the claimant] could work through an eight hour workday with breaks every two hours”).
The Court finds that the evidence in the record, and lack thereof, does not support the RFC formulated by the ALJ. The RFC is not supported by any medical opinions from any source. Plaintiff, relying on Bradford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV2100232TUCSHRJR, 2022 WL 4538569, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 18, 2022) and other sources, contends that the ALJ impermissibly rendered a lay person interpretation of the raw medical evidence in support of his RFC determination. (Joint Mot., ECF No. 13 at 10-11.) The Court agrees. Ninth Circuit courts have found that “barring a few exceptions, an ALJ must have a doctor's opinion of a claimant's functional capacity in order for there to be substantial evidence supporting the decisions.” Bradford, No. CV2100232TUCSHRJR, 2022 WL 4538569, at *5; (quoting Howell v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-2517-BLM, 2022 WL 2759090, at *7 (S.D. Cal. July 14, 2022)); Walker v. Comm'rof Soc. Sec., No. 2:22-cv-1871-EJY, 2024 WL 64784, at *6 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2024) (“While the ALJ ‘can pick and choose between opinions expressed by the experts,' when an ALJ decides severity or residual functional capacity ‘without the support of any of the medical opinion evidence,' this is error.”) (quoting Holtan v. Kijakazi, No. 2:22-cv-01222-VCF, 2023 WL 2424648, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2023)).
Defendant, relying on Laborin v. Berryhill, claims the ALJ fulfilled their duty by incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC. 867 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2017); (AR 14-15.) However, the issue in Laborin is whether the ALJ properly incorporated “the individual's complaints of pain and other symptoms” in the RFC assessment. Laborin, 867 F.3d at 1153. Laborin fails to address whether there is substantial evidence supporting an RFC assessment when there is no medical opinion.
In addition, while the ALJ's decision summarizes the medical records and finds that the “objective medical evidence discussed above establishes that the claimant had a greater sustained capacity than the claimant alleges,” the ALJ fails to discuss what specific evidence supports the functional limitations. (AR 21.) “This “fail[ure] to ‘build an accurate and logical bridge' from the evidence to [the ALJ's] conclusions” is, “in itself, [a] reasons to remand for a new decision.” Walker, 2024 WL 64784, at *4 (citation omitted).
Because the ALJ did not provide an explanation of the evidence in the record that supports his conclusion that Plaintiff was able to perform medium work and how he arrived at his conclusions regarding Plaintiff's limitations, the Court cannot determine how the ALJ formulated the RFC or that the disability determination was supported by substantial evidence. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[The Court] will affirm the ALJ's determination of [the claimant's] RFC if the ALJ applied the proper legal standard and his decision is supported by substantial evidence.”) (citation omitted.)
C. Harmless Error
The Court must now consider whether the error is harmless. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012). An error is harmless if it is “inconsequential to the ultimate non disability determination” and if the Court “can confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when [not making the same error], could have reached a different disability determination.” Stout v. Comm r Soc. Sec. Admin, 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56. (9th Cir. 2006).
Here, the ALJ's error was not harmless. The ALJ determined Plaintiff's RFC without a medical opinion that defined Plaintiff's limitations. The RFC affects the step-five analysis where “the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant is not disabled and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted.) The “ALJ may meet his burden at step five by asking a vocational expert a hypothetical question based on medical assumptions supported by substantial evidence in the record and reflecting all the claimant's limitations, both physical and mental, supported by the record.” Id.
The ALJ did pose hypothetical questions to the VE based on an RFC that lacks substantial evidence. (AR 45-48.) The VE also relied on this unsupported RFC to opine that Plaintiff could work as a laundry worker, industrial cleaner, and kitchen worker. (AR 46.) The ALJ adopted the VE's opinion and concluded Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 23.) Therefore, the ALJ's error in formulating the RFC is not “inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination” and as a result, the error is not harmless. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1056.
D. Remedy
Plaintiff requests that the Court remand for additional proceedings. (Jot. Mot. at 19.) The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or for immediate payment of benefits is within the discretion of the court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Treichler v. Comm. Of Soc. Sec. Admin, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014.. “If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative proceedings, a social security case should be remanded.” Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Garrison, I 759 F.3d at 1019 (noting that a Social Security case should usually be remanded to remedy defects in the administrative proceeding).
The evidence in this case does not conclusively establish that Plaintiff is disabled under the Social Security disability regulations. Rather the evidence must still be weighed and evaluated properly. Additional proceedings can remedy the defects in the ALJ's decision. Accordingly, remand for additional proceedings is appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends that the final decision of the Commissioner be REVERSED, and the case REMANDED for further proceedings.
This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the Honorable Linda Lopez, United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or before July 31, 2024 . The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed on or before August 7, 2024 . The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED.