The fact that [plaintiff] and [third-party defendant] may be co-citizens is completely irrelevant. Unless [plaintiff] chooses to amend his complaint to assert a claim against [third-party defendant], [plaintiff] and [third-party defendant] are simply not adverse, and there need be no basis of jurisdiction between them.' ") (quoting J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 14.26 (2d ed.1996) (footnotes omitted)); Chestnut Run Fed. Credit Union v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. of Wis., 392 F.Supp. 76, 77 (D.Del.1975) (holding that lack of diversity between plaintiff and third-party defendant did not destroy diversity jurisdiction over original complaint and that court could adjudicate third-party complaint) (citation omitted); Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 387 F.Supp. 626, 628 (E.D.Tex.1975) (same); Fedorchak v. Montgomery Ward, 18 F.R.D. 1, 2 (M.D.Pa.1955) (same); cf. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 15 F.3d 1230, 1236 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Ancillary subject matter jurisdiction may be exercised over ... third party defendants."); Washington Hosp. Ctr. Nat'l Rehabilitation Hosp. v. Collier, 947 F.2d 1498, 1501 (D.C.Cir.1991) (holding that district court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over claim between non-diverse defendant and third-party defendant). Thus, the fact that the City and Root are both citizens of the State of Florida does not affect this court's diversity jurisdiction over Balfour's original complaint.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to SunTrust, and JPMorgan's argument would turn that requirement on its head. See Fedorchak v. Montgomery Ward, 18 F.R.D. 1, 3 (M.D. Pa. 1955) (refusing to dismiss third-party complaint merely because its allegations were inconsistent with those in plaintiff's complaint).
Unless [plaintiff] chooses to amend his complaint to assert a claim against [third-party defendant], [plaintiff] and [third-party defendant] are simply not adverse, and there need be no basis of jurisdiction between them.’ " ) (quoting J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.26 (2d ed.1996) (footnotes omitted)); Chestnut Run Fed. Credit Union v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. of Wis., 392 F.Supp. 76, 77 (D.Del.1975) (holding that lack of diversity between plaintiff and third-party defendant did not destroy diversity jurisdiction over original complaint and that court could adjudicate third-party complaint) (citation omitted); Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 387 F.Supp. 626, 628 (E.D.Tex.1975) (same); Fedorchak v. Montgomery Ward, 18 F.R.D. 1, 2 (M.D.Pa.1955) (same); cf.Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 15 F.3d 1230, 1236 (3d Cir.1994) (" Ancillary subject matter jurisdiction may be exercised over ... third party defendants." ); Washington Hosp. Ctr. Nat'l Rehabilitation Hosp. v. Collier, 947 F.2d 1498, 1501 (D.C.Cir.1991) (holding that district court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over claim between non-diverse defendant and third-party defendant).
The proper procedure for raising such an objection is by motion for a more definite statement. Fedorchak v. Montgomery Ward, 18 F.R.D. 1 (D.C.M.D.Pa.1955). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading (including third party pleadings) setting forth a claim for relief to contain a short and plain statement of the claim and of the grounds which will enable the pleader to recover.
A complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and unless it appears to a certainty that he would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim the court should not dismiss the complaint. Fedorchak v. Montgomery Ward, D.C., 18 F.R.D. 1; Carroll v. Morrison Hotel Corp., 7 Cir., 149 F.2d 404. Where in granting the judgment there was no showing that the pleading, deposition and admissions on file showed that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, therefore instead of a summary judgment, there should have been a trial.