The test is one of usefulness and reason" ( Allen v. Crowell–Collier Publ. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449, 235 N.E.2d 430 ). "At the same time, however, the principle of ‘full disclosure’ does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure" ( Mendives v. Curcio, 174 A.D.3d 796, 797, 105 N.Y.S.3d 513 ; seeBuxbaum v. Castro, 82 A.D.3d 925, 925, 919 N.Y.S.2d 175 ). The Court of Appeals "has recognized that ‘litigants are not without protection against unnecessarily onerous application of the discovery statutes.
However, since a party does not waive the physician-patient privilege with respect to unrelated illnesses or injuries ( see McFarlane v. County of Suffolk, 60 A.D.3d 918, 918, 875 N.Y.S.2d 581;Gill v. Mancino, 8 A.D.3d 340, 341, 777 N.Y.S.2d 712;Carboni v. New York Med. Coll., 290 A.D.2d 473, 473, 736 N.Y.S.2d 250), the defendants were not entitled to any of the other authorizations for the release of the injured plaintiff's medical records requested in their notice to produce, which sought disclosure of medical records pertaining to illnesses and injuries unrelated to the subject accident. Furthermore, CPLR 3101(a) requires, in pertinent part, “full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” “ ‘[T]he principle of “ full disclosure” does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure’ ” ( Buxbaum v. Castro, 82 A.D.3d 925, 925, 919 N.Y.S.2d 175, quoting Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v. Walsh, 45 A.D.3d 531, 531, 845 N.Y.S.2d 124). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying that branch of the defendants' motion which was to compel the plaintiffs to provide authorizations for the release of the injured plaintiff's medical records pertaining to illnesses and injuries unrelated to the subject accident, and authorizations for the release of other records, such as the injured plaintiff's health insurance records, the injured plaintiff's complete employment file with the New York City Fire Department, the file of “any attorney” who represented the injured plaintiff before the Medical Board of the Fire Department of New York, and the complete file of the injured plaintiff's auto insurer ( see Buxbaum v. Castro, 82 A.D.3d at 925, 919 N.Y.S.2d 175;Peluso v. Red Rose Rest., Inc., 78 A.D.3d 802, 803, 910 N.Y.S.2d 378).
. "The Supreme Court has broad discretion over the supervision of disclosure, and its determination will not be disturbed absent an improvident exercise of that discretion" ( Buxbaum v. Castro, 82 A.D.3d 925, 925, 919 N.Y.S.2d 175 ). In 1996, Congress enacted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (hereinafter HIPAA) in order to "improve the portability and continuity of health insurance coverage," "combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and health care delivery," and "simplify the administration of health insurance," among other things ( Pub L 104–191, 110 U.S. Stat 1936).
The test is one of usefulness and reason" (Allen v Crowell-Collier Publ. Co., 21 NY2d 403, 406). "At the same time, however, the principle of 'full disclosure' does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure" (Mendives v Curico, 174 AD3d 796, 797; see Buxbaum v Castro, 82 AD3d 925, 925). The Court of Appeals "has recognized that 'litigants are not without protection against unnecessarily onerous application of the discovery statutes.
CPLR 3101(a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action” ( see Allen v. Crowell–Collier Publ. Co., 21 N.Y.2d 403, 406, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449, 235 N.E.2d 430). However, the principle of “full disclosure” does not give a party the right to unlimited disclosure ( see Buxbaum v. Castro, 82 A.D.3d 925, 919 N.Y.S.2d 175;Spohn–Konen v. Town of Brookhaven, 74 A.D.3d 1049, 902 N.Y.S.2d 391;Harris v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 48 A.D.3d 631, 632, 851 N.Y.S.2d 875;Silcox v. City of New York, 233 A.D.2d 494, 650 N.Y.S.2d 305). Here, while the plaintiff's demand for information concerning subsequent rentals of his former apartment was material and necessary to his defense against one of the defendant's counterclaims, his remaining unfulfilled discovery demands were unduly burdensome, and sought irrelevant and immaterial information.
With respect to the denial of that branch of the plaintiffs motion which was for a protective order, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion. While CPLR 3101 (a) provides that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution . . . of an action," "the principle of 'full disclosure' does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure" ( JFK Family Ltd. Partnership v Millbrae Natural Gas Dev. Fund 2005, L.P., 83 AD3d 899, 900; see Buxbaum v Castro, 82 AD3d 925; Peluso v Red Rose Rest, Inc., 78 AD3d 802; Foster v Herbert Slepoy Corp., 74 AD3d 1139; Gilman Ciocia, Inc. v Walsh, 45 AD3d 531). When a particular discovery demand is inappropriate, the court may "make a protective order" with respect to that demand (CPLR 3103 [a]).
While CPLR 3101(a) provides that “[t]here shall be full disclosure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution ... of an action,” “the principle of ‘full disclosure’ does not give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure” ( JFK Family Ltd. Partnership v. Millbrae Natural Gas Dev. Fund 2005, L.P., 83 A.D.3d 899, 900, 920 N.Y.S.2d 708; see Buxbaum v. Castro, 82 A.D.3d 925, 925, 919 N.Y.S.2d 175; Peluso v. Red Rose Rest., Inc., 78 A.D.3d 802, 910 N.Y.S.2d 378; Foster v. Herbert Slepoy Corp., 74 A.D.3d 1139, 902 N.Y.S.2d 426; Gilman & Ciocia, Inc. v. Walsh, 45 A.D.3d 531, 845 N.Y.S.2d 124).
Here, Brightview failed to demonstrate that plaintiffs failure to submit to a further deposition or IME following the service of the January 10, 2020 supplemental bill of particulars was done in bad faith or was willful and contuamcious, and leaves it without a means to establish a material and necessary element of its case (see Pecile v Titan Capital Group, LLC, 113 A.D.3d 526, 979 N.Y.S.2d 303 [1st Dept 2014]; Buxbaum v Castro, 82 A.D.3d 925, 919 N.Y.S.2d 175 [2d Dept 2011]; Peluso v Red Rose Rest., Inc., 78 A.D.3d 802, 910 N.Y.S.2d 378 [2d Dept 201 O]; cf Fritz v Burman, 107 A.D.3d 934, 967 N.Y.S.2d 761 [2d Dept 2013]). Moreover, once the note of issue has been filed, any further pretrial disclosure is only allowed upon a showing of "unusual or unanticipated circumstances" and "substantial prejudice" (see Arons v Jutkowitz, 9 NY3 d 393, 411, 850 N.Y.S.2d 345 (2007]; Jones v Grand Opal Constr. Corp., 64 A.D.3d 543, 883 N.Y.S.2d 253 [2d Dept 2009];
The principle of full disclosure does not, however, give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure. Matters relating to disclosure lie within the broad discretion of the trial court which is in the best position to determine what is material and necessary (see Buxbaum v Castro, 82 AD3d 925 [2d Dept 2011]).
The principle of full disclosure does not, however, give a party the right to uncontrolled and unfettered disclosure (see Peluso v. Red Rose Rest., Inc., 78 A.D.3d 802, 803 [2d Dept. 2010]). Matters relating to disclosure lie within the broad discretion of the trial court which is in the best position to determine what is material and necessary (see Buxbaum v. Castro, 82 A.D.3d 925 [2d Dept. 2011]).