We also note that in construing an amendment to a statute, it is presumed that a change in phraseology implies that a change in meaning was also intended. Lawrence Baking Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 308 Mich. 198, 205; 13 N.W.2d 260 (1944), cert den 323 U.S. 738; 65 S Ct 43; 89 L Ed 591 (1944), Michigan Transportation Co v Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 665; 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972), lv den 389 Mich. 767 (1973). While this case actually involves the repeal of one statute and the enactment of another covering the same subject area, the presumption of a change of meaning principle is equally applicable.
In construing an amendment to a statute, a change in phraseology raises a presumption that a change in meaning was also intended. Lawrence Baking Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 308 Mich. 198, 205; 13 N.W.2d 260 (1944), cert den 323 U.S. 738; 65 S Ct 43; 89 L Ed 591 (1944), Michigan Transportation Co v Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 665; 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972), lv den 389 Mich. 767 (1973). We find nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended anything other than to change the allocation of the burden of proof vis-a-vis true cash value when amending MCL 205.737; MSA 7.650(37).
Returning the arrest power directly to the surety, thus making a significant change in a long-standing statute (one of which it must be presumed the Legislature was well aware, People v Buckley, 302 Mich. 12, 21; 4 N.W.2d 448, Lenawee County Gas Electric Co v City of Adrian, 209 Mich. 52, 64; 176 N.W. 590), must be regarded as "evidencing a purpose to change the force and effect of the existing law". In re Loakes' Estate, 320 Mich. 674, 679; 32 N.W.2d 10 (1948), Michigan Transportation Co v Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 665; 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972). Secondly, by the plain words of MCL 765.26; MSA 28.913, the state has entitled the bondsman to the aid of state officers in arresting the individual released on bail. "Entitle" is a strong word, and when given its ordinary and common-sense meaning, General Motors Corp v Erves, (On Rehearing), 399 Mich. 241, 253-254; 249 N.W.2d 41 (1976), would establish a claim of right in the bondsman to the assistance of state officers.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the constitutional limitation on a state's power to impair the obligation of contract is not to be read with mathematical exactness and that "it is not every modification of a contractual promise that impairs the obligation of contract". El Paso v Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 506-507; 85 S Ct 577; 13 L Ed 2d 446 (1965), reh den, 380 U.S. 926; 85 S Ct 879; 13 L Ed 2d 831 (1965), Washtenaw Community College Education Ass'n v Board of Trustees of the Washtenaw Community College, 50 Mich. App. 467, 472; 213 N.W.2d 567 (1973), Michigan Transportation Co v Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 663; 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972), lv den, 389 Mich. 767 (1973). In each case where there is an alleged impairment of the obligation of contract, the state's economic interests and sovereign right to protect the general welfare of the people must be balanced against the constitutional limitation.
While it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine whether or not a declaratory judgment is appropriate, the question on review of that determination is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. Michigan Transportation Co v Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 671; 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972) lv den, 389 Mich. 767 (1973). Review of a declaratory judgment is de novo.
The trial court granted a declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff. Such judgments are governed by GCR 1963, 521, and as noted in Michigan Transportation Co v Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 671; 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972), lv den, 389 Mich. 767 (1973), "[i]t is within the sound discretion of the circuit court to determine whether or not a declaratory judgment is appropriate." Was that discretion abused in this case?
Lawrence Baking Co v Unemployment Compensation Commission, 308 Mich. 198; 13 N.W.2d 260 (1944); Bonifas-Gorman Lumber Co v Unemployment Compensation Commission, 313 Mich. 363; 21 N.W.2d 163 (1946)". Michigan Transportation Co v Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 665; 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972). Jads, Inc v Detroit, 41 Mich. App. 693, 696; 200 N.W.2d 715 (1972); People v Kirstein, 6 Mich. App. 107; 148 N.W.2d 539 (1967); People v Brown Brothers Equipment Co, Inc, 3 Mich. App. 618; 143 N.W.2d 155 (1966) aff'd 379 Mich. 363; 151 N.W.2d 824 (1967).
Based upon these facts, the Court held that the 1941 statute did not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contract. More recently this Court adopted the rationale of El Paso v Simmons, supra, in Michigan Transportation Co v Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654; 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972), lv to app den, 389 Mich. 767 (1973). In this latter case ยง 801(k) of the Vehicle Code (MCLA 257.801; MSA 9.2501) provided that except where otherwise agreed in writing, the lessee of a truck or road tractor without a trailer was to pay the individual owner-operator 60% of the state registration fee.
Our analysis of the first question requires that we consider whether this application improperly impairs the obligation of existing contracts. Relying on authority of the United States Supreme Court this Court in Michigan Transportation Co v Secretary of State, 41 Mich. App. 654; 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972), has recently concluded that rights under existing contracts are not absolute. Where there is a valid exercise of the state's police power which only incidentally affects the existing contract then the state enactment is not prohibited.
To the contrary, the fact that no similar language is included in the present statute is indicative of a legislative intention to remove any effect given to that language under the predecessor act. See Michigan Trans. Co. v. Sec. of State, 41 Mich. App. 654, 665, 201 N.W.2d 83 (1972). B.