124 Mich. App. 271; 335 N.W.2d 475 (1983). 123 Mich. App. 667; 333 N.W.2d 319 (1983). See 418 Mich. 949 (1984) (Galloway), and 418 Mich. 950 (1984) (Michigan Hospital Ass'n).
This interpretation is consistent with the rule of statutory construction that a court must give effect to all words in a statute and may not interpret a statute so as to render some of the terms nugatory. Michigan Hospital Ass'n v Michigan Employment Security Comm, 123 Mich. App. 667, 671; 333 N.W.2d 319 (1983). Here, if the § 2.
The law is also well-settled that non-lawyers may not represent parties before the courts and most administrative agencies. See e.g. Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 A. 20 (1937) (non-lawyers may not represent parties in workmen's compensation proceedings); Cobb v. Judge of the Superior Court of Grand Rapids, 43 Mich. 289, 5 N.W. 309 (1880); Michigan Hospital Association v. Michigan Employment Security Commission, 123 Mich. App. 667, 333 N.W.2d 319 (1983) (non-lawyers may not represent parties before administrative bodies). One exception to this rule is found in Section 702 of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess. P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 862, that provides that an individual claiming unemployment compensation may be represented before the Department of Labor and Industry, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, or a referee, by counsel "or other duly authorized agent."