Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-2591-CM.
February 7, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff has filed this lawsuit to compel enforcement of a Stipulation and Agreement entered into by plaintiff and the United States of America on January 14, 1999, which resolved prior litigation entitled Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Kan. 1998). This matter comes before the court on defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 56).
I. Procedural Background
On November 27, 2002, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit seeking enforcement of a January 15, 1999, Stipulation and Agreement (Stipulation and Agreement) that settled prior litigation between plaintiff and the United States over the status of the Maria Christiana Reserve No. 35 (the Reserve) under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (the IGRA). Count I of plaintiff's complaint, entitled "APA, Injunctive Relief, and Violation of Stipulation," alleges that an October 31, 2002, opinion letter issued by the Office of the Solicitor, Department of the Interior (DOI) to the National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), which determined plaintiff did not possess jurisdiction over the Reserve for purposes of gaming under the IGRA, violated the Stipulation and Agreement between the Tribe and the United States. Plaintiff also requested review under the APA of the Department of the Interior's (DOI) October 31, 2002, opinion letter, claiming that the DOI's opinion letter was an arbitrary and capricious determination. Count II of plaintiff's complaint, entitled "Equitable Relief and Accounting" alleges that defendants have repudiated the determination in the Stipulation and Agreement that the Reserve is Indian lands under the IGRA.
On March 28, 2003, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. In its February 18, 2004 Order ruling on defendants' motion to dismiss, the court found that the crux of both counts of plaintiff's complaint was its attempt to bind the United States to the terms of the Stipulation and Agreement and prevent the United States, its agencies and employees from taking any action contrary to the Stipulation and Agreement. Miami Tribe of Okla. v. United States, et al., 2004 WL 954501, at *4 (D. Kan. Feb. 18, 2004).
The court further found that: 1) a suit against the federal government to compel performance of a contract requires the specific consent of the sovereign; 2) the government's waiver of sovereign immunity for claims seeking relief other than money damages pursuant to the APA does not extend to actions founded on a contract with the United States; 3) the only remedy to which the United States has consented in cases of breach of contract is to the payment of money damages under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491(a)(1), 1346(a)(2); 4) federal courts do not have the power to order specific performance by the United States of its alleged contractual obligations; 5) the only remedy for that type of breach of contract claim would be monetary damages; 6) the Stipulation and Agreement, as a settlement agreement, constituted a contract for enforcement purposes; 7) claims against the United States based on an express or implied contract with the United States that exceed $10,000.00 in amount come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims (Court of Federal Claims); and 8) in the absence of any claim for monetary damages in an amount under $10,000.00, a district court must dismiss a breach of contract claim against the United States for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court noted that plaintiff requests only equitable relief in the form of specific performance under the Stipulation and Agreement, but the only remedy available to plaintiff for its breach of contract claims against the United States, if any, is monetary damages. Because the court was unclear whether plaintiff intended to allege any monetary damages, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, and gave plaintiff 20 days to amend its complaint to claim money damages under $10,000.00 in amount. The court further noted that, if plaintiff amended its complaint to claim money damages over $10,000.00, upon renewed motion from defendants, the court would dismiss plaintiff's complaint without prejudice in favor of its litigation in the Court of Federal Claims. Id. at *4-5.
On February 28, 2004, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the court's February 18, 2004 Order. In its motion to reconsider, plaintiff claimed that the court erred by not recognizing jurisdiction under the APA to review plaintiff's claims for equitable relief from the allegedly wrongful agency action. Plaintiff argued that the DOI's October 31, 2002, opinion letter was arbitrary and capricious, and that plaintiff's claim for review of the determination under the APA is independent of its contract claims.
On June 8, 2004, the court entered an Order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the court's February 18, 2004 Order. In the June 8, 2004 Order, the court found that plaintiff's claim for relief under the APA is not independent of its contract claims and that plaintiff's APA claim is simply another aspect of plaintiff's attempted enforcement of the Stipulation and Agreement. Miami Tribe of Okla. v. United States, et al., 2004 WL 2278584, at *4 (D. Kan. June 8, 2004). The court reiterated that plaintiff's appropriate remedy for its claims lies in the Court of Federal Claims. In the Order, the court also addressed the merits of plaintiff's claims for equitable relief under the APA. The court found that the October 31, 2002, opinion letter from the DOI is not final agency action reviewable under the APA. "[R]eview of the determination in the DOI's opinion letter at this point in the process would be premature and could very possibly impede the NIGC's final determination. Accordingly, even if the court considered plaintiff's APA claim independently of its breach of contract claims, plaintiff's claim for equitable relief under the APA is not based on a final agency action that is ripe for review at this time." Id.
II. The Current Motion to Dismiss
On March 7, 2004, plaintiff filed its first amended complaint, including Count I "APA and Injunctive Relief," Count II "Enforcement of Settlement — Equitable Relief," and Count III "Breach of Stipulation and Agreement and Misrepresentation" — a claim for monetary damages in excess of $75,000.00. On April 30, 2004, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice of Count III of the first amended complaint, with plaintiff retaining its rights to file a complaint in the Court of Federal Claims. The same day, defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In the briefing on the current motion, the parties have presented essentially the same arguments with regard to plaintiff's claims for injunctive and equitable relief under the APA (Counts I and II) that they did in the briefing on defendants' first motion to dismiss. In defendants' reply brief, defendants contend that the court, in its ruling on the first motion to dismiss and its ruling on the motion to reconsider, has resolved all of plaintiff's pending claims. The court agrees. Plaintiff's remaining claims are for injunctive and equitable relief, and rest on the premise that the DOI's October 31, 2002, opinion letter was arbitrary and capricious and violated the parties' prior Stipulation and Agreement.
In light of the court's prior holdings that: (1) plaintiff's claim for relief under the APA is not independent of its contract claims; (2) plaintiff's appropriate remedy for its contract claims lies in the Court of Federal Claims; and (3) even considering plaintiff's APA claim independently of its breach of contract claims, plaintiff's claim for equitable relief under the APA is not based on a final agency action that is ripe for review, the court finds that it has resolved all of plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, dismissal of plaintiff's remaining claims (Counts I and II of the first amended complaint) is appropriate.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Doc. 56) is granted for the reasons set forth above. The court hereby incorporates by reference its findings in its February 18, 2004 and June 8, 2004 Orders (Docs. 40 and 63).
IT IS SO ORDERED.