Opinion
186104330
11-02-2018
Suruj Miah v. Melissa Smith
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Droney, Nuala E., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Hon. Nuala E. Droney Judge of the Superior Court
The plaintiff, landlord Suruj Miah, initiated this summary process action for alleged nonpayment of rent against residential tenant Melissa Smith concerning a rental property at 19 Park Street, Apartment 2, Norwich, Connecticut ("premises"). Both parties are represented by counsel.
On October 10, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss under Practice Book § 10-30 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (Docket No. 103.00). The defendant also filed a supporting memorandum of law and the affidavit of defendant Melissa Smith. The defendant alleges that the plaintiff made statements after the service of the notice to quit that "render the notice to quit equivocal" citing Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, 132 Conn.App. 582 (2011). The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition on October 15, 2018. The court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on October 24, 2018. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.
STANDARD
"Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy ... It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms ... Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and final determination ... Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed." Cheshire Land Tr., LLC v. Casey, 156 Conn.App. 833, 839, 115 A.3d 497, 503 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
"Service of a valid notice to quit, which terminates the lease and creates a tenancy at sufferance ... is a condition precedent to a summary process action ... It is well settled that breach of a covenant to pay rent does not automatically result in the termination of a lease ... rather, it gives the lessor a right to terminate the lease which he may or may not exercise ... In order to effect a termination, the lessor must perform some unequivocal act which clearly demonstrates his intent to terminate the lease ..." Id. at 839 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). "As a condition precedent to summary process action, proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity." Centrix, 132 Conn.App. at 587 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted).
A motion to dismiss under Practice Book § 10-30 "properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court." Santorso v. Bristol Hosp., 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013) (quotation omitted). Such a motion "tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." MacDermid, Inc. v. Leonetti, 310 Conn. 616, 626, 79 A.3d 60 (2013) (citations omitted).
"Summary process statutes are strictly construed, and a paramount consideration is insulating the tenant from confusion and uncertainty." Centrix, 132 Conn.App. at 589-90. Accordingly, a "proper notice to quit is a jurisdictional necessity" and "condition precedent to a summary process action." Housing Auth. v. Harris, 28 Conn.App. 684, 689, 611 A.2d 934 (1992) (citations omitted).
When ruling on motions to dismiss, "a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296-308, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). When, as here, a motion to dismiss "accompanied by supporting affidavits containing undisputed facts, the court may look to their content for determination of the jurisdictional issue and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." Barde v. Board of Trustees, 207 Conn. 59, 62 (1998).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 24, 2018, the plaintiff filed a summary process complaint for non-payment of rent alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff and defendant entered into a lease for the premises on or about December 18, 2017 with a one-year term. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant agreed to pay $900.00 a month by the first of the month and that the defendant failed to pay rent due on September 1, 2018. See Compl. (Docket No. 100.31).
On September 28, 2018, the defendant filed an answer with three special defenses. See Ans. and Special Defenses (Docket 101.00). The defendant admits that she entered into a written lease with the plaintiff and that she occupies the premises at 19 Park Street Norwich, Connecticut. She denies that she agreed to pay $900.00 a month by the first of the month and that she failed to pay rent due by September 1, 2018 as agreed upon in the lease. The defendant asserts the following special defenses: (1) "lack of subject matter jurisdiction"; (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction specifically alleging, inter alia, that the plaintiff withdrew an earlier summary process case against the defendant on August 17, 2018 and then served this notice to quit on September 13, 2018, arguing that the defendant was due a "new grace period" under the lease and Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47a-15a; (3) withholding of rent was appropriate based on the defendant’s alleged failure to "clear the premises of bed bugs"; and (4) the notice to quit was "served within six months of the defendant’s good faith attempt to remedy the plaintiff’s violations" concerning the "conditions of the premises." Id.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on October 24, 2018. To determine whether there was any dispute as to the statements alleged in the defendant’s affidavit submitted in support of the motion to dismiss, the Court allowed testimony about the post-notice to quit interactions between the landlord and tenant.
The following facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff had a notice to quit served on the defendant on September 13, 2018 (Notice to Quit (Docket No. 100.32); Def.’s Aff. (Docket 104.00) Para. 4). The notice to quit requested that the defendant vacate the premises by September 18, 2018. The notice to quit further alleged that the defendant had failed to pay rent. The notice to quit included the following statement: "any money received after the Notice to Quit is served will only be used for occupancy." Docket No. 100.32. The defendant did not vacate the premises by September 18, 2018. The defendant continues to remain in possession of the premises.
The Court concludes based on the parties’ testimony and submissions in this matter that the plaintiff’s statements that give rise to this motion are not truly in dispute. The defendant’s sworn affidavit states that on October 1, 2018, "the plaintiff called me to let me know that he had materials to do caulking work in my apartment. He also told me that I need to start thinking about him, that I’m not paying him and that I should start paying him." Def. Aff. Para 6, (Docket 104.00). The defendant testified consistently with this recitation in court. The plaintiff did not offer any testimony that, in the court’s mind, undermined the defendant’s recollection of the October 1 interaction. The court credits the defendant’s recitation of the October 1, 2018 incident.
The defendant’s affidavit further states that on October 9, 2018 "at approximately 5:30 p.m., the plaintiff knocked on my door and told me that he wanted to talk about the bed bug situations in my apartment. He told me that he has done all that he can do but if I paid him money, he could do more. I told him he is trying to evict me. He replied that eviction doesn’t matter and that I could still pay him." Def. Aff. Para. 7 (Docket 104.00) (emphasis added). At the hearing, the defendant credibly testified in support of the affidavit.
The plaintiff landlord’s testimony about October 9, 2018 was consistent with the defendant tenant’s account of their interaction on that day. The plaintiff’s own testimony strongly supports the defendant’s arguments. The plaintiff admitted that he told the defendant: "if you pay my rent - and still you can- eviction doesn’t matter . Sometimes I don’t like you [to] go very quickly. You can pay the rent. You can stay. Because I am taking care of you all the time." (Emphasis added.) When the plaintiff’s counsel asked the plaintiff if he ever said the exact words "eviction doesn’t matter" to the defendant, the plaintiff’s response was: "I didn’t say- I didn’t mean that . I mean if she has a problem- if she pay [sic] the rent she can stay until we finish the agreement because she has October, November, December that’s all ..." (emphasis added).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The defendant argues Centrix Management Co., LLC v. Valencia, 132 Conn.App. 582 (2011), supports dismissal of this action. The issue in Centrix, and this present case, is whether the "combination of the[ ] written and spoken statements could create reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable tenant as to whether the lease, in fact, remained terminated." Id. at 589 (emphasis added). Specifically, the defendant argues that as "a result of the plaintiff landlord’s conduct, the notice to quit is rendered equivocal and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this summary process action and the case should be dismissed." Pl. Mem. (Docket No. 105.00 at 2).
In response, the plaintiff first argues "[c]ontrary to the Defendant’s representations ... that the eviction was somehow not going to proceed or the default on the lease for nonpayment was waived, the Notice to Quit clearly indicated that ‘any money received after the notice to quit is served will be used for occupancy.’ " Def. Mem. Opp. at 1 (Docket No. 106.00). The plaintiff argues that the "manner in which the Defendant couches her testimony is disingenuous. She certainly could still pay him- the Notice to Quit clearly advised and warned her that, ‘any money received after the notice to quit will be used for occupancy.’ " Def. Mem. at 2 (emphasis in original).
The plaintiff’s first argument fails in light of the plaintiff’s own testimony that he repeatedly told the plaintiff she could pay, in his own words, the "rent." He invited the plaintiff to pay rent- not use and occupancy. Although the notice to quit stated that payments after the notice to quit would be used for "occupancy," the landlord’s repeated statements after the service of the notice to quit that the defendant could pay the "rent" ("if you pay my rent - and still you can- eviction doesn’t matter ... if she pay [sic] the rent she can stay until we finish the agreement because she has October, November, December that’s all ..." (emphasis added)) could create reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable tenant as to whether the lease, in fact, remained terminated. Given the landlord’s testimony, a reasonable tenant could reasonably believe that the tenancy had been reinstated and the notice to quit was equivocal.
The plaintiff next argues that the October 9 discussion "however the Defendant may wish to misconstruct and misrepresent it, occurred an entire month after the date to quit possession in the Notice to Quit" and therefore it does not "constitute ‘a new lease agreement or with an invitation to enter into a new rental agreement after a notice to quit has been served’ as Centrix Management contemplates." Id. at 3. The plaintiff points out that the draft agreement that the court in Centrix partially relied on was drafted prior to the expiration of the notice to quit.
Centrix, however, does not require the initiation of a new lease for a notice to be quit to be considered equivocal. In Centrix, the Connecticut Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the notice to quit was rendered equivocal by the landlord’s written and verbal communication to the tenant after the service of the notice to quit. There was "no communication initiating a new lease agreement or inviting payment of rent." Instead, the Centrix landlord took "actions, however, that were not consistent with a ‘clear intention to terminate the lease and to proceed with judicial process to secure possession.’ " Centrix, 132 Conn.App. at 589 (citation omitted).
Specifically, the landlord in Centrix (1) informed the tenant that the landlord "did not want to evict her and that they could try to work out a settlement," (2) told the tenant he "did not like spending money on attorneys fees" and "wanted to avoid attorneys fees and court," and (3) drafted a document in the tenant’s presence that "contained an agreement" that the landlord "would forgive two month’s of use and occupancy payments" and that the parties would "work to straighten out [the] arrearage." Id. The Centrix court concluded that the "combination of these written and spoken statements could create reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable tenant as to whether the lease, in fact, remained terminated." Id. The Centrix court further explained that in examining post-notice to quit interactions between tenants and landlords, trial courts should apply an "objective standard" focusing on the "acts of the parties rather than the parties’ intentions." Id. at 589 n.3.
The court finds that the plaintiff here admitted that he said to the defendant on October 9, 2018, in his own words "eviction doesn’t matter." Although he testified later that he meant she "could stay," the court’s focus is what the landlord said- not what he meant. Following Centrix, trial courts are to apply an "objective standard" focusing on the "acts of the parties rather than the parties’ intentions." Id. at 589 n.3. As in Centrix, the "combination of the[ ] written and spoken statements could create reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable tenant as to whether the lease, in fact, remained terminated." Id. (emphasis added).
During the plaintiff’s counsel’s cross examination of the defendant, the defendant’s counsel objected to counsel’s questioning of the defendant as to whether she, as the tenant, subjectively believed the eviction was going forward. While the defendant testified that she believed the eviction would continue, the court concludes that the landlord’s statements inviting the defendant to pay rent after the notice to quit caused the notice to quit to became equivocal. From a public policy standpoint, the issue is whether the landlord’s words and actions could create a reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable tenant about whether the lease remained terminated. The court concludes that a reasonable tenant in the defendant’s position- faced with a landlord stating that the tenant could still pay the landlord "rent" and that "eviction doesn’t matter"- would be reasonable in having doubt about whether the lease remained terminated. The court makes this conclusion guided by the underlying tenet that statutes relating to summary process "must be narrowly construed and strictly followed" Centrix Mgmt. Co., LLC v. Valencia, 132 Conn.App. 582, 587, AA A.3d 802 (2011) (citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted). "Summary process statutes are strictly construed, and a paramount consideration is insulating the tenant from confusion and uncertainty." Id. at 589-90. Public policy is served by requiring landlords to refrain from statements that would cause confusion and uncertainty to a reasonable tenant.
Furthermore, to the extent that the landlord here was attempting to settle the dispute with the defendant tenant, the Connecticut Appellate Court has recognized that Centrix noted that a landlord "is not prohibited from attempting to settle a tenancy dispute with a tenant provided it informs the tenant that eviction will result should settlement efforts fail ." Cheshire Land Tr., LLC v. Casey, 156 Conn.App. 833, 843-44, 115 A.3d 497, 506 (2015) (emphasis added). Here, however, the plaintiff landlord did not inform the defendant tenant that eviction would result if settlement efforts failed.
Finally, as to the plaintiff’s arguments about the timing of the October 9, 2018 interaction between the parties, the motion to dismiss is not defeated merely because the plaintiff made the statements to the defendant after the date the notice to quit gave to vacate the property. In Steele Casa Nueva, LLC v. Ortiz, Nos. HDSP- 181088, H-1618, 2016 WL 1211851 (Mar. 21, 2016), the court concluded that a September 18, 2015 notice to quit that gave until October 1, 2015 to vacate was rendered equivocal by two letters dated after the date to vacate the property. The court concluded that both letters (dated October 12, 2015 and January 12, 2016) made the notice to quit equivocal and granted the motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff’s spoken statements to the defendant in this case after the service of the notice to quit could create reasonable doubt in the mind of a reasonable tenant as to whether the lease, in fact, remained terminated. Accordingly, the notice to quit in this action was rendered equivocal and this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this summary process action. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 103.00) is GRANTED.