Opinion
1202 WDA 2021 J-S03001-22
04-20-2022
IN RE: ADOPTION OF M.H., A/K/A M.G.H.., A MINOR CHILD v. APPEAL OF: K.W., MOTHER v.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 15, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County Orphans' Court at No(s): Case No. 3 or 2021
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. [*]
MEMORANDUM
LAZARUS, J.
K.W. (Mother) appeals from the final decree, entered in the Orphans' Court of Armstrong County, terminating her parental rights to M.H. (born 9/2010), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8), and (b) of the Adoption Act. After our review, we affirm based on the opinion authored by the Honorable Chase G. McClister.
On August 27, 2021, M.H.'s Father filed a petition to voluntarily relinquish his parental rights to M.H. The court entered a decree terminating Father's parental rights that same day. He is not involved in this appeal.
Armstrong County Children, Youth and Family Services (CYF) became involved with Mother in September 2017 due to unsafe and substandard home conditions. CYF provided in-home services, but despite sporadic improvement, the housing situation deteriorated. In July 2018, CYF visited the home and noted deplorable conditions: excessive garbage, clutter, and animal feces throughout the house, particularly in M.H.'s bedroom. In September 2018, M.H. was adjudicated dependent, and she remained in Mother's custody under protective supervision. Home conditions continued to deteriorate. In the spring of 2019, CYF received reports that the conditions in Mother's home worsened, and she was keeping multiple animals, including up to 40 cats and a pig, in the home. CYF filed an application for protective custody, which the court granted on July 17, 2019. M.H. was removed from the home. At that time, CYF had growing concerns about Mother's mental health issues. M.H. was placed in foster care. The court held permanency review hearings in January, June, September, and December of 2020. After each hearing the court found Mother had made minimal progress toward alleviating the conditions in the home that led to placement. After the December 2020 hearing, the court changed the permanency goal from return to home to adoption.
In April 2021, M.H. was placed with a different foster family; she remains with them to date as her pre-adoptive family.
Approximately eighteen months later, on January 27, 2021, CYF filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights under sections 2511(a)(1), (a)(5), and (a)(8) of the Adoption Act. The court scheduled a hearing and, over objections by both the guardian ad litem and CYF, the court granted Mother three continuances. The court ultimately held a termination hearing on August 27, 2021, after which the court entered a decree terminating Mother's parental rights to M.H.
The court appointed Paula C. LaStrapes, Esquire, as guardian ad litem, who reported to the court that there was no conflict between M.H.'s legal interests and best interests. See In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218 (Pa. 2020).
Mother filed a timely appeal. She raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court err in granting the petition for involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?
2. Did the trial court err in granting the petition for involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)?
3. Did the trial court err in granting the petition for involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5)?
4. Did the trial court err in granting the petition for involuntary termination of parental rights of Mother under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?Appellant's Brief, at 8.
Because we affirm the trial court's determination under section 2511(a)(8), we need not address issues two and three. See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (this Court may affirm trial court's decision regarding termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a), along with consideration of section 2511(b)). We note the trial court need only determine CYF met its burden under one subsection of section 2511(a); Mother's claims with respect to subsections (a)(1) and (a)(5) are superfluous.
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when considering a trial court's determination of a petition for termination of parental rights. . . . [O]ur standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
As [the Supreme Court] discussed in In re: R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)], there are clear reasons for applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. [U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment; instead[, ] we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record and the court's legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (some citations omitted).
CYF, as petitioner, has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). "[T]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights under sections 2511(a)(8) and (b). A party seeking termination under section 2511(a)(8) must prove the following by clear and convincing evidence: "(1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child." In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). "Termination under section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent's current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused placement or the availability or efficacy of Agency services." Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.-The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
(b) Other considerations.-The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(8), (b) (emphasis added).
Mother argues that CYF failed to meet the requirements of subsection 2511(a)(8) by clear and convincing evidence because CYF "failed to show that the conditions which led to the removal or placement of [M.H.] continue to exist[.]" Appellant's Brief, at 14. However, even though Mother acquired a new housing situation in March 2020, she did not do so until two months after the petition for termination was filed. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/21, at 17. The trial court is prohibited by statute from considering Mother's efforts after CYF filed the petition for termination. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
The court did, however, take judicial notice of the fact that Mother was charged on March 23, 2021, with 198 counts of animal-related crimes, including aggravated cruelty to animals, neglect, and cruelty. See Trial Court Opinion, supra at 7. The disturbing recitation from the prosecuting humane officer is set forth in full in the trial court's opinion. Id. at 7-8. Bail conditions preclude Mother from having any animals in her new residence.
The trial court set forth in its opinion its reasons for determining that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was proper under sections 2511(a)(8) and (b). See Trial Court Opinion, supra at 15-17 (stating M.H. has been in placement for more than 12 months; as of time of filing of termination petition, conditions that lead to placement continued to exist-indeed, were much worse; M.H.'s issues, including several chronic respiratory problems, low weight, behavioral difficulties, and truancy, "have resolved since [M.H.] has been placed with her pre-adoptive family[, ]" and therefore termination would best serve M.H.s needs and welfare).
Additionally, the court set forth in its opinion its reasons for determining that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights was in M.H.'s best interests under section 2511(b). See Trial Court Opinion, supra at 18-19 (although there is bond between Mother and M.H., it "is clear that the bond has deteriorated over the past year" and that M.H. believes Mother prioritizes her animals over her, and relationship "appears to be moving from familiar and relatively comfortable to somewhat hostile and tense. Severing such a bond will not work a significant detriment to [M.H.], who now looks to her pre-adoptive family for emotional, physical and financial support.").
The record supports the trial court's findings, and the court's conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion. See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27. Accordingly, we affirm the termination decree based on the trial court's opinion. The parties are directed to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
[*] Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.