Similarly, assessing extra points based on the technique with or circumstances under which the juvenile allegedly committed the currently scored offense also constitutes double scoring. See M.W. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 15 So.3d 782, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that assessing three aggravating points based on use of a firearm was impermissible because the juvenile had already been assessed eight points for the offense of possession of a firearm); see also M.G. v. Berry, 998 So.2d 634, 635–36 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (holding that the circuit court improperly added points as an aggravating factor based on the facts of a charge for conspiracy to commit an armed robbery pending in the adult felony division because that circumstance was incorporated into the RAI for other current offenses and pending charges). In any event, as the respondent observed in its response to this petition, if the circuit judge relied only upon the fact that the petitioner was arrested for this crime because he left fingerprints to infer that J.L.B. employed stealth, secrecy, or skill in the commission of the crime, this legal conclusion may be flawed.

We agree with our sister court's conclusion in D.P. v. State, 8 So.3d 1203 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009), that this scoring method runs afoul of the prohibition on "double-scoring" additional aggravation points for factors already accounted for and quantified in the RAI. See P.AJ. v. Gnat, 684 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); D.G.H. v. Gnat, 682 So.2d 210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); see also M.G. v. Berry, 998 So.2d 634 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); D.G. v. Miles, 872 So.2d 343 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The fact that petitioner violated section 790.23(1)(b) by possessing a firearm had already been accounted for by the scoring of 10 points for that offense, rather than the 8 points that would have been scored had he violated the statute by some means other than possession of a firearm or concealed weapon.