"We need not decide whether plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the existence of valid and subsisting encumbrances since, even if such allegations were sufficient, we find that the complaint would then state a cause of action for mere nominal damages, as will be explained below. The covenant against encumbrances constitutes a covenant in praesenti and is breached, if at all, at the moment it is made. ( Meyers v. Veres (1923), 245 Ill. App. 127.) This breach is, however, merely a technical one and gives rise to a cause of action for only nominal damages unless the convenantee has paid off the encumbrance, voluntarily or under compulsion, or has been evicted because of it. ( Willets v. Burgess (1864), 34 Ill. 494; 20 Am.Jur. 2d Covenants, Conditions, Etc. sec. 138, at 695-97 (1965).

We also observe that by the express terms of the written agreement between Stanley DeFurgalski and Seifert and Rynes, DeFurgalski agreed to convey title free and clear of all incumbrances. Relying on the well-settled rule that a covenant against incumbrances is a covenant in praesenti, that is breached, if at all, at the moment it is made ( Firebaugh v. Wittenberg (1923), 309 Ill. 536, 543, 141 N.E. 379; Meyers v. Veres (1923), 245 Ill. App. 127, 130; see Fechtner v. Lake County Savings Loan Association (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 307, 308-09, 337 N.E.2d 193, rev'd (1977), 66 Ill.2d 128), Inland contends that there was no breach of that covenant because the sales agreement was executed and the warranty deed delivered in 1972, and the back taxes were not imposed until 1978. According to Inland, since at the time the warranties in this case were made there were no tax liens of record, no back taxes levied or unpaid, no reassessment of the premises, and no notice of intention to back tax, the covenant against incumbrances was not breached and the Seiferts had no defense to its foreclosure action.

• 1, 2 The covenant against encumbrances constitutes a covenant inpraesenti and is breached, if at all, at the moment it is made. ( Meyers v. Veres (1923), 245 Ill. App. 127.) This breach is, however, merely a technical one and gives rise to a cause of action for only nominal damages unless the covenantee has paid off the encumbrance, voluntarily or under compulsion, or has been evicted because of it. ( Willets v. Burgess (1864), 34 Ill. 494; 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, Conditions, Etc. § 138, at 695-97 (1965).)