Moreover, the State presented sufficient evidence that Thompson entered the victim's apartment with the intent to commit a theft, and the jury was authorized to convict Thompson of the crime of burglary as charged in the indictment. See Meyers v. State, 281 Ga.App. 670, 670–671(1), 637 S.E.2d 78 (2006) (jury authorized to find appellant guilty of burglary when there was evidence that appellant entered friend's home and took television, VCR, cable box, and other items without permission although appellant claimed, among other things, that he took certain items in satisfaction of debt). Accordingly, we affirm.

Holloman v. State, 167 Ga. App. 683, 684 (3) ( 307 SE2d 266) (1983). See Duren, supra; see also Meyers v. State, 281 Ga. App. 670, 672 (2) ( 637 SE2d 78) (2006). We note that most of the testimony at issue was admissible on grounds other than as declarations of co-conspirators.

See Bills v. State, 283 Ga. App. 660, 661 (1) (a) ( 642 SE2d 352) (2007). See Meyers v. State, 281 Ga. App. 670, 671 (1) ( 637 SE2d 78) (2006). See Bills, supra at 662.

In this case, the evidence shows that the victim's kidnapping and rape were part of one criminal transaction, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the rape. See, e.g., Meyers v. State, 281 Ga. App. 670, 671-673 (2) ( 637 SE2d 78) (2006) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that defendant sexually propositioned the victim during course of the burglary for which he was charged). Evidence that the victim did not inform the Louisiana police that she had been sexually assaulted does not render her testimony that she was raped inadmissible. "[A]ny inconsistencies in the victim's testimony raised a credibility issue properly determined by the jury."