Opinion
Civil No. 03-5251 (JRT/RLE).
September 30, 2004
Michael A. Meyer, Moose Lake, Minnesota, pro se.
Kerri Stahlecker Hermann, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL, St. Paul, Minnesota, for defendants.
ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This is a civil action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state laws in which plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages, as a result of his being placed in segregation while a patient in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program ("MSOP").
Defendants, various current and former Department of Human Services officials and 12 MSOP employees, brought a motion to dismiss. The motion was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson for a report and recommendation. This matter is now before the Court on plaintiff's objections to the report and recommendation, which recommends that the defendants' motion to dismiss be granted. The Court has conducted a de novo review of plaintiff's objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and D. Minn. LR 72.1(c)(2). For the reasons stated below, the Court overrules plaintiff's objections and adopts the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael A. Meyer ("Meyer") was adjudicated a psychopathic personality by a final commitment order dated March 14, 1996, and was civilly committed to the MSOP in Moose Lake, Minnesota. On October 4, 2001, Meyer was dying the hair of another patient in the MSOP when a third patient, Chris Welin ("Welin"), entered the room. A physical altercation ensued between Meyer and Welin that was stopped by two members of the National Guard who were filling in for MSOP employees that were on strike.
Meyer was then summoned to an operational team meeting and placed in Protective Isolation ("PI"), or segregation, for 90 days as a result of the altercation. Meyer attended a PI Review Panel Meeting on October 9, 2001, and objected to his placement in PI. The panel upheld the use of PI. Meyer then appealed the review panel's decision to the Chief Operating Officer ("COO") of the facility on October 29, 2001. On October 31, 2001, Meyer received a memo stating that the COO overturned the decision to impose 90 days of PI, converted it to 60 days of Unit Protective Isolation ("UPI"), and gave Meyer extra credit for the time served. Accordingly, Meyer was released from PI on October 31, 2001, and placed in UPI for 15 days. Meyer filed a grievance regarding his placement in UPI that was heard by a review panel on November 5, 2001. The review panel decided to release Meyer from UPI as of that date.
UPI is similar to PI, except that patients are in their own rooms, rather than in a separate protective isolation room, have access to their personal belongings, and are allowed out of their rooms for showering and meals.
In November 2003, Meyer filed this lawsuit alleging that his placement in PI and UPI violated his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state laws. Meyer seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits this Court from granting injunctive relief against the defendants in their official capacities; that Meyer fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); that the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Meyer's remaining state law claims; and that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from all of Meyer's § 1983 claims.
On July 27, 2004, United States Magistrate Judge Raymond L. Erickson recommended that defendant's motion to dismiss be granted. Meyer, after being granted an extension of time, timely objected to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Defendants move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On a motion to dismiss, this Court must accept all the allegations in the complaint as true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 270 F.3d 637, 638 (8th Cir. 2001). In addition, this Court must liberally construe a pro se complaint. Smith v. St. Bernards Reg'l Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 1254, 1255 (8th Cir. 1994). The Court will dismiss the complaint only if there is no set of facts under which Meyer can prevail. Holden Farms, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 347 F.3d 1055, 1059 (8th Cir. 2003).
II. Eleventh Amendment
The Magistrate Judge recommended that plaintiff's claims for monetary damages and for injunctive relief for claimed violations of state law against defendants in their official capacities be dismissed because they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Meyer does not object to this recommendation, and the Court, therefore, adopts it.
III. Due Process
In his complaint, Meyer alleges that his Due Process rights were violated when the defendants placed him in PI, and did so without affording him adequate procedural rights. Meyer now objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that civilly committed detainees should not have broader due process rights than those guaranteed to pretrial detainees. Meyer refers to the holdings in Devillion v. Milczark, No. 01-617 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2001) and Nicolairson v. Milczark, 26 Fed. Appx. 596, 2002 WL 15669 (8th Cir. Jan. 8, 2002), which the Magistrate Judge relied on, as "mistakes." In addition, Meyer argues that he is not a detainee at all, but instead is a "patient" and, therefore, should receive greater due process protection than a pretrial detainee.
It is true that Meyer is a patient and is not incarcerated for purposes of "punishment." Meyer was, however, lawfully committed by the state and clearly does not have the same freedoms or rights as a free citizen. The exact standard to be applied to a civilly committed sex offender asserting a due process violation, however, has not been definitively decided in this circuit. That said, in Devillion v. Milczark, a sister court in this district adopted a report and recommendation that concluded that civilly committed detainees should not have broader due process rights than those granted to pretrial detainees. No. 01-617 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2001). The Court in Devillion went on to state that civilly committed detainees should actually be extended less due process protection than pretrial detainees, because civilly committed detainees have already received the benefit of a complete court trial. Id. In Nicolaison v. Milczark, the Eighth Circuit cited to the standard for considering a pretrial detainee's procedural due process rights when considering a civilly committed detainee's § 1983 claim. 26 Fed. Appx. 592, 2002 WL 15669 (8th Cir. Jan. 8, 2002). The Eighth Circuit in Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2001), used the same excessive-force standard applied to pretrial detainees when considering a § 1983 claim brought on behalf of a civilly committed detainee.
For the purposes of this case, the Court agrees with the report and recommendation that the same due process standard used for pretrial detainees should be applied to Meyer. Accordingly, the Court finds that Meyer was not "punished" without adequate procedural due process. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (holding that pretrial detainees cannot be punished without due process). Meyer's placement in PI, and then UPI, does not amount to punishment because it was related to the government interest of maintaining order in the facility and protecting the safety of Meyer and other patients in the MSOP. See Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that "if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to `punishment'"). In addition, the Court finds that the defendants followed MSOP procedures and that those procedures provided Meyer with sufficient process. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (stating that "federal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment").
To the extent that Meyer is asserting that his placement in segregation violated a liberty interest, this claim also fails. The United States Supreme Court has held that Due Process rights are implicated only if the liberty interest is infringed in a way that "imposes atypical and significant hardship." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). The Eighth Circuit has "consistently held that a demotion to segregation . . . is not itself an atypical and significant hardship. See Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2003). Meyer has presented no evidence giving rise to a conclusion that his placement in segregation was either atypical or significant. Therefore, the Court adopts the report and recommendation as to this issue.
IV. Eighth Amendment
Meyer objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation to dismiss his Eighth Amendment claim arguing that his pro se complaint should be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." (Pl.'s Mem. at 14.) This Court acknowledges that pro se complaints should be liberally construed, Smith, 19 F.3d at 1255, but even a liberal reading of Meyer's complaint would not give rise to a viable Eighth Amendment claim. See Ricker v. Leapley, 25 F.3d 1406, 1411 (8th Cir. 1994) ("While the Eighth Amendment certainly would be implicated if prison officials imposed a barbaric disciplinary penalty, such as flogging, serving an additional thirty to sixty days in punitive segregation is not cruel and unusual punishment."). Therefore, this Court adopts the report and recommendation as to this issue.
V. Qualified Immunity
Finally, Meyer objects to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities. The United States Supreme Court has held that if a government official's conduct did not violate a constitutional right, then the official is entitled to qualified immunity. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766 (2003). Neither Meyer's Due Process rights nor his Eighth Amendment rights were violated. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the Court adopts the report and recommendation as to this issue.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the submissions of the parties, and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court OVERRULES plaintiff's objections [Docket No. 40] and ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 36]. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 29] is GRANTED.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to the plaintiff.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.