Meyer v. N.Y. Office of Mental Health

11 Citing cases

  1. Jones v. Onondaga Cnty. Res. Recovery Agency

    5:13-cv-01425 (N.D.N.Y. Jun. 3, 2014)   Cited 3 times
    Denying the defendant's motion to dismiss, despite the fact “that [p]laintiff's retaliation claims barely provide plausible factual allegations supporting a prima facie case of retaliation because the allegations are so vague and conclusory, they do give [d]efendants fair notice of the basis for Plaintiff's claims,” and noting that “[d]iscovery can be used to delineate and define these issues, and a motion for summary judgment can be made if it is contended after discovery that the claims are insufficient”

    Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511; see also Jackson v. NYS Dep't of Labor, 709 F. Supp.2d 218, 223-24 (S.D.N.Y.2010) ("In the context of a discrimination claim, the Iqbal plausibility standard applies in conjunction with employment discrimination pleading standards.") (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Meyer v. New York Office of Mental Health, 2014 WL 1767818, at * 3 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014). "However, the elements of a prima facie case 'provide an outline of what is necessary to render [a plaintiff's employment discrimination] claims for relief plausible.'"

  2. Sullivan v. Creedmoor Psychiatric Ctr.

    22-CV-3420 (RPK) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2023)   Cited 1 times

    Because Creedmoor is a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, plaintiff's ADEA claim against Creedmoor necessarily fails. See, e.g., Harvey v. Creedmoor Psychiatric Ctr., No. 21-CV-7031 (PKC) (LB), 2022 WL 36169, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2022); Meyer v. N.Y. Off. of Mental Health, No. 12-CV-6202 (PKC), 2014 WL 1767818, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014).

  3. Harvey v. Creedmoor Psychiatric Ctr.

    21-CV-7031 (PKC) (LB) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2022)   Cited 2 times

    ; accord Meyer v. New York Office of Mental Health, No. 12-CV-6202 (PKC), 2014 WL 1767818, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014) (dismissing discrimination claims against the Office of Mental Health and Creedmoor based on the Eleventh Amendment). Therefore, the Complaint is dismissed insofar as it “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

  4. Livingston v. City of New York

    563 F. Supp. 3d 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)   Cited 76 times

    As the "pertinent language of the two laws is ‘virtually identical’ " with respect to aiding and abetting liability, "applying the same standard under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL is appropriate." Lyman v. N.Y. & Presbyterian Hosp. , No. 11 Civ. 3889 (KPF), 2014 WL 3417394, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2014) (quoting Meyer v. N.Y. Off. of Mental Health , No. 12 Civ. 6202 (PKC), 2014 WL 1767818, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014) ). 2. Analysis

  5. Tenecora v. Ba-Kal Rest. Corp.

    2:18-cv-7311 (DRH) (AKT) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2021)   Cited 3 times

    The Boykin plaintiff's pro se status is not a basis to "materially distinguish" the Second Circuit's holding. Meyer v. N.Y. Off. of Mental Health, 2014 WL 1767818, at *5 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014); Ritterband v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 3887605, at *8 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2008). II. Damages

  6. Mills-Sanchez v. Research Found. for State Univ. of N.Y.

    1:18-cv-723 (GLS/DJS) (N.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 2019)   Cited 8 times

    However, plaintiff fails to explain how any of these allegations, which occurred after her resignation, are capable of altering the conditions of her work environment so as to state a hostile work environment claim. See Meyer v. N.Y. Office of Mental Health, No. 12-CV-6202, 2014 WL 1767818, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014) (declining to apply continuing violation doctrine where plaintiff bringing hostile work environment claim was terminated prior to certain conduct). Given that plaintiff fails to identify a timely incident that contributed to her hostile work environment claims, the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable.

  7. Spence v. Bukofzer

    15 Civ. 6167 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017)   Cited 21 times
    Finding sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct for purposes of a hostile work environment discrimination claim based on, inter alia, exclusion from a meeting

    The Court therefore construes the TAC to also be asserting hostile work environment discrimination claims. See, e.g., Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Although the complaint does not explicitly allege discrimination based on a hostile work environment, the complaint alleges 'continued harassment' of Kassner and alleges facts from which we may infer pleading of hostile work environment claims..."); Meyer v. N.Y. Office of Mental Health, No. 12 Civ. 6202 (PKC), 2014 WL 1767818, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014) (construing a hostile work environment claim where no "specific count" alleges hostile work environment, but the allegations sound in that relief). Defendants move to partially dismiss the TAC on grounds that: (1) Spence's claims are partially time-barred; (2) the retaliation claim under Title VII is barred by her failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) she fails to plead a plausible claim for discrimination; (3) she fails to plead a plausible claim for hostile work environment; (4) she fails to plead facts that plausibly establish a claim for municipal liability under § 1981; and (5) her state tort claims must be dismissed for failure to comply with notice of claim requirements.

  8. Dechberry v. New York City Fire Department

    124 F. Supp. 3d 131 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)   Cited 93 times
    Holding that, "even construing all of the allegations as true and drawing inferences liberally and in favor of the pro se plaintiff, there is no factual basis upon which to conclude that any of defendant's actions were taken because of plaintiff's" membership in a protected class

    ) Indeed, plaintiff may not allege violations during a period in which she was not employed by or working for defendant. See Meyer v. New York Office of Mental Health, No. 12–CV–6202, 2014 WL 1767818, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014) (dismissing hostile work environment claim where plaintiff alleged “continuing violation” because plaintiff had been terminated prior to the period alleged.); Gillman v. Inner City Broad. Corp., No. 08–CV–8909, 2011 WL 181732, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2011) (dismissing hostile work environment claim where there was no dispute that the alleged incidents occurred while plaintiff was on leave and did not take place in the “workplace”); Akinfaderin v. W.P. Carey & Co. LLC, No. 11–CV–3184, 2011 WL 6961403, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2011) on reconsideration in part, No. 11–CV–3184 LBS, 2012 WL 432647 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2012) (dismissing state hostile work environment claim where plaintiff never returned to workplace after going on medical leave).

  9. Purdie v. City Univ. of N.Y.

    13 Civ. 6423 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2015)   Cited 12 times

    This conclusion is consistent with our observation that individual-capacity suits against state employees are seldom challenged on the basis of sovereign immunity. See Feingold; Meyer v. N.Y. Off. of Mental Health, No. 12-cv-6202 (PKC), 2014 WL 1767818 at *7 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014) (denying Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss individual-capacity claims brought under City Human Rights Law against a state employee); Shanahan v. New York, No. 10-cv-742 (RWS), 2011 WL 223202 at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2011) (dismissing official-capacity claims brought under City Human Rights Law on grounds of sovereign immunity, but dismissing individual-capacity claims on the merits). II. FAILURE TO STATE CLAIMS

  10. Fanelli v. State

    51 F. Supp. 3d 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)   Cited 33 times
    Finding the continuing violation doctrine did not apply in a case where the Plaintiff's supervisor was amongst the Defendants

    Thus, all of these allegations are sufficient to give the Defendants fair notice of the Plaintiff's claims and the Defendants' motion to dismiss the Title VII discrimination claim is denied. Meyer v. New York Office of Mental Health, No. 12–CV–6202 (PKC), 2014 WL 1767818, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2014) (holding that allegations that female Plaintiff was qualified for position but was treated less favorably than other employees because of her gender was sufficient to survive motion to dismiss). E. As to the Plaintiff's NYSHRL Claims