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Meyer v. Cnty. of Suffolk

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Dec 13, 2011
90 A.D.3d 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)

Opinion

2011-12-13

Dennis MEYER, appellant, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, respondent.

Joseph C. Stroble, Sayville, N.Y., for appellant. Christine Malafi, County Attorney, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Christopher A. Jeffreys of counsel), for respondent.


Joseph C. Stroble, Sayville, N.Y., for appellant. Christine Malafi, County Attorney, Hauppauge, N.Y. (Christopher A. Jeffreys of counsel), for respondent.

PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, RANDALL T. ENG, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for false imprisonment and violation of civil and constitutional rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gazzillo, J.), dated June 19, 2009, which denied his motion to deem the notice of claim timely served, and granted the defendant's cross motion to dismiss the action for failure to timely serve a notice of claim.

ORDERED that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof granting that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was to dismiss the cause of action alleging a violation of civil and constitutional rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983, and substituting therefor a provision denying that branch of the cross motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

“ ‘In exercising its discretion in determining whether or not to [deem a notice of claim timely served], the court must consider various factors, including whether (1) the claimant is an infant, (2) the claimant has demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to serve a timely notice of claim, (3) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the facts constituting the claim within 90 days of its accrual or a reasonable time thereafter, and (4) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in defending on the merits ( see General Municipal Law § 50–e [5] )’ ” ( Wade v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 85 A.D.3d 1016, 1017, 925 N.Y.S.2d 630, quoting Matter of Kaur v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 82 A.D.3d 891, 891–892, 918 N.Y.S.2d 545; see Matter of Davis v. County of Westchester, 78 A.D.3d 698, 911 N.Y.S.2d 103). “[T]he presence or absence of any one factor is not determinative” ( Matter of Kaur v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 82 A.D.3d at 892, 918 N.Y.S.2d 545).

Here, the plaintiff failed to set forth a reasonable excuse for his delay in serving his notice of claim, and the record does not reveal the existence of a reasonable excuse. Lack of awareness of the possibility of a lawsuit is not a reasonable excuse for delay in filing a notice of claim ( see Bucknor v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp. [Queens Hosp. Ctr.], 44 A.D.3d 811, 813, 844 N.Y.S.2d 100; Matter of Flores v. County of Nassau, 8 A.D.3d 377, 378, 777 N.Y.S.2d 739; Matter of Cotten v. County of Nassau, 307 A.D.2d 965, 966, 763 N.Y.S.2d 474). Additionally, ignorance of the requirement to serve the notice of claim within 90 days does not constitute a reasonable excuse ( see Williams v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 13 A.D.3d 363, 364, 786 N.Y.S.2d 207, affd. 6 N.Y.3d 531, 814 N.Y.S.2d 580, 847 N.E.2d 1154; Matter of Pico v. City of New York, 8 A.D.3d 287, 288, 777 N.Y.S.2d 697).

The record also does not reflect that the defendant had “actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim” (General Municipal Law § 50–e [5]; see Matter of Estate of Curreri v. New York City Hous. Auth., 87 A.D.3d 1064, 929 N.Y.S.2d 759; Matter of Felice v. Eastport/South Manor Cent. School Dist., 50 A.D.3d 138, 147–148, 851 N.Y.S.2d 218). Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish that the delay in serving the late notice of claim would not substantially prejudice the defendant ( see Williams v. Nassau County Med. Ctr., 6 N.Y.3d at 539, 814 N.Y.S.2d 580, 847 N.E.2d 1154; Wade v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 85 A.D.3d 1016, 925 N.Y.S.2d 630; see Matter of Lewis v. City of New York, 82 A.D.3d 981, 918 N.Y.S.2d 734). Accordingly, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to deem his notice of claim timely served and granting that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was to dismiss the State common-law causes of action to recover damages for false imprisonment, negligence, and gross negligence for failure to timely serve a notice of claim.

However, the Supreme Court erred in granting that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was to dismiss the cause of action to recover damages for a violation of the plaintiff's civil and constitutional rights pursuant to 42 USC § 1983. The defendant cross-moved to dismiss the action solely on the ground that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice of claim requirement of the General Municipal Law ( see CPLR 3211[e], [a][7] ). A cause of action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 is not subject to a State statutory notice of claim requirement ( see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 153, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 101 L.Ed.2d 123; Rowe v. NYCPD, 85 A.D.3d 1001, 1002, 926 N.Y.S.2d 121).


Summaries of

Meyer v. Cnty. of Suffolk

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.
Dec 13, 2011
90 A.D.3d 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
Case details for

Meyer v. Cnty. of Suffolk

Case Details

Full title:Dennis MEYER, appellant, v. COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, respondent.

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Date published: Dec 13, 2011

Citations

90 A.D.3d 720 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)
934 N.Y.S.2d 235
2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 9100

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