A servant who is employed by one person may with his consent be loaned to a third person to render a special service and thereby become the servant or employee of the third person in the performance of such special service. Creek v. Naylor, 309 Ill. App.? 601, 33 N.E.2d 740; Watson v. Trinz, 274 Ill. App. 379; Meyer v. All-Electric Bakery and Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 271 Ill. App. 522; Schmalzl v. Derby Foods, Inc., 341 Ill. App. 390, 94 N.E.2d 86 and MacNeal, Inc. v. Timber Structures, Inc., 6 Ill. App.2d 323, 127 N.E.2d 504. There was evidence from which the jury could conclude that Shreeves' employee, Powell, was loaned to and utilized by the defendant to make the trip to Chicago to obtain the parts necessary to repair its engine.

In this connection its counsel say: "On this appeal, so far as defendant Porter Company is concerned, the sole question presented for determination is whether or not such an agency existed between Wagner and the Porter Company as made it liable for his negligence." And counsel argue that the court erred in refusing to hold as a matter of law that the operator of the crane [Wagner] was not, at the time of the occurrence, the servant of the defendant Porter Company and in support of this cite Meyer v. All-Electric Bakery, Inc., 271 Ill. App. 522; Perong v. Eudeikes, 223 Ill. App. 72; Allen-Garcia Co. v. Industrial Commission, 334 Ill. 390; Thompson v. Industrial Commission, 351 Ill. 356, and cases from other jurisdictions. Some of these cases support counsel's contention but we think it unnecessary to discuss the facts and analyze the cases for the reason we are of opinion that viewing the evidence most favorably to the Porter Company, the question whether Wagner was its agent was for the jury.