Opinion
Civil Action 01-CV-7308.
April 20, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court are plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the Court's January 31, 2005 Order resolving the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment (hereafter "motion for reconsideration") (Doc. No. 99), filed on February 15, 2005; defendants' reply brief thereto (Doc. No. 102), filed on March 4, 2005; and plaintiffs' response to defendants' reply brief (Doc. No. 103), filed on March 22, 2005. The Court held oral argument on April 8, 2005 to address the merits of plaintiffs' motion.
For the following reasons, plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.
I. Motion for Reconsideration
A party may raise a motion for reconsideration within ten days from the date of entry of the judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). A motion for reconsideration should be granted "sparingly." Synthes v. Globus Medical Inc., 2005 WL 562764, at *1 (E.D. Pa. March 7, 2005). A motion for reconsideration may only be granted when the plaintiff demonstrates: (i) an intervening change in controlling law; (ii) new evidence that was not previously available; or (iii) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice. See, e.g., North River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reins. Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). In other words, a motion for reconsideration may not be based upon new arguments that could have been raised in support of the original motion. See, e.g., Agere Systems, Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 2004 WL 1970111, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sep. 7, 2004). Nor should a motion for reconsideration be used as a vehicle to "reconsider repetitive arguments that have already been fully examined by the court." EEOC v. Dan Lepore Sons Co., 2004 WL 569526, at *2 (E.D. Pa. March 15, 2004).
In their motion for reconsideration, plaintiff Mextel, Inc. ("Mextel") and plaintiff Vedran Skulic ("Skulic") (collectively "plaintiffs") rely upon the third prong of this standard, arguing that the Court must rectify certain clearly erroneous legal conclusions in its January 31, 2005 Opinion ("Opinion") (Doc. No. 95). Plaintiffs present the following sets of arguments in support of this relief. First, with respect to Mextel's breach of contract claim, Mextel argues that the Court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Hill-Rom Manufacturing Inc. ("Hill-Rom") on the issue of liability for: (i) controllers that Hill-Rom ordered and which Mextel began to manufacture before the termination of the Development and Supply Agreement (the "agreement"); and (ii) Hill Rom's contractual obligation to purchase 8000 units over the term of the agreement. Second, with respect to Hill-Rom's breach of contract counterclaims, Mextel argues that the Court erred by finding as a matter of law that: (i) Mextel breached ¶¶ 6.1(b) and 8.2 of the agreement; and (ii) Mextel was not entitled to summary judgment on the remaining counterclaims in ¶¶ 38, 39, and 40 of Hill-Rom's answer. Finally, with respect to the patent claim, plaintiffs argue that the Court erred by requiring plaintiffs to answer infringement arguments that Hill-Rom never raised and by making plaintiffs disclose more evidence than necessary to survive summary judgment.
The Court collectively refers to Hill-Rom, and its successors, including Air-Shields, as Hill-Rom.
A. Contract Claims
Mextel argues that the Court erred by finding that Hill-Rom's termination of the agreement pursuant to ¶ 18.2 discharged Hill-Rom's contractual obligations to pay for ordered, but unshipped controllers and to purchase the minimum requirement of 8000 controllers under the agreement. (See Pl. Mot., at 4-6). Mextel also argues that the Court committed clear error by sua sponte granting summary judgment for Hill-Rom on Mextel's claim that Hill-Rom breached ¶ 15.1(c) of the agreement. (Id., at 6-7).
1. Unshipped Controllers
Mextel argues that the obligation to pay for ordered, but unshipped controllers at the time of termination was not executory. Instead, Mextel argues that, because Hill-Rom failed to pay for controllers ordered by Mextel, § 2-709 of the Pennsylvania UCC permits Mextel to recover the price of those controllers, so long as Mextel was unable to resell them. (See Pl. Mot., at 4-5); 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2-709 ("When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may recover" the price of "goods identified to the contract if the seller is unable after reasonable effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing"). In the alternative, Mextel argues that Hill-Rom is estopped from denying payment for the ordered controllers because Hill-Rom misled Mextel into manufacturing specialized controllers and the corollary belief that Hill-Rom would pay for these controllers (Id., at 4).
Hill-Rom's termination of the agreement based upon the controller's obsolescence discharged all obligations still executory on both sides. See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2-106(c) (termination discharges all obligations still executory on both sides, but any right based on prior breach of performance survives). Under the agreement, Hill-Rom's obligation to pay Mextel for ordered controllers did not arise until after the date of shipment of the controllers, which never occurred because of the December 28, 1999 termination letter. (See Agreement, at ¶ 9.6). Thus, Mextel's obligation to deliver, and Hill-Rom's corresponding obligation to pay for, the ordered but unshipped controllers, were "executory." Both obligations were discharged by virtue of Hill-Rom's proper termination of the agreement.
In affirming this conclusion, the Court notes that Mextel's reliance on § 2-709 is misplaced. This section only applies when the "buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due." Id. § 2-709(a). In this instance, Hill-Rom never received the relevant controllers, and, thus, payment was never "due" under the terms of the agreement. (See Agreement, at ¶ 9.6).
The Court also concludes that Mextel's current estoppel argument was not raised at the summary judgment stage, and, therefore, may not be raised through a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., U.S. v. Natl. Railroad Passenger Corp., 2004 WL 1879657, at *1 (motion for reconsideration does not provide opportunity to raise argument that should have been articulated in support of previous motion). Moreover, even if Mextel would have raised this argument at the appropriate time, the estoppel argument is deficient. Mextel cites no dipositive case law to support its position that the termination of an agreement based upon the seller's inability to deliver a non-obsolete product somehow renders the purchaser liable for the costs of ordered, but undelivered products at the time of termination. Nor does Mextel demonstrate why a common law theory of estoppel would trump the Pennsylvania UCC's position regarding the effect of termination on executory obligations. Finally, Mextel fails to argue, let alone show, how it would be able to satisfy the elements of an equitable estoppel theory under Pennsylvania law, particularly because Hill-Rom, through its purchase orders, sought goods in conformity with the terms of the agreement and never represented that it would pay for obsolete products. See, e.g., Chester Extended Care Center v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 526 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa. 1991) (remedy of equitable estoppel under Pennsylvania law requires misleading words, conduct or silence and reasonable reliance on misrepresentations by party asserted estoppel).
Mextel's passing reference in its reply brief to Mextel's "detrimental reliance" on Hill-Rom's purchase orders, in the context of discussing Mextel's alleged repudiation of the agreement, without mentioning or elaborating upon the theory of equitable estoppel, and without case law to support this theory, does not constitute raising a particular argument before the Court. (See Pl. Reply Br. In Support of SJ on Contract Claims, at 6).
Accordingly, the Court did not commit a clear error of law in granting summary judgment for Hill-Rom on Mextel's breach of contract claim for the cost of ordered, but undelivered controllers.
2. Minimum Purchase Requirement
Mextel argues that, despite Hill-Rom's proper termination of the agreement, Hill-Rom was obligated to purchase at least 8,000 controllers pursuant to the addendum to the agreement, which required Hill-Rom to purchase "from Mextel a minimum of two thousand (2000) C-2000 type controllers per year during the TERM" of the agreement up to an aggregate of 8,000 controllers. (See Addendum to Agreement, at ¶ 2). Mextel contends that the "term" of the agreement was redefined by virtue of Hill-Rom's termination of the agreement, so that it lasted from December 1, 1996 until the date of termination. Thus, upon termination, signaling the end of the "term," Hill-Rom was required to complete the purchase of the remaining number of controllers, regardless of their obsolescence. (See Pl. Br., at 4-6; Pl. Reply Br., at 1-3).
This argument defies common sense. The termination of the agreement discharged the "executory" obligations of the agreement. See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2-106(c) (termination discharges all obligations which are still executory on both sides). The ordering of the remaining controllers by Hill-Rom, and Mextel's obligation to manufacture and deliver the controllers, were executory obligations. Indeed, the agreement expressly defined the "term" of the agreement as the period between December 1, 1996 and December 1, 2000. (See Addendum to Agreement, at ¶ 1). Any termination prior to December 1, 2000, prior to the completion of the agreement's "term," therefore discharged the unperformed obligation of purchasing the remaining number of controllers. To require Hill-Rom to purchase additional obsolete controllers that were not manufactured in accordance with the terms of the agreement would eviscerate the language of the agreement, applicable provisions of the Pennsylvania UCC, and principles of common sense. See, e.g., Bollinger v. Palmerton Area Communities Endeavor, Inc., 361 A.2d 676, 684 (Pa.Super.Ct. 1976) (common sense should be used in construing contract to avoid defeating contract's intent and purpose).
3. ¶ 15.1(c)
Mextel argues that the Court erred by ruling that Hill-Rom did not breach ¶ 15.1 of the agreement because "neither party moved for summary judgment with respect to ¶ 15.1(c) of the agreement." (See Pl. Mot., at 6). As such, Mextel states that the Court was not entitled sua sponte to raise and decide this issue. (Id.).
In contrast to Mextel's argument, this issue was raised by Mextel, briefed by the parties, and its resolution was necessary to the ultimate resolution of the core arguments in both parties' respective motions. For instance, Mextel raised this argument in ¶ 7 of its Statement of Material Facts in support of its motion for summary judgment. (See Pl. Undisputed Facts, at ¶ 7) ("Air-Shields also began negotiating and contracting with third parties to copy Mextel's intellectual property and supply the component parts developed and manufactured by Mextel, in violation of the parties' exclusive development and supply agreement."). Mextel also raised this argument in ¶ 14 of its Statement of Disputed Facts, contending that Hill-Rom impermissibly "decided to terminate the agreement when it began to develop knock-offs of the Mextel controller and sensor module in 1998." (See Pl. Disputed Facts, at ¶ 14). In fact, Mextel raised this very argument in its brief in opposition to Hill-Rom's motion for summary judgment, in which plaintiff argued that the "surreptitious material breach [of § 15.1(c)] by Air-Shields, which began by February 1998, precludes any claim by Air-Shields that Mextel failed in its performance of the agreement." (See Pl. Br. In Opp'n, at 4-5). Thus, in order to determine whether Hill-Rom could prevail on its breach of contract counterclaims, the court was first required to determine whether Hill-Rom breached § 15.1(c) of the agreement in 1998 and whether this breach cancelled (or in Mextel's parlance, "terminated") Mextel's remaining obligations. (See Opinion, at 35-37). Consequently, Mextel's argument that the Court sua sponte entered summary judgment on this issue in favor of Hill-Rom lacks merit.
Mextel stated that the "bases" for its motion for partial summary judgment were set forth in Mextel's Statement of Undisputed Facts. (See Pl. Mot. For Partial SJ on Contract Claims, at 2).
B. Hill-Rom's Contract Counterclaims
1. Plaintiff's Breach of ¶ 6.1(b) and ¶ 8.2
Mextel argues that the Court erred by finding that Mextel breached ¶ 6.1(b) and ¶ 8.2 of the agreement. Specifically, Mextel provides four arguments: (1) that Mextel was not bound by the good manufacturing practice ("GMP") regulations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the "Act"), 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq., because it was a supplier of component medical parts, not a manufacturer of finished devices; (2) that the Court engaged in an inappropriate weighing of the evidence in finding that Mextel breached ¶ 6.1(b) and ¶ 8.2 as a matter of law; (3) that Mextel could not create the appropriate device master record ("DMR") documentation, pursuant to the GMPs, because such documentation could only be developed after the device (ie., the incubator) was assembled; and (4) that an amendment to the agreement absolved Mextel's responsibility to produce verification and validation information. (See Pl. Br., at 7-13; Pl. Reply Br., at 4-7).
These arguments fail to raise a clear error of law. First, the Court found that the unambiguous language of the agreement required Mextel to manufacture the controller in accordance with GMPs, 21 C.F.R. Part 820. (See Opinion, at 53-55). Indeed, Mextel agreed to manufacturer the controller "in accordance with good manufacturing practices under the Act." (See Agreement, at ¶ 6.1(b)). This means that although Mextel was not required under the language of the GMP regulations to manufacture the controller in accordance with GMPs, it contractually assumed the obligation to comply with GMPs, including the creation and supply of DMR documentation and verification and validation information, in the design, manufacturing, and production of the controller. (See Agreement, at ¶ 6.1(b) and ¶ 8.2); see 21 C.F.R. § 820.1(a) (1995). Furthermore, the Court notes that the testimony of Mextel's signatories both that Mextel was not obligated to manufacture the controller in accordance with the technical requirements of the GMP regulations and that Mextel did not have to provide Hill-Rom with DMR documentation for the controller, as prescribed by 21 C.F.R. § 820.180-198 (1996), does not raise a genuine issue of material fact; this evidence is inadmissible because it contradicts the intent of the parties as manifested through the clear language of ¶ 6.1(b) and ¶ 8.2. See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2-202 (extrinsic evidence may be used to supplement or explain, but not to contradict, terms of fully integrated document).
Second, the Court did not engage in an impermissible weighing of evidence concerning Mextel's violation of ¶ 6.1(b) and ¶ 8.2 of the Agreement. Instead, the Court thoroughly evaluated the exhibits submitted by both sides, including letters, third party testing reports, purchase orders, certified FDA documentation, and affidavit testimony. (See Opinion, at 56-63). Based upon the Court's review of the record, which consisted of "overwhelming" evidence in favor of defendant's summary judgment position, and for the reasons stated in the January 31, 2005 Opinion, Mextel failed to make the necessary showing at the summary judgment stage, indeed, Mextel failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that it satisfied its obligations under ¶ 6.1(b) and ¶ 8.2 of the agreement, as interpreted by the Court, by generating and then providing to Mextel technically compliant DMR and verification and validation documentation for the controller. Mextel even conceded at oral argument that its (mis)construction of the agreement was the reason "why the device master record and the verification and validation were never done." (See Oral Argument Transcript, at 12).
Third, Mextel's argument that it could not supply Hill-Rom with documents or information related to the incubator misconstrues Mextel's contractual undertaking. Despite the applicability of GMPs to "devices," rather than components of devices, Mextel was contractually required to maintain and produce full DMR documentation for the controller. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.181 (1995) (listing DMR requirements). To reiterate, plaintiff's contractual obligation was not to supply DMR documentation for the incubator, but, instead, to supply the party liable under the regulations, Hill-Rom, with extensive DMR documentation for the component piece of the product, the controller, as recommended by the regulations themselves. See 21 C.F.R. § 820.1(a) (exempting "manufacturer of components or parts of finished devices" from compliance with GMPs, while emphasizing that "such manufacturers are encouraged to use appropriate provisions of this regulation as guidance").
Fourth, Mextel's argument that ¶ 20.2(b) of the amendment to the agreement rendered Hill-Rom solely responsible for verification and validation information also fails. The amendment stated that Mextel's obligation was to provide Hill-Rom with "those documents and materials identified by Air-Shields as being required for conducting design verification and validation testing" for the controller within forty days from the execution of the amendment. (See Amendment to Agreement, at ¶ 20.2(b)). This obligation to provide verification and validation documentation pursuant to ¶ 20.2(b) for "review" by a third-party therefore supplemented Mextel's obligation in ¶ 6.1(b) to manufacture the controller in accordance with GMPs, including Mextel's obligation to generate appropriate verification and validation documentation. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.30(f)-(j), 820.70 (1997) (outlining requirements). Although it is true that verification and validation requirements did not exist under the GMP regulations at the time of the signing of the agreement, new requirements took effect in 1997, during the life of the agreement, and the agreement expressly required Mextel to comply with all GMPs "under" the Act, "as amended." (See Agreement, at ¶¶ 6.1, 1.1). Any contrary interpretation of the agreement would render Hill-Rom unable to manufacture and sell incubators in accordance with applicable FDA regulations.
Mextel also presents the argument, albeit without great detail, that Hill Rom's interpretation of the agreement as requiring Mextel to comply with FDA regulations promulgated after the execution of the agreement violates the contract clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. (See Pl. Br., at 12 n. 3). Mextel failed to raise this argument in its submissions to the Court at the summary judgment stage, and, thus, may not raise this argument on a motion for reconsideration. Moreover, such an argument presumes that Mextel did not voluntarily contract to comply with future regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act. Indeed, the Court notes that ¶ 20.2 of the amendment to the agreement was executed in December 1997, more than six months after the verification and validation requirements were promulgated pursuant to the QS regulation. (See Opinion, at 9, 61-62).
2. Hill-Rom's Remaining Counterclaims and Defenses
Mextel contends that the Court erred by not granting summary judgment on the remaining affirmative defenses and counterclaims in ¶¶ 38, 39, and 40 of Hill-Rom's answer. (See Pl. Br., at 6-7). Specifically, Mextel contends that it filed an affidavit demonstrating the lack of a genuine issue of material fact on the remaining breach of contract counterclaims and defenses, including defenses and counterclaims that Hill-Rom never addressed in its motion for summary judgment or in its brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. (Id.). By not granting Mextel's motion on these remaining counterclaims, the Court allegedly committed a clear error of law.
Mextel's argument is flawed. Mextel specifically identified the following counterclaims in its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment: 39(b), 39(h), 39(j), 40(a), 40(b), 40(c), and 40(d). The Court addressed each of these counterclaims in its January 31, 2005 Opinion. Furthermore, the Court refused to determine summary judgment in favor of either side on the remaining counterclaims in the answer because these counterclaims were never squarely addressed in the respective briefs of the parties, including counterclaims 39(a), (d)-(g), and (n)-(x). (See Opinion, at 66). Finally, to the extent that Mextel raised non-conclusory arguments in favor of summary judgment on these counterclaims in its Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, Hill-Rom made the requisite showing to avoid summary judgment through its Statement of Disputed Material Facts (¶ 15-35) and its Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. Accordingly, the Court's refusal to grant Mextel summary judgment on these counterclaims was not a clear error of law.
For instance, Mextel's motion for summary judgment on ¶ 40 (relating to damages) of the answer was discussed at pages 66-75 of the Opinion. Furthermore, the remaining counterclaims identified in Mextel's brief in support of its partial summary judgment motion were discussed in reaching the conclusion that Mextel breached ¶ 6.1(b) and ¶ 8.2 of the agreement, that plaintiff did not breach ¶ 2.1(b) of the agreement as a matter of law, and that genuine issues of material fact exist on all counterclaims arising from any alleged breach of ¶ 9.4 of the agreement.
Although ¶ 39(j) was listed as a counterclaim that neither party appropriately addressed, this was a clerical error, as the Order specifically stated in other places that Hill-Rom was entitled to summary judgment on Mextel's failure to "maintain its facility and Product records in accordance with the Act" (¶ 39(j)). (See Opinion, at 60, 63).
C. Patent Claims
Plaintiffs present two main arguments in support of their motion for reconsideration with respect to the patent claims: (i) plaintiffs were not obligated, based upon Hill-Rom's motion, to put forward evidence of infringement, literally or through a substantial equivalent, for each and every claim in the various patents that was allegedly infringed upon; and (ii) in the alternative, the Court should consider the newly submitted affidavit of plaintiff Skulic, which now addresses how and why the C2000 incubator infringes on each element of the respective claims in both the '006 and '830 patents. (See Pl. Mot., at 14-18).
1. Lack of Evidence
Plaintiffs argues that the court erred by granting summary judgment to Hill-Rom on plaintiffs' patent claims because Hill-Rom's motion on the issue of non-infringement was limited to one argument: that its device did not infringe the claims of the '006 Patent because of the absence of a mounting bushing in the heater assembly of the new incubator. (See Pl. Br., at 15-17). Accordingly, because Hill-Rom did not detail further its argument against infringement, plaintiffs had no obligation to address any additional arguments, such as how each and every element in plaintiffs' various claims in the '006 and '083 patents are infringed by one of Hill-Rom's products. (Id., at 15-16). In other words, plaintiffs contend that the Court "demanded far more than the law required of Mextel." (See Pl. Mot., at 17).
This arguments fails. Rather than a very "limited" motion, Hill-Rom moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs' patent claim on three independent bases, one of which was plaintiffs' failure to produce evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hill-Rom's products infringed either of the two patents, wether literally or under the doctrine of substantial equivalents. (See Def. Mot. For SJ., at 12-14, 18-19; Def. Reply Br. In Support of SJ., at 7-10). Indeed, in its reply brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, Hill-Rom unambiguously elaborated upon this threshold argument, averring, with supporting citations, that the "entire record is devoid of any explanation as to how Hill-Rom's products infringe Skulic's patents." (See Def. Reply Br., at 7-8).
Plaintiffs concede that they did not present evidence sufficient to support claims for infringement, emphasizing, instead, that they were not required to do so because Hill-Rom never presented evidence that it did not infringe the two patents. (See Pl. Mot. For Reconsideration, at 17-18; Oral Argument Transcript, at 17). As Hill-Rom correctly notes, however, plaintiff misconstrues its burden at the summary judgment stage. Hill-Rom was only required to point out the absence of evidence to support plaintiffs' patent claim, which, in turn, required plaintiffs to make some type of showing that each and every limitation in each asserted claim in their patents is found in an accused device. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (party moving for summary judgment need not "produce evidence showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, even with respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof . . . [i]instead . . . the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case"). Plaintiffs failed to meet this burden, as plaintiffs' misunderstood Hill-Rom's argument, misconstrued the nature of their burden at the summary judgment stage, and introduced an affidavit that was "admittedly conclusory" as to the elements of infringement. (See Oral Argument Transcript, at 16).
Plaintiff further contends that the Court's lack of a claim construction makes it difficult to address any infringement issue. However, with the exception of the term "mounting bushing," the parties never disagreed on any of the terms in the claims in the patents at issue, thereby discharging the Court's duty to construe these terms. See, e.g., Unitherm Food Systems, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (district court not obligated to construe undisputed claim terms prior to issuing summary judgment on invalidity);PSC Computer Products, Inc. v. Foxconn Intern, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (affirming district court's decision to not construe claims as first step of infringement analysis because their meaning was not disputed); Westvaco Corp. v. Viva Magnetics Ltd., 2002 WL 31052870, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (only claims that are disputed need to be construed).
2. New Evidence
In the alternative, plaintiffs ask the Court to consider the newly submitted declaration of plaintiff Skulic, which allegedly explains "how and why" a product by Hill-Rom infringes both of the patents. (See Pl. Br., at 18). However, plaintiffs provide no legal justification for considering this evidence on a motion for reconsideration, particularly because plaintiffs admit that the evidence was available at the time of filing the motion for summary judgment. (See Oral Argument Transcript, at 17-18);see Bailey v. United Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 201 (3d Cir. 2002) ("A district court may properly refuse to consider evidence presented in a motion for reconsideration when the evidence was available prior to summary judgment."); Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming district court's decision not to include affidavit submitted with motion for reconsideration of summary judgment motion because affidavit contained evidence available prior to summary judgment motion). Indeed, consideration of this affidavit would be a correction of the plaintiffs' own error in legal strategy, which is not a proper basis for a motion for reconsideration. (Id.).
Furthermore, submission of the affidavit constitutes an acknowledgment of plaintiffs' discovery violations, including plaintiffs' refusal to respond to Hill-Rom's interrogatory on October 18, 2002 requiring plaintiffs to explain the manner in which the limitations of the asserted claims of the patents were found in Hill-Rom's products.
II. Conclusion
For the preceding reasons, this Court denies plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and reaffirms the content of the January 31, 2005 Opinion. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of April 2005, upon consideration of Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Memorandum and Order Addressing the Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 99), and the Defendants' response thereto (Doc. No. 102), it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion is DENIED.