"[P]roscribing the use of a search warrant as a means of obtaining evidence of a driver's intoxication 'would be to place allegedly drunken drivers in an exalted class of criminal defendants, protected by the law from every means of obtaining the most important evidence against them.'" Metzner v. State, 462 S.W.3d 650, 657 (Ark. 2015) (quoting Brown v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1001, 1007 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002)). "We conclude that the implied consent law is designed to facilitate, not impede, the gathering of chemical test evidence in order to remove drunk drivers from the roads.

We will not interpret a statute, even a criminal one, so as to reach an absurd conclusion that is contrary to legislative intent. Metzner v. State, 2015 Ark. 222, 462 S.W.3d 650. The majority's refusal to consider the legal backdrop of Act 683 is a dereliction of its duty and a rejection of common sense.

The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Metzner v. State, 2015 Ark. 222, 462 S.W.3d 650. We construe the statute just as it reads; if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation. Id.

Beeman v. State , 86 S.W.3d 613, 615–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ; see also State v. Smith , 134 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that prohibition found in implied consent statute on forced blood draws did not extend to searches pursuant to a valid search warrant); Brown v. State , 774 N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (similarly concluding that implied consent law does not "preclude[ ] the use of a search warrant to obtain a blood sample after a request to submit to a chemical test has been refused"); Metzner v. State , 2015 Ark. 222, 462 S.W.3d 650, 656–57 (2015) (same); State v. Minett , 376 Mont. 260, 332 P.3d 235, 238 (2014) (same); State v. Stone , 229 W.Va. 271, 728 S.E.2d 155, 168 (2012) (same); State v. Zielke , 137 Wis.2d 39, 403 N.W.2d 427, 428 (1987) (same); State v. Evans , 378 P.3d 413, 420 (Alaska Ct. App. 2016) (same). ¶26 In sum, the Expressed Consent Statute's prohibition against forced specimen collection applies only to warrantless tests based on implied consent.

Strict construction means narrow construction and requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed. Id. (citing Metzner v. State, 2015 Ark. 222, 462 S.W.3d 650). However, even a penal statute must not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.

Strict construction means narrow construction and requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed. Metzner v. State , 2015 Ark. 222, 462 S.W.3d 650. Additionally, in construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect to be derived from the whole.

Strict construction means narrow construction and requires that nothing be taken as intended that is not clearly expressed. Metzner v. State, 2015 Ark. 222, 462 S.W.3d 650. However, even a penal statute must not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.

I would join with those courts construing the "no such test" language so as not to exclude test results obtained pursuant to a valid warrant. See, e.g., Britton v. State, 631 So. 2d 1073, 1076-1077 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) ; Metzner v. State, 2015 Ark. 222, at 10, 462 S.W.3d 650 ; State v. Smith, 134 S.W.3d 35, 40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) ; Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 616-617 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ; State v. Stone, 229 W. Va. 271, 284, 728 S.E.2d 155 (2012). See also Brown v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1001, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (noting statutory silence on question and concluding that "provisions of the implied consent law do not act either individually or collectively to prevent a law enforcement officer from obtaining a blood sample pursuant to a search warrant").

To determine whether penalties for refusal are criminal or civil, we need look to the text of the statute and the actual penalties imposed. Refusal results in suspension or revocation of driving privileges, Ark. Code Ann. § 5–65–205(b), and we have previously affirmed that evidence of an accused's refusal to submit to a chemical test can be properly admitted as circumstantial evidence showing a knowledge or consciousness of guilt, seeMetzner v. State , 2015 Ark. 222, at 6, 462 S.W.3d 650, 655. We have previously characterized these consequences as a civil sanction that does not rise to the level of criminal punishment.

To determine whether penalties for refusal are criminal or civil, we need look to the text of the statute and the actual penalties imposed. Refusal results in suspension or revocation of driving privileges, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-205(b), and we have previously affirmed that evidence of an accused's refusal to submit to a chemical test can be properly admitted as circumstantial evidence showing a knowledge or consciousness of guilt, see Metzner v. State, 2015 Ark. 222, at 6, 462 S.W.3d 650, 655. We have previously characterized these consequences as a civil sanction that does not rise to the level of criminal punishment.