United Fire Cos. Co. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 164 Colo. 42, 45, 433 P.2d 769, 771 (1967) (citations omitted). In contrast, a representation of law is a statement of opinion as to what the law permits or prohibits, and cannot support an action for fraud. Chacon v. Scavo, 145 Colo. 222, 223, 358 P.2d 614, 614 (1960); Metzger v. Baker, 93 Colo. 165, 167, 24 P.2d 748, 749 (1933). As a mere statement of opinion, a representation of law may be correct or incorrect.
There, the Court explained that "a representation of law is a statement of opinion as to what the law permits or prohibits, and cannot support an action for fraud." Id. at 153 (citing Chacon v. Scavo , 145 Colo. 222, 358 P.2d 614, 614 (1960) ; Metzger v. Baker , 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748, 749 (Colo. 1933) ). Further, "[a]s a mere statement of opinion, a representation of law may be correct or incorrect."
In Parks v. Bucy, 72 Colo. 414, 211 P. 638, 639, the Supreme Court applied the general rule, but also recognized the exceptions thereto, in the following language: "If there was a fiduciary relation between these parties, or if the defendant was a lawyer and the circumstances were such as required him to divulge all the information that he had, or if he knew that the plaintiff was relying upon him as one learned in the law, a different question would be presented * * *." In Metzger v. Baker, 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748, 749, the court said: "This rule, is of course, subject to certain qualifications, such as special knowledge possessed by one and not available to the other; a fiduciary relationship * * *." Without repeating them, the allegations of the complaint with respect to the applicable law clearly fall within the exceptions to the general rule.
To review that judgment plaintiffs prosecute this writ of error. The applicable rule has been well expressed by this court in Metzger v. Baker (1933), 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748: "Whether there was an ordinance on the subject and if so what it permitted or forbade was a question of law, and the general rule is that a representation of law is a mere expression of opinion, and impotent to avoid a contract or support an action for damages. 'A representation of what the law will or will not permit to be done, is one upon which the party to whom it is made has no right to rely, and if he does so, it is his own folly, and he cannot ask the law to relieve him from the consequences.
Arthur D. Shores and Peter A. Hall, Birmingham, for appellant. A misrepresentation as to a matter of domestic law will not constitute remedial fraud, even though such misrepresentation is believed and acted upon. Metzger v Baker, 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748; DeFranco v. Shedden, 251 App. Div. 720, 295 N.Y.S. 370; Clayton v. Glasscock, 221 Ala. 3, 127 So. 538; Stevens v. Odlin, 109 Me. 417, 84 A. 899; 37 C.J.S., Fraud, § 55, p. 324. There can be no recovery for representations technically false but substantially true. 26 C.J. 1171; Vlates v. Catsigionis, Mo. App., 202 S.W. 441. Where complaint alleged plaintiff was deceived by misrepresentations it was error to refuse charge that there could be no recovery without intent to deceive.
Several carefully considered decisions support this view. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Eviston, 110 Ind. App. 143, 37 N.E.2d 310; In re Miller's Will, 162 Misc. 563, 295 N YS. 943, affirmed 252 App. Div. 872, 300 N.Y.S. 798; Metzger v. Baker, 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748; Epp v. Hinton, 91 Kan. 513, 138 P. 576, L.R.A. 1915A, 675; Best v. Best, 247 Ala. 627, 25 So.2d 723. As we have recently held, relief may be granted when one having or professing to have superior knowledge undertakes to make representations concerning a matter of law, which later prove false. Dixon v. Dodd, D.C.Mun.App., 80 A.2d 282, and cases there cited. It is to be noted that a significant part of the misrepresentation offered to be proved was entirely one of fact: that the Maryland authorities had agreed to permit trucks of defendants and those working for them to come onto the project without Maryland tags. If there were nothing else in the case this, if proved, would support a recovery.
Birge v. Bock, 44 Mo. App. 69; Gerhart v. Peck, 42 Mo. App. 644; Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 352, 48 S.W. 470; Mastin v. Grimes, 88 Mo. 478; Williams v. Ellis, 239 S.W. 157. (6) The defense of alleged fraud and misrepresentation was not sustained because (a) The statements attributed to the broker, Rogers, with respect to the restrictions were not representations, false or otherwise, as to an existing or past fact or facts, but merely an expression of an opinion as to a matter of law. Stacey v. Robinson, 184 Mo. App. 54, 26 C.J. 1079, 1207; 12 R.C.L. 295; American Ins. Co. v. Capps, 4 Mo. App. 571; Ordway v. Continental Ins. Co., 35 Mo. App. 426; Allgood v. Tarkio Elec. Water Co., 222 Mo. App. 964; Dalrymple v. Craig, 149 Mo. 345; Easton-Taylor Trust Co. v. Loker, 205 S.W. 87; Gilmore v. Ozark Mut. Assn., 21 S.W.2d 633; Bondurant v. Raven Coal Co., 25 S.W.2d 566; Thompson v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 27 S.W.2d 58; 12 R.C.L. 295; Metzger v. Baker, 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748; Harrington v. Heder, 109 N.J. Eq. 528, 158 A. 496; Wuesthoff v. Seymour Wheelock, 22 N.J. Eq. 66; Phyfe v. Cohen, 131 N.Y.S. 620; Zempel v. Hughes, 235 Ill. 424, 85 N.E. 641; Wolleson v. Coburn, 63 Cal.App. 315, 218 P. 479; Bartley v. Big Branch Coal Co., 160 Ky. 123, 169 S.W. 601; Adkins v. Hoskins, 3 S.W.2d 322. (b) The statements attributed to the broker, Rogers, with respect to other prospective purchasers were not shown to be false and the testimony with respect to an agreement to release respondent from his contract and sell the property to one of such prospective purchasers was properly stricken out. Cole v. Smith, 26 Colo. 506. (c) The broker, Rogers, had no authority to make any such representations as those attributed to him by respondent. 12 C.J.S. 323; 8 Am. Jur. 1020; Edwards v. French, 304 Mo. 194, 263 S.W. 132; Judd v. Walker, 215 Mo. 312, 114 S.W. 697; Insurance Co. v. Carson, 186 Mo. App. 221, 172 S.W. 69; Millard v. Smith, 119 Mo. App. 701, 95 S.W. 940; Brauckman v
Therefore, a mistake of law induced by the other party's misrepresentation is ordinarily not a ground for relief. Ryan v. Vickers, 158 Colo. 274, 406 P.2d 794 (1965). This rule is typically applied in cases in which the alleged misrepresentation was as to the existence or effect of an ordinance or statute. See, e.g., Metzger v. Baker, 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748 (1933). Naturally, there are also exceptions to this general rule:
However, as noted by the trial court, there are two exceptions to the general rule that misrepresentations of law are not actionable: (1) where the party making the misrepresentation has or professes to have superior knowledge which is not reasonably available to the person to whom the representation is made, or (2) where the parties are in a confidential or trust relationship. See Chacon v. Scavo, supra; Metzger v. Baker, 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748 (1933); Parks v. Bucy, 72 Colo. 414, 211 P. 638 (1922). We disagree with the trial court ruling that these exceptions, as a matter of law, do not apply in this case.
Rather, that representation concerned the subdivision's existing status, and was made in the face of their knowledge that the El Campo Estates subdivision had only been conditionally approved by the pertinent zoning authority. This constituted a misrepresentation of fact, not requiring a legal opinion such as might be required to determine the adequacy of a legal filing in the county land records, or the applicability of a city ordinance restricting land use. Cf. Chacon v. Scavo, supra; Metzger v. Baker, 93 Colo. 165, 24 P.2d 748 (1933). The record supports the trial court's finding that Warren and Jarnagin were representing as accomplished facts that the El Campo Estate subdivision filing had been approved and recorded, and that the lots were ready for sale. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's determination that the misrepresentations concerning El Campo Estates were factual in nature and, therefore, supported a finding of fraud.