Mettee v. Kemp

9 Citing cases

  1. In re Condemnation of Land for State Highway

    3 P.3d 1268 (Kan. 2000)   Cited 1 times

    See K.S.A. 26-513(c). For the verdict to be upheld as within the range of the evidence, the jury's findings as to "before" and "after" value must fall within the range of the opinion testimony. Mettee v. Kemp, 236 Kan. 781, Syl. ¶, 696 P.2d 947 (1985). K.S.A. 26-513(d) does not authorize a jury to make a finding as to "before" and "after" values outside the range of opinion evidence.

  2. Pener v. King

    305 Kan. 1199 (Kan. 2017)   Cited 9 times

    In particular, the verdict in a condemnation proceeding must be within the range of the opinion testimony admitted at trial. Mettee v. Kemp , 236 Kan. 781, 787, 696 P.2d 947 (1985). The before value must not be more than the highest expression of opinion evidence and the after value must not be less than the lowest expression of opinion of the value of the property remaining after the taking.

  3. Mullinax Concrete Serv. v. Zowada

    243 P.3d 181 (Wyo. 2010)   Cited 2 times

    One is IN [sic] considering the loss to Mullinax in ascertaining damages. In Lindt v, Murray, 895 P.2d 459, [463] (Wyo. 1995) and R.C.R. Inc. v. Deline, 70 P.3d 214, [221] (Wyo. 2003) the Wyoming Supreme Court cited Mettee v. Kemp, [ 236 Kan. 781], 696 P.2d 947, [949] (Kan. 1985) as articulating various factors which may be considered in determining damages. It would seem that the loss of convenience or use, the potential effective taking of additional land to meet the runoff need, the loss of this profitable use are each consistent with factors listed in Mettee. A second method of addressing this loss to Mullinax is by way of the "reasonable and convenient" analysis that is required of this Commission in determining the location of a private road.

  4. Small v. Kemp

    727 P.2d 904 (Kan. 1986)   Cited 13 times
    Relocating a frontage road near the landowner's property, eliminating the intersection between the street abutting the property and another street, and causing a circuitous route to landowner's property was a reasonable exercise of police power and not a compensable taking

    The trial court granted Small a new trial because the jury's findings in the first trial were not within the range of the value testimony. Mettee v. Kemp, 236 Kan. 781, 696 P.2d 947 (1985). The State contends our decision in Mettee is wrong and should be overruled. It requests that we reconsider Mettee and rule that a verdict is properly within the range of opinion testimony if the before value finding is lower than the highest before value opinion in evidence or the after value finding is higher than the lowest after value opinion in evidence.

  5. Miller v. Glacier Development Co.

    284 Kan. 476 (Kan. 2007)   Cited 30 times
    Holding error admitting purchase price of property subject to condemnation proceeding was harmless because award was within range of values given by experts, so sufficient evidence other than purchase price supported jury's award

    Whether a prior sale is too remote in time is a question to be determined by the district court in the exercise of judicial discretion. Mettee v. Kemp, 236 Kan. 781, 790, 696 P.2d 947 (1985); Wilkey v. Kansas City Power Light Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 599, 615, 631 P.2d 268, rev. denied 230 Kan. 819 (1981). There are three generally recognized approaches to valuation of real property: (1) the cost approach, i.e., the reproduction cost of the property at the time of the taking less depreciation; (2) the market data approach, i.e., the value of the property based upon recent sales of comparable properties; and (3) the income approach, i.e., the capitalization of net income from the property.

  6. R.C.R., Inc. v. Deline

    70 P.3d 214 (Wyo. 2003)   Cited 3 times
    Finding no due process violation occurred despite absence of one viewer and appraiser

    Therefore, we remand to the district court with directions that the district court remand to the Board and the Board reassemble the viewers and appraisers, or if necessary a different body of viewers and appraisers, and those viewers and appraisers assess damages as follows: (1) determine the value of the entirety of the Lindts' affected land before the private road was established; then, (2) determine the value of the Lindts' remaining land after the private road is in place; (3) subtract the "after" value from the "before" value, which then equals the damages due the Lindts. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982); and see generally Mettee v. Kemp, 236 Kan. 781, 696 P.2d 947, 949 (1985) (discussing Kansas statute which enumerates factors which may be considered in the "before-after" analysis).See also Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, ¶¶ 32-44, 28 P.3d 838, ¶¶ 32-44 (Wyo. 2001) and Miller v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 888-89 (Wyo. 2000).

  7. Wagstaff v. Sublette Cty. Bd.

    53 P.3d 79 (Wyo. 2002)   Cited 12 times
    Holding dirt track did not constitute public road because “no evidence was presented that the public generally has the privilege to traverse the unimproved dirt tracks on the State and BLM land involved.”

    Therefore, we remand to the district court with directions that the district court remand to the Board and the Board reassemble the viewers and appraisers, or if necessary a different body of viewers and appraisers, and those viewers and appraisers assess damages as follows: (1) determine the value of the entirety of the Lindts' affected land before the private road was established; then, (2) determine the value of the Lindts' remaining land after the private road is in place; (3) subtract the "after" value from the "before" value, which then equals the damages due the Lindts. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982); and see generally Mettee v. Kemp, 236 Kan. 781, 696 P.2d 947, 949 (1985) (discussing Kansas statute which enumerates factors which may be considered in the "before-after" analysis).See also Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, ¶¶ 35-39 and Miller v. Bradley at 888-89.

  8. Lindt v. Murray

    895 P.2d 459 (Wyo. 1995)   Cited 19 times
    In Lindt v. Murray, 895 P.2d 459 (Wyo.1995), this Court held the measure of damages for taking a private road was the difference in value of the entire parcel before and the remaining land after the taking.

    Therefore, we remand to the district court with directions that the district court remand to the Board and the Board reassemble the viewers and appraisers, or if necessary a different body of viewers and appraisers, and those viewers and appraisers assess damages as follows: (1) determine the value of the entirety of the Lindts' affected land before the private road was established; then, (2) determine the value of the Lindts' remaining land after the private road is in place; (3) subtract the "after" value from the "before" value, which then equals the damages due the Lindts. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423, 433 (Wyo. 1982); and see generally Mettee v. Kemp, 236 Kan. 781, 696 P.2d 947, 949 (1985) (discussing Kansas statute which enumerates factors which may be considered in the "before-after" analysis). Under the circumstances of this case which involves complex and troublesome questions of fact and law, and especially in view of our decision to remand for a proper determination of damages, we vacate the district court's assessment of attorney's fees against the Lindts.

  9. City of Manhattan v. Signor

    772 P.2d 753 (Kan. 1989)

    The record supports an award based upon a division of 54.28% to 45.72%, a 66% to 34% division, or a percentage within these ranges. Mettee v. Kemp, 236 Kan. 781, 696 P.2d 947 (1985). However, in view of the decision we reached on the foregoing issue, this issue is moot and need not be addressed.