Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Stallo. No. 2

3 Citing cases

  1. Irby v. Kidder

    85 S.E.2d 405 (S.C. 1955)   Cited 2 times

    W. Brantley Harvey, Esq., of Beaufort, for Defendant-Appellant, cites: As to several causes of action being allegedin complaint and misjoined: 20 S.C.L. 560; 26 S.C. 72, 1 S.E. 363; 157 S.C. 407, 154 S.E. 632. As to the severalcauses of action stated in the complaint being improperlyunited: (S.C.) 150 S.E.2d 575; 97 S.C. 27, 81 S.E. 189. As to plaintiff having no legal capacity to sue: 24 C.J. 1199, Executors and Administrators, Par. 2869; 199 S.C. 385, 19 S.E.2d 481. As to third ground of demurrerbeing proper and allowable: 6 S.C. 184; 18 S.C. 366. Messrs. Whaley McCutchen, of Columbia, for Respondents, cite: As to causes of action in complaint being properlypleaded and multiplicity of suits thereby prevented: 34 C.J. S. 988, Executors and Administrators, Sec. 849; 148 S.C. 133, 145 S.E. 692, 694; 214 S.C. 87, 51 S.E.2d 365; 62 App. Div. 189, 70 N.Y. Supp. 963; 166 App. Div. 649, 152 N.Y. Supp. 173. As to the respondents having the legalcapacity to bring the action stated in the complaint: 34 C.J. S. 945. Executors and Administrators, Sec. 830; 34 C.J.S. 947, Executors and Administrators, Sec. 830; 34 C.J.S. 948, Executors and Administrators, Sec. 830; 34 C.J.S. 950, Executors and Administrators, Sec. 831; 177 S.C. 231, 181 S.E. 6, 101 A.L.R. 266; 33 Am. Jur., Life Estates, Remainders, Sec. 177, p. 643, Sec. 224, p. 710, Sec. 230, p. 718; Anno. 45 A.L.R. 519; 87 S.C. 55, 68 S.E. 966; 33 Am. Jur., Life Estates, Remainders, Sec. 66, p. 525, Sec. 67, O. 527, Sec. 117. p. 574, Sec. 134, p. 595. Sec. 150, p. 615.

  2. Marsh v. Woodworth

    180 App. Div. 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1917)   Cited 1 times

    If the plaintiffs were required to bring in as parties those who are accountable to the trustees for the management of the estate they might with equal propriety be required to bring in all debtors of the estate, for an accounting by those who managed the estate would not necessarily determine the amount or value of the estate. The respondents insist that the decision of this court in Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Stallo, No. 2 ( 166 App. Div. 649; affd. by Court of Appeals, 215 N.Y. 710) is authority for the order; but in that case the action was brought for an accounting and the plaintiff joined the parties interested in the accounting and the decision was with respect to whether there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff and of causes of action, while here there is no action for an accounting and the respondents seek to compel the plaintiffs, against their will, to bring in the parties who are accountable to the trustees only. Therefore, the decision in that case is not in point.

  3. Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Stallo No. 1

    166 App. Div. 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915)   Cited 5 times
    In Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Stallo (166 App. Div. 639), despite charges of self-dealing and derelictions of duty having no counterpart here, the court, in an action for an accounting, stayed the prosecution of a Surrogate's Court proceeding for the removal of an administrator, commenting (p. 644): "The mere fact that plaintiff was at one and the same time administrator of the estate and a creditor thereof is not alone a legal objection to its acting as administrator. It was a creditor when it was appointed, and very probably was selected as administrator for that very reason.

    The nature of this action and the relief sought therein are stated at length in the opinion handed down herewith on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. ( Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Stallo, No. 2, 166 App. Div. 649.) For the purpose of this opinion it is sufficient to say that plaintiff is the administrator of the estate of Alexander McDonald, deceased; that it was at the time of its appointment a creditor of the estate holding collateral security for its debt; that it had sold such security for the payment of its claim, and that it now holds a part of the proceeds of such sale, as well as certain securities with reference to which claims have been made by persons other than the estate or those ultimately entitled to it. The judgment sought is a general accounting in which it may be ascertained with what plaintiff is chargeable, in cash or securities, as administrator, and what valid claims, if any, are held by any of the defendants against money or securities in plaintiff's hands which are apparently assets of the estate for which it is administrator. It seems to be quite plain that every question respecting the amount of the estate, the valid claims against it and the liability of plaintiff f