” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gould, Larson, Bennet, Wells & McDonnell, P.C. v. Panico, 273 Conn. 315, 321–22, 869 A.2d 653 (2005); see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 47–51, 730 A.2d 51 (1999) (grantinginterlocutory appeal from discovery order under General Statutes § 52–265a principally on issues implicating need to preserve attorney-client privilege); J. Sexton, “A Post- Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege,” 57 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 443, 445 (1982) (“[T]he attorney-client privilege is ‘the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications' know to the common law. Indeed, ‘[t]he history of this privilege goes back to the reign of Elizabeth I, where the privilege already appears as unquestioned.’

The Mississippi Supreme Court held that Moore waived her privilege as to those attorney-client communications when she "specifically pled reliance on [her attorney's] advice as an element of her defense to [the] motion for summary judgment." Id. at 773 (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. , 249 Conn. 36, 730 A.2d 51, 60 (1999) ). "When Moore used confidential communications with her attorney to toll the statute of limitations," the court explained, "she used the attorney-client privilege as a sword." Id.

"The liberal Hearn test has been criticized by many jurisdictions as potentially chilling the freedom to engage in confidential communications by a client with his or her attorney, causing an increase in litigation costs concerning discovery disputes, and tending to favor wealthier litigants. See Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.Del. 1992); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 730 A.2d 51, 60 (1999); Aranson, [ 140 N.H. at 370,] 671 A.2d at 1030. Instead, those jurisdictions apply a stricter test to determine if there has been a waiver of the privilege, holding that a party has waived the attorney-client privilege `only when the contents of the legal advice [are] integral to the outcome of the legal claims of the action.'

Next, petitioners cite to a Connecticut case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., to support the argument that attorney-client communications may contain only subjective evidence irrelevant to the objective determination of a settlement's reasonableness. 249 Conn. 36, 55, 730 A.2d 51 (1999). The Metropolitan court held that the reasonableness of the settlement should be examined under an objective standard and concluded, “[T]he exact communications between the plaintiff and its attorneys regarding the decision to settle, which would aid only in a subjective determination, are not at issue.” 249 Conn. at 56, 730 A.2d 51.

Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-146c(c)(2).           In discussing the analogous attorney-client privilege -which " protects both the confidential giving of professional advice by an attorney ... as well as the giving of information to the lawyer to enable counsel to give sound and informed advice," Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52, 730 A.2d 51 (1999)-the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that the " privilege implicitly is waived when the holder of the privilege has placed the privileged communications in issue." Hutchinson v. Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 33, 39, 867 A.2d 1 (2005) (describing " recogni[tion]" of Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 249 Conn. at 52-53, 730 A.2d 51) (emphasis added).

The request is not subject to the "at issue" exception to the attorney-client privilege. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. et al., 249 Conn. 36, 51-57, 53 fn 17, (1999). The request is not subject to the "common interest" exception to the attorney-client privilege.

The liberal Hearn test has been criticized by many jurisdictions as potentially chilling the freedom to engage in confidential communications by a client with his or her attorney, causing an increase in litigation costs concerning discovery disputes, and tending to favor wealthier litigants. See Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 142 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.Del. 1992); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 730 A.2d 51, 60 (Conn. 1999); Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1030. Instead, those jurisdictions apply a stricter test to determine if there has been a waiver of the privilege, holding that a party has waived the attorney-client privilege "only when the contents of the legal advice is integral to the outcome of the legal claims of the action."

In Cunha, 745 A.2d at 160, the Rhode Island Supreme Court adopted the test promulgated in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, 730 A.2d 51, 52-53 (Conn. 1999), as it relates to implicit waiver of attorney-client privilege. Our Supreme Court stated that implicit waiver exists when:

“Because of the important public policy considerations that necessitated the creation of the attorney-client privilege, the ‘at issue,' or implied waiver, exception [to the privilege] is invoked only when the contents of the legal advice is integral to the outcome of the legal claims of the action.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52-53 (1999). For example, “[s]uch is the case when a party specifically pleads reliance on an attorney's advice as an element of a claim or defense, voluntarily testifies regarding portions of the attorney-client communication, or specifically places at issue, in some other manner, the attorney-client relationship.”

Exceptions to the attorney-client privilege should be made only when the reason for disclosure outweighs the potential chilling of essential communications." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 249 Conn. 36, 52 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "The work product doctrine is distinct from and broader than the attorney-client privilege."