A court's primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Business Professional People for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 146 Ill.2d 175, 207, 585 N.E.2d 1032 (1991); Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 262 Ill. App.3d 266, 273-74, 634 N.E.2d 377 (1994). Courts should give statutory language its plain meaning and the fullest possible meaning to which it is susceptible, reading the statute as a whole, in order to effectuate legislative intent. Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity Benefit Fund of Chicago, 155 Ill.2d 103, 111, 610 N.E.2d 1250 (1993); Metro Utility, 262 Ill. App.3d at 274.

When a court interprets a statute, the primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 266, 273 (1994). The best indication of what the legislature intended is the statutory language itself.

A court's primary function in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Courts should give statutory language its plain meaning and the fullest possible meaning to which it is susceptible, reading the statute as a whole, in order to effectuate legislative intent. Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1994), 262 Ill. App.3d 266, 273-74, 634 N.E.2d 377, 382. Section 5-115 of the Procedure Act, although silent on whether JCAR can lift a filing prohibition, must be interpreted to allow such a decision.

Moreover, in context, the Commission's order makes clear that, as the testimony of Moul and Hauk showed, a ROE of 8.12% was far too low to allow IAWC to compete for capital investment. The Commission had also been presented data showing how very low a ROE of 8.12% would be when compared to other utilities' ROEs. See Continental Mobile Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n , 269 Ill. App. 3d 161, 171, 206 Ill.Dec. 511, 645 N.E.2d 516 (1994) (stating that the challenger must show that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident, not merely that the evidence could support a different conclusion); Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n , 262 Ill. App. 3d 266, 278, 199 Ill.Dec. 538, 634 N.E.2d 377 (1994) (stating that the presentation of contradictory evidence is not sufficient to reverse the Commission's order).

Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, review is de novo. Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 266, 273 (1994). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature.

The Commission is required to analyze the transaction and is not required to merely accept the accounting practices of the utility appearing before it. See United Cities Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 163 Ill.2d 1, 23-25, 205 Ill.Dec. 428, 643 N.E.2d 719, 730-31 (1994); Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 262 Ill.App.3d 266, 276-78, 199 Ill.Dec. 538, 634 N.E.2d 377, 383-85 (1994).         In a 59-page order, this one reference to what NECA found does not support Moultrie's contention that the Commission based its decision upon what NECA had already done.

Therefore, the primary objective of interpreting a regulation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters. Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 266, 274 (1994). The best indication of what the drafters intended is the statutory language itself.

"However, because of an agency's experience and expertise, courts will generally give substantial weight and deference to the interpretation of a statute by the agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute." Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 262 Ill. App. 3d 266, 273 (1994). In its order, the Commission determined that "the legislature has authorized the sale of ComEd's nuclear plants and the collection of decommissioning expense from ratepayers after the sale."

Because the construction of a statute is a question of law, the Board's construction of the Act is not binding and we may independently construe the Act. Metro Utility Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission, 262 Ill. App.3d 266, 273 (1994). The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature.

A court's primary function in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. Metro Utility Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission et al., 262 Ill. App.3d 266, 273-74, 634 N.E.2d 377 (1994). In construing a municipal ordinance, courts should give effect to the intention of the municipality as it is evidenced by the ordinance's terminology, its goals and purposes, the structure of the ordinance, the setting in which the words are used, and the common and accepted usage of the words.