Opinion
11-19-2014
In the Matter of METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, etc., appellant; v. LONGRIDGE ASSOCIATES, L.P., respondent.
Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, New York, N.Y. (John R. Casolaro, Matthew D. Dunn, and Michael H. Bauscher of counsel), for appellant. Goldstein, Rikon, Rikon & Houghton, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Michael Rikon of counsel), for respondent.
Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, New York, N.Y. (John R. Casolaro, Matthew D. Dunn, and Michael H. Bauscher of counsel), for appellant.
Goldstein, Rikon, Rikon & Houghton, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Michael Rikon of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, ROBERT J. MILLER, and COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.
Opinion In a condemnation proceeding, the condemnor, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Tolbert, J.), entered February 25, 2013, which, upon a decision of the same court (La Cava, J.) dated December 4, 2012, made after a nonjury trial, awarded the claimant damages in the principal sum of $3,675,000.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, this Court's “authority is as broad as that of the trial court,” and this Court “may render the judgment it finds warranted by the facts,” taking into account that in a close case the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses (Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 499, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 458 N.E.2d 809 ; see J. D'Addario & Co., Inc. v. Embassy Indus., Inc., 83 A.D.3d 1001, 1002, 921 N.Y.S.2d 550, affd. 20 N.Y.3d 113, 957 N.Y.S.2d 275, 980 N.E.2d 940 ; Matter of Stavisky v. Koo, 54 A.D.3d 432, 434, 863 N.Y.S.2d 87 ; Musick v. 330 Wythe Ave. Assoc., LLC, 41 A.D.3d 675, 675–676, 838 N.Y.S.2d 620 ).When private property is taken for public use, the condemning authority must “compensate the owner ‘so that [the owner] may be put in the same relative position, insofar as this is possible, as if the taking had not occurred’ ” (Matter of City of New York [Kaiser Woodcraft Corp.], 11 N.Y.3d 353, 359, 870 N.Y.S.2d 827, 899 N.E.2d 933, quoting City of Buffalo v. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 258, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 269 N.E.2d 895 ; see U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 7 ; 520 E. 81st St. Assoc. v. State of New York, 99 N.Y.2d 43, 47, 750 N.Y.S.2d 833, 780 N.E.2d 518 ; Rose v. State of New York, 24 N.Y.2d 80, 87, 298 N.Y.S.2d 968, 246 N.E.2d 735 ; Matter of Metropolitan Transp. Auth. [Washed Aggregate Resources, Inc.], 102 A.D.3d 787, 789, 958 N.Y.S.2d 405 ). “The measure of damages must reflect the fair market value of the property in its highest and best use on the date of the taking, regardless of whether the property is being put to such use at the time” (Matter of Board of Commr. of Great Neck Park Dist. of Town of N. Hempstead v. Kings Point Hgts., LLC, 74 A.D.3d 804, 805, 903 N.Y.S.2d 451 ; see Matter of Rochester Urban Renewal Agency [Patchen Post], 45 N.Y.2d 1, 8, 407 N.Y.S.2d 641, 379 N.E.2d 169 ; Matter of Village of Haverstraw [AAA Electricians, Inc.], 114 A.D.3d 955, 956, 981 N.Y.S.2d 436 ; Matter of Metropolitan Transp. Auth. [Washed Aggregate Resources, Inc.], 102 A.D.3d at 789–790, 958 N.Y.S.2d 405 ). A property's market value is defined as “ ‘the amount which one desiring but not compelled to purchase will pay under ordinary conditions to a seller who desires but is not compelled to sell’ ” (936 Second Ave. L.P. v. Second Corporate Dev. Co., Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 628, 632, 861 N.Y.S.2d 256, 891 N.E.2d 289, quoting Plaza Hotel Assoc. v. Wellington Assoc., 37 N.Y.2d 273, 277, 372 N.Y.S.2d 35, 333 N.E.2d 346 ; see W.T. Grant Co. v. Srogi, 52 N.Y.2d 496, 510, 438 N.Y.S.2d 761, 420 N.E.2d 953 ; Matter of Rochester Urban Renewal Agency [Patchen Post], 45 N.Y.2d at 8, 407 N.Y.S.2d 641, 379 N.E.2d 169 ; Matter of Western Ramapo Sewer Extension Project, 120 A.D.3d 703, 704, 990 N.Y.S.2d 895 ; Matter of Metropolitan Transp. Auth. [Washed Aggregate Resources, Inc.], 102 A.D.3d at 790, 958 N.Y.S.2d 405 ). Moreover, “[i]t is necessary to show that there is a reasonable possibility that the property's highest and best asserted use could or would have been made within the reasonably near future, and a use which is no more than a speculative or hypothetical arrangement may not be accepted as the basis for an award” (Matter of Village of Dobbs Ferry v. Stanley Ave. Props., Inc., 95 A.D.3d 1027, 1029, 944 N.Y.S.2d 241 ; see Matter of Village of Haverstraw [AAA Electricians, Inc.], 114 A.D.3d at 956, 981 N.Y.S.2d 436 ; Matter of Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 86 A.D.3d 314, 320, 927 N.Y.S.2d 67 ).
The Supreme Court properly rejected the appraisal submitted by the condemnor, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (hereinafter MTA), since the evidence demonstrated that the highest and best use of the property was as a retail development, as the claimant's expert concluded, and not as vacant land, as the MTA's expert opined (see Matter of City of New York [Broadway Cary Corp.], 34 N.Y.2d 535, 354 N.Y.S.2d 100, 309 N.E.2d 870 ; Matter of Village
of Haverstraw [AAA Electricians, Inc.], 114 A.D.3d at 956–957, 981 N.Y.S.2d 436 ; Chester Indus. Park Assoc., L.P. v. State of New York, 103 A.D.3d 827, 962 N.Y.S.2d 236 ; Gyrodyne Co. of Am., Inc. v. State of New York, 89 A.D.3d 988, 989, 933 N.Y.S.2d 375 ).
Having rejected the appraisal set forth by the MTA, the Supreme Court was bound either to accept the claimant's appraisal or explain the basis for any departure (see Matter of City of New York [Reiss], 55 N.Y.2d 885, 886, 449 N.Y.S.2d 18, 433 N.E.2d 1266 ; Matter of Village of Haverstraw [AAA Electricians, Inc.], 114 A.D.3d at 957, 981 N.Y.S.2d 436 ; Gyrodyne Co. of Am., Inc. v. State of New York, 89 A.D.3d at 990, 933 N.Y.S.2d 375 ). The Supreme Court properly accepted the claimant's appraisal. The claimant's appraiser sufficiently and credibly explained the basis for his selection of comparable properties and relevant adjustments made to the valuation of these properties. Although the court made certain changes to the final results presented in the claimant's appraisal, it adequately explained its reasons for making those changes (see Chester Indus. Park Assoc., L.P. v. State of New York, 103 A.D.3d at 828, 962 N.Y.S.2d 236 ). The court's determination was therefore within the range of expert testimony and adequately supported by the record (see Matter of Village of Haverstraw [AAA Electricians, Inc.], 114 A.D.3d at 957, 981 N.Y.S.2d 436 ; Chester Indus. Park Assoc., L.P. v. State of New York, 103 A.D.3d at 828, 962 N.Y.S.2d 236 ; Matter of Board of Commr. of Great Neck Park Dist. of Town of N. Hempstead v. Kings Point Hgts., LLC, 74 A.D.3d at 805–806, 903 N.Y.S.2d 451 ). Accordingly, the court's determination is entitled to deference and we find no basis to disturb it (see Matter of Village of Haverstraw [AAA Electricians, Inc.], 114 A.D.3d at 957, 981 N.Y.S.2d 436 ; Matter of Metropolitan Transp. Auth. [Washed Aggregate Resources, Inc.], 102 A.D.3d at 791, 958 N.Y.S.2d 405 ; Matter of Board of Commr. of Great Neck Park Dist. of Town of N. Hempstead v. Kings Point Hgts., LLC, 74 A.D.3d at 806, 903 N.Y.S.2d 451 ).
The MTA's remaining contentions are without merit.