Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-000966-WC
05-08-2015
METHODIST HOSPITAL APPELLANT v. MELINDA KEOWN; HONORABLE CHRIS DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD APPELLEES
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: C. Donald Thompson, Jr. Henderson, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE MELINDA KEOWN: Daniel Caslin Owensboro, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-12-85818
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: MAZE, THOMPSON, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. VANMETER, JUDGE: Methodist Hospital petitions this court for review of a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board ("Board") vacating the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision to dismiss Melinda Keown's claim for failure to prove a work-related injury. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Keown worked as a paramedic for Methodist Hospital from October 1994 through April 2012. On December 9, 2011 she sustained an injury to her right shoulder while moving an obese patient from one bed to another. Three weeks later, she saw a doctor, and in April 2012, her doctor took her off work. The parties participated in a Benefit Review Conference ("BRC") on October 31, 2013. At the BRC the parties stipulated that Keown sustained a work injury on December 9, 2011, and that she gave timely notice of that injury. However, Methodist Hospital reserved "injury" as defined by the Worker's Compensation Act and "work-relatedness/causation" as contested issues.
On December 23, 2013, the ALJ issued an opinion and order summarily dismissing Keown's claim for failure to prove a work-related injury, temporary or permanent. Keown filed a petition for reconsideration, which the ALJ denied. Keown appealed to the Board, which vacated the ALJ's order and remanded the case to the ALJ for entry of an amended opinion, award and order. The Board found that because the parties stipulated to the fact that Keown sustained a work-related injury, the ALJ's decision finding no work-related injury was not supported by substantial evidence and a new order determining whether Keown sustained a permanent or temporary injury and her entitlement to medical benefits was necessary. Methodist Hospital now petitions for review of the Board's decision.
Methodist Hospital maintains that it specifically reserved the issue of whether the injury was work related and argued throughout the proceedings that the injury was not work related. Accordingly, Methodist Hospital claims that the Board improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the ALJ and thus, the Board's opinion should be reversed.
The well-established standard of review for the appellate courts of a workers' compensation decision "is to correct the [Workers' Compensation] Board only where the Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice." E.g., W. Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992); Butler's Fleet Serv. v. Martin, 173 S.W.3d 628, 631 (Ky. App. 2005); Wal-Mart v. Southers, 152 S.W.3d 242, 245 (Ky. App. 2004). See also Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986) (if the fact-finder finds in favor of the person having the burden of proof, the burden on appeal is only to show that some substantial evidence supported the decision); cf. Gray v. Trimmaster, 173 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Ky. 2005) (if the ALJ finds against the party having the burden of proof, the appellant must "show that the ALJ misapplied the law or that the evidence in her favor was so overwhelming that it compelled a favorable finding[]").
An ALJ must provide the parties with findings of fact sufficient to inform them of the basis for his decision and permit meaningful review. Kentland Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. Yates, 743 S.W.2d 47, 49 (Ky. App. 1988). "Only when an opinion summarizes the conflicting evidence accurately and states the evidentiary basis for the ALJ's finding does it enable the Board and reviewing courts to determine in the summary manner contemplated by KRS [Kentucky Revised Statutes] 342.285(2) whether the finding is supported by substantial evidence and reasonable." Arnold v. Toyota Motor Mfg., 375 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Ky. 2012)(footnotes omitted).
We agree with the Board's conclusion that Methodist Hospital stipulated that Keown suffered a work-related injury, and therefore the ALJ's order dismissing Keown's claim for failure to prove a work-related injury was in error. With such a stipulation in place, the ALJ's determination that the evidence did not support a finding of a work-related injury was not supported by the evidence. See Osborne v. Pepsi-Cola, 816 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Ky. 1991) (if no party moved to set aside a stipulation of work-related injury, the parties and ALJ were bound by it), superseded by statute.
Methodist Hospital cites Byrd v. Ford Motor Co., 2005-CA-2281-WC (Ky. App. July 28, 2006), in which the employer stipulated that the employee sustained a work-related injury on the date in question and failed to list causation/work-relatedness as a contested issue, yet the court still found that employer did not waive all arguments concerning causation. In Byrd, this court distinguished causation of injury and causation of impairment, holding that the employer did not waive any argument regarding the causation of the employee's impairment by stipulating to a work-related injury. In this case, the ALJ made no findings regarding Keown's impairment; he simply found that Keown suffered no work-related injury. While many of the doctors who evaluated Keown noted her chronic disease, and her preexisting issues with her shoulder, none directly refuted the fact that Keown sustained a work injury. Keown may or may not have impairment resulting from the work injury, but that does not render her work injury nonexistent. Therefore, the Board properly decided that the ALJ erred by finding no work-related injury. On remand, the ALJ must determine whether Keown suffers any impairment caused by the work-related injury. If the ALJ finds that she suffered impairment as a result of the work-related injury, only then must he determine what type of impairment she suffered and to what benefits she is entitled, if any.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Workers' Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: C. Donald Thompson, Jr.
Henderson, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
MELINDA KEOWN:
Daniel Caslin
Owensboro, Kentucky