Opinion
2016–09752 Index No. 563/16
06-13-2018
In the Matter of Jackson METELLUS, appellant, v. Anthony J. ANNUCCI, etc., et al., respondents.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Robert C. Newman of counsel), for appellant. Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Anisha S. Dasgupta and Ester Murdukhayeva of counsel), for respondents.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Robert C. Newman of counsel), for appellant.
Barbara D. Underwood, Attorney General, New York, N.Y. (Anisha S. Dasgupta and Ester Murdukhayeva of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SANDRA L. SGROI, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, inter alia, to review a determination relating to a proceeding to revoke the petitioner's release to postrelease supervision, the petitioner appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Joan S. Posner, J.), dated August 3, 2016. The judgment denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The petitioner was convicted of robbery in the first degree, robbery in the second degree, and promoting prostitution in the second degree, and a sentence of imprisonment and a period of postrelease supervision (hereinafter PRS) were imposed. Upon the petitioner's designation for release to PRS, he was placed at a residential treatment facility in Fishkill (hereinafter Fishkill RTF) as a condition of PRS. Less than three months later, the petitioner was charged with violating a condition of PRS while at Fishkill RTF. After a preliminary hearing, it was determined that probable cause existed to support the alleged violation. Eventually, after a final revocation hearing, the petitioner's release was revoked and a time assessment imposed.
The petitioner commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, asserting that the respondents lacked jurisdiction to revoke his release because, never having actually been released from imprisonment, he was not properly subject to the conditions of PRS at the time of the alleged violation. The petitioner alleged that he was not released from prison, since Fishkill RTF failed to comply with the statutory requirements for residential treatment facilities. The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding. The petitioner appeals.
Contrary to the respondents' contention, the final determination revoking the petitioner's release due to the subject violation did not render academic the petitioner's assertion that the respondents lacked jurisdiction to charge him with that violation in the first instance (cf. People ex rel. McDaniel v. Berbary, 35 A.D.3d 1172, 828 N.Y.S.2d 741 ; People ex rel. Calvin J. v. Bednosky, 245 A.D.2d 324, 667 N.Y.S.2d 262 ; see generally Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 N.Y.2d 707, 714, 431 N.Y.S.2d 400, 409 N.E.2d 876 ).
Nevertheless, the petitioner's contention that he could not be charged with a violation of PRS is without merit. On November 25, 2015, the petitioner was granted conditional release by the Board of Parole and signed a certificate of release to parole supervision. As a condition of his release, the petitioner was transferred from Gouverneur Correctional Facility to Fishkill RTF. Pursuant to Penal Law § 70.45(3), "the board of parole may impose as a condition of post-release supervision that for a period not exceeding six months immediately following release from the underlying term of imprisonment the person be transferred to and participate in the programs of a residential treatment facility." Under these circumstances, regardless of whether Fishkill RTF failed to comply with the statutory requirements for residential treatment facilities as the petitioner contends (see Correction Law § 73 ; see also Correction Law § 2[6] ), he was properly subject to the conditions of PRS and could properly be charged with a violation of those conditions (see generally Executive Law § 259–i[2][b] ; [3] ). The petitioner has not argued, in this proceeding, that the conduct with which he was charged did not constitute a violation of a condition of PRS. Moreover, since the petitioner was properly subject to the conditions of PRS whether or not the Fishkill RTF met the statutory standards for residential treatment facilities, the question of such statutory compliance need not be resolved in this CPLR article 78 proceeding pertaining to revocation of the petitioner's release to PRS.
The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.
Accordingly, the petition was properly denied on the merits, and the proceeding was properly dismissed.
MASTRO, J.P., LEVENTHAL, SGROI and MALTESE, JJ., concur.